Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Open Access Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

5-2018

Driving Foreign Relations: The European Sports Car and the
Globalization of America
Keenan J. Shimko
Purdue University

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations

Recommended Citation
Shimko, Keenan J., "Driving Foreign Relations: The European Sports Car and the Globalization of America"
(2018). Open Access Dissertations. 1829.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations/1829

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries.
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.

DRIVING FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE EUROPEAN SPORTS CAR AND
THE GLOBALIZATION OF AMERICA
by
Keenan J. Shimko

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of Purdue University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History
West Lafayette, Indiana
May 2018

ii

THE PURDUE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL
STATEMENT OF COMMITTEE APPROVAL

Dr. David Atkinson, Chair
Department of History
Dr. John Larson
Department of History
Dr. William Gray
Department of History
Dr. Rayvon Fouché
Department of American Studies

Approved by:
Dr. John Larson
Head of the Graduate Program

iii

To my parents, Richard and Yvonne, whose unwavering support made this endeavor possible.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As I sit here looking at my completed dissertation and type this it is hard to believe that
seven years have gone by since I came to Indiana to attend my first semester of graduate school.
It seems like only yesterday that I threw nearly everything I owned into the back of my father’s
Ranger pickup truck and headed east, brimming with the unrelenting optimism of youth to start
the next phase of my academic career. However, much like then I must acknowledge that this was
not a solitary effort, and I owe a substantial amount to my colleagues, family, and friends who
have helped me along the way.
I would first like to thank my dissertation advisor and mentor, David Atkinson, for
introducing me to the very field in which I would ultimately contribute, as well as his help and
perseverance while reading and commenting on many a chapter draft. It was a great coincidence
that David and I both came to Purdue in the Fall of 2011, and I am grateful that he did, otherwise
I never would have been exposed to the new trends in diplomatic history which inspired this project.
But even more important was David’s excellent criticism tempered by a genuine interest and
enthusiasm for my project which kept me motivated throughout its most difficult phases.
I would also like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, beginning with
William Gray, who had served as my initial advisor as a master’s student and was encouraging
and enthusiastic about the new directions my work was taking. Many discussions with William
deeply influenced the direction of my dissertation and helped me to articulate my project’s broader
economic significance. John Larson first let me into the program, and also lent his considerable
expertise in business history in the preliminary phase. Lastly, special thanks to Rayvon Fouché for

v

joining my committee at the last minute and offering a fresh perspective from beyond the discipline
of history.
Pursuing a doctorate, and particularly traveling to complete the research required for a
dissertation project is not cheap. Therefore, I must thank the Department of History for funding
my studies continuously through TA assignments and several Summer Research Grants.
Additionally, thanks are due to the College of Liberal Arts for providing the PROMISE grants that
funded travel to international conferences and also allowed me to complete research for my
dissertation in England. Lastly, I am grateful to have been awarded a Samuel Flagg Bemis
Dissertation Research Grant from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations which
provided a significant portion of the funding necessary for a prolonged research trip to the
corporate archives of Porsche, Mercedes, and BMW in Stuttgart and Munich. It goes without
saying that without such support completing the project would not have been possible.
This project was based largely on documents from business archives which are under no
obligation to allow scholars access, let alone aid them in their search. For that reason, I am gratified
to have enjoyed considerable assistance from American archivists Linda Skolarus from The
Benson Ford Research Center, Christo Datini from the General Motors Heritage Center and Media
Archive, and Skip Marketti from the Nethercutt Museum. In Germany the work of the archivists
was compounded by my less-that-fluent German language skill and I am deeply indebted to Herr
Jens Torner and Frau Sara Pelters from the Porsche Historisches Arkiv, Herr Wolfgang Rabus
from the Daimler-Benz Group Arkiv, and Frau Julia Oberndörfer from the BMW Group Archiv
who helped me sharpen my focus and get the documents I needed. I am also grateful for the help
of Herr Eberhard Merk from the Baden-Würtemburg Landes Arkiv and the staff of the National

vi

Archives of the UK in navigating the inscrutable finding aids and access policies of government
archives.
The process of completing a Ph. D is one of increasing isolation and for that reason I owe
an incredible debt of gratitude to my friends whose continued support (in the form of drinking,
adventuring, and venting) made these past years bearable. In no particular order thanks to: Brian
and Sam Alberts, Max Rieger, Andrew McGregor, Rachel Steely, A.W. Bell, Ed Gray, Michelle
Martindale, Matthew Schownir, Renee Gaarder, Cesare Guariniello, Olivia Hagedorn, Haley
Bowman, and Alex Dessens. However, a special shout-out to close friends from middle school
Will George, Lee Taber, and Shawn Merrill. It can take quite a bit of effort to keep old friendships
going as more and more time goes by, especially when they cross time-zones, so I am incredibly
grateful to these guys for making the time to log-on early, stay up late, and even traveling to Indiana
to hang out. Without you guys I certainly would not have been able to retain my sanity.
None of this would have been possible without the continual support of my family. In fact,
my family grew during my time at Purdue to include wonderful in-laws Frederick and Mary Jo
Brown, and without their continual and generous support and understanding of odd and hectic
academic schedules this process would have been unbearable. I would also like to thank my
brother-in-law Dave and his wife Lauren Brown for welcoming us (and our dog) into their home
for an extended stay to conduct research in Washington D.C. I am especially grateful to my mother
and father for indulging a whining teenage version of myself and helping me to acquire and restore
my first car, a 1972 Mustang. I learned a lot about cars and myself in the countless hours I spent
tinkering on it, and I don’t think that anyone could have predicted that fostering a teenager’s
automotive enthusiasm would eventually inspire a doctoral dissertation, but it did. Thank you for
believing in me, especially when I didn’t believe in myself, and pushing me to succeed. To my

vii

brother: I have missed some of the most formative years of your life, and it is one of my deepest
regrets. Thank you for your support and understanding.
Saving the best for last, I must thank my incredible wife Alison. I did not imagine that I’d
be hosting my future wife when I offered up a spare bed for a visiting prospective student way
back in 2013. In fact, I can say with a great degree of certainty that had I not met you I would have
returned to California for good that summer and never even had taken on this project. Beyond that
though you have brought light and joy into my life and supported me throughout the incredibly
difficult process of producing this dissertation. These simple words will never be enough to
adequately express my overwhelming gratitude.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... x
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
A EUROPEAN PHENOMENA: DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPORTS CAR
AND ENTHUSIAST CULTURE ................................................................................................. 17
1.1 Motor-Racing and the Development of the European Sports Car .................................... 22
1.2 Taxation and European Engine Design............................................................................. 29
1.3 The Development of Enthusiast Culture ........................................................................... 34
1.4 The Effects of European Contingency .............................................................................. 37
1.5 The Divergent Path of Interwar American Automotive Development ............................. 43
1.6 Cold War Military Service as a Conduit for the European Sports Car ............................. 47
A BRITISH INVASION ..................................................................................... 56
2.1 ‘Export or Die’: The Push for Automakers to Export....................................................... 61
2.2 Changing Tax Policy: A Push to Aid Automotive Sales .................................................. 72
2.3 The Effect of the British Sports Car on American Enthusiast Culture ............................. 81
2.4 ‘The European Tour’: Using the idea of ‘Europe’ to Sell the Sports Car......................... 91
‘DER PORSCHE VAS PUSHIN’: A CASE STUDY ...................................... 100
3.1 Identifying the Market and Means to Entry .................................................................... 105
3.2 Hoffman, Porsche, and Adaptation for the American Consumer ................................... 110
3.3 Marketing European Performance to American Consumers .......................................... 123
3.4 Porsche Club of America ................................................................................................ 128
AMERICAN ADAPTATION AND APPROPRIATION OF THE EUROPEAN
SPORTS CAR ........................................................................................................................... 144
4.1 An American Copy: The Chevrolet Corvette ................................................................. 147
4.2 An American Appropriation: The Ford Thunderbird ..................................................... 163
4.3 Opel: If You Can’t Beat them, Import Them .................................................................. 170
4.4 The Enthusiast Reaction to the Corvette ......................................................................... 178
‘GOES LIKE SCHNELL’: REGULATIONS, NIXON SHOCK, AND BMW 185
5.1 ‘Burdensome’ Safety and Emissions Regulations .......................................................... 189

ix
5.2 ‘Neue Klasse’: The BMW Sports Sedan ........................................................................ 202
5.3 Time to Go Racing: BMW’s Brand Image ..................................................................... 219
EPILOGUE ................................................................................................................................. 226
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 238

x

ABSTRACT

Author: Shimko, Keenan J. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: Driving Foreign Relations: The European Sports Car and the Globalization of America
Major Professor: Dr. David Atkinson
Historians are just beginning to examine the ways in which Americans were affected at home
by contact with the peoples and cultures of Europe through consumption. As Kristin Hoganson
notes in Consumer’s Imperium, when it comes to Americanization and the globalization of culture
“we know more about the outgoing tide than the incoming swells.”1 My dissertation takes the
notion of Americanization and inverts it to examine the influence of a European product, the sports
car, on American consumers and automobile manufacturers in the postwar period. By using
European sports cars as a case study to explore the influence of European culture, modes of
production, and manufacturers within postwar America I challenge the myth of postwar American
cultural and economic impermeability. Secondly, I argue that the process described as
Americanization was one part of a larger process of cultural and economic globalization, and that
the globalization of America began immediately following the end of World War II. The tendency
to ascribe globalization a national character is a relic of the privileged position that America held
when technology and geopolitical reality all made America finally, inescapably, global. Therefore,
my work provides a new context for understanding the ultimate collapse of the Bretton-Woods
agreements in 1971 and America’s increasingly globalized economy by demonstrating that
globalization was a process that began immediately after the end of the war rather than a “shock”
that came in the 1970s.

1

Hoganson, Consumer’s Imperium, 5.

1

INTRODUCTION

Americans assumed a position of global economic and cultural primacy following the end
of the Second World War. Consequently, historians examining the postwar and Cold War periods
have tended to portray Americans and their consumption-driven popular culture as a monolithic,
quasi-imperial construct, engulfing or consuming the local cultures and practices of Western
Europe. This notion is encapsulated by the term “Americanization,” which has become shorthand
for the expansion of American products as well as cultural and economic power. 2 The term
Americanization has come to represent an entire field of historical scholarship precisely due to the
slippery nature of its definition. Akin to the term “empire,” Americanization can be defined in
such a way as to represent dramatically different understandings of the spread of American
political, cultural and economic power and practices from the late nineteenth century to the present.

2

See C.W.E. Bigsby, ed., Superculture: American Popular Culture and Europe (Bowling Green: Bowling Green State
University Popular Press, 1975), Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural
Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1982), Frank Costigliola, An Awkward Dominion: American
Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), Kristin
Thompson, Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film Market 1907-34 (London: British Film Institute,
1986), Ralph Willet, The Americanization of Germany, 1945-1949 (New York: Routledge, 1989), Irwin M. Wall, The
United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Peter
Duignan & L.H. Gann, The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945-1958 (New
York: Blackwell, 1992), Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley:
University of California Press 1993), Rob Kroes, R.W. Rydell, & D.F.J. Bosscher eds., Cultural Transmissions and
Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1993), Reinhold Wagnleitner,
Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World
War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1994), Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business
and the Modernization of Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), Rob Kroes, If You’ve Seen One, You’ve
Seen the Mall: Europeans and Mass Culture (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996), Richard Pells, Not Like Us:
How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II (New York: Basic Books
1997), Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. & Thomas W. Zeiler eds., Globalization and the American Century (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), R. Laurence Moore & Maurizio Vaudagna eds., The American Century in Europe
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), Agnes C. Mueller, German Pop Culture: How American Is It? (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2004); Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th Century
Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), Robert W. Rydell & Rob Kroes, Buffalo Bill in Bologna: The
Americanization of the World, 1869-1922 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), Alexander Stephan ed., The
Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanization after 1945 (New York: Berghahn Books
2006), Greg Grandin, Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s Forgotten Jungle City (New York: Picador,
2010).
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It is also tangled in debates about whether this is process is Americanization at all, or whether it is
cultural imperialism, cultural transfer, or a facet of a broader process of economic and cultural
globalization. Yet if we accept this notion of Americanization then we must also consider the
inverse: How did the consumption of European products and culture influence Americans during
this period?
Historians are just beginning to examine the ways in which Americans were affected at
home by contact with the peoples and cultures of Europe through consumption. 3 As Kristin
Hoganson notes in Consumer’s Imperium, when it comes to Americanization and the globalization
of culture “we know more about the outgoing tide than the incoming swells.”4 By taking the notion
of Americanization and examining these incoming European swells, my dissertation makes two
key contributions to the historiography. First, by using European sports cars as a case study to
explore the influence of European culture, modes of production, and manufacturers within postwar
America I challenge the myth of postwar American cultural and economic impermeability.
Secondly, I argue that the process described as Americanization was one part of a larger process
of cultural and economic globalization, and that the globalization of America began immediately
following the end of World War II, through the consumption of a European product—the sports
car—by American consumers who were never as isolated from European influences as has been
portrayed. The tendency to ascribe globalization a national character is a relic of the privileged
position that America held when technology and geopolitical reality all made America finally,

3

For examples of the shift toward explorations of the way in which the United States has been affected by Europe see
Kristin L. Hoganson, “Stuff It: Domestic Consumption and the Americanization of the World Paradigm” in
Diplomatic History Vol. 30 No. 4 (Malden: Blackwell, 2006); Kristin L. Hoganson, Consumer’s Imperium: The
Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007),
Brooke L. Blower, Becoming Americans In Paris: Transatlantic Politics and Culture Between the World Wars
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), and Andrew C. McKevitt, “You are not Alone!”: Anime and the Globalizing
of America, Diplomatic History, Vol. 34, No. 5 (Malden: Wiley Periodicals, 2010), 893-921.
4
Hoganson, Consumer’s Imperium, 5.
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inescapably, global. Therefore, my work provides a new context for understanding the ultimate
collapse of the Bretton-Woods agreements in 1971 and America’s increasingly globalized
economy by demonstrating that globalization was a process that began immediately after the end
of the war rather than a “shock” that came in the 1970s, as a recent volume suggests.5
By extension, this project also argues that the automobile should be analyzed in a critical
and transnational context. As a means of conveyance, it has fundamentally shaped the ways in
which people and populations move between or across spaces; as a commodity it has shaped trade
agreements and played a key role in determining the perceived balance of economic power among
nations. More specifically, I argue that the car as a cultural object, and especially the sports car,
has shaped the way individuals interact with the environment, with others, and even the way that
they perceive themselves and their communities. As early automotive advertising clearly
demonstrates, the sports car was deeply attached to notions of masculine power, sexuality, and
freedom. Furthermore, the numerous automobile clubs, periodicals, and (albeit later) internet
forums that sprung into existence—combined with the fact that automobile enthusiasts have driven,
and continue to drive, across continents, and even ship their vehicles across oceans, in order to
participate in club and social meets—clearly show that there is a cultural significance to the
automobile that rivals that of any other international commodity.
Finally, this dissertation is centered on a specific category of vehicle: the sports car. This
project will use the British automotive journalist and amateur historian Cyril Posthumus’s

5

Niall Ferguson ed. The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010),
and David Kuchenbuch, “Eine Welt“: Globales Interdependenzbewusstsein und die Moralisierung des Alltags in den
1970er und 1980er Jahren” Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 38. Jahrg., H. 1, (Januar –März 2012), pp. 158-184 which
charts the emergence of the conception of “global” among consumers. For more on the Bretton-Woods agreements
see Benn Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New
World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013) and Harold James “The Multiple Contexts of Bretton
Woods” in The Oxford Review of Economic Policy Vol. 28 No. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 411430.

4
definition: “a sports car is one in which performance takes precedence over carrying capacity.”6
However, on a more nuanced level this project defines the sports car as a product with a particularly
European origin. The sports car was born of the European industrial ethos, which favored small
batches, individual craftsmanship, and was influenced by the geography, urbanization patterns,
and tax structures of Europe.7 This European vision of a performance vehicle intended for road
use was not suited (or at least not optimized) for the highways that connected American towns,
especially in the Midwest, Southwest, and Great Plains regions. Nor was it easily adaptable to the
prewar American industrial ethos, which favored large batch production of a single multipurpose
vehicle, as exemplified by the Ford Model T. However, as European sports cars begin to trickle
into the domestic market following the end of the Second World War, American manufacturers
first reflected then refracted the European vision of the sports car to suit the expectations of
American buyers. 8 My dissertation examines how American producers tried to reproduce the
European sports car by both borrowing European production styles as well as modifying the sports
car into something that could be mass produced, all while attempting to retain a kernel of
“Europeaness” that would appeal to the target consumer: automobile enthusiasts. Indeed, both
domestic and foreign automakers struggled to maintain the balance that would attract the enthusiast
consumer while also appealing to a broader American consumer base.

6

G.N. Georgano, The History of the Sports Car (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. 1970), 11.
Ibid, 14-15. See also Nick Georgano ed., Britain’s Motor Industry: The First Hundred Years (Somerset: G.T. Foulis
& Company, 1995), For more on the small batch, European style of production and its competition with and later
assimilation of Fordist modes of production see Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the
Modernization of Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
8
For example, the initial model year of the Corvette was clearly an aim at matching the European sports car ideal; the
1953 Corvette was a small two-seat roadster powered by a small (by American standards) inline six-cylinder engine.
However, by 1958 the Corvette came with a V8 engine as standard, as well as grew dimensionally for greater comfort.
See Karl Ludvigsen. Corvette: America’s Star-Spangled Sports Car, The Complete History. 2nd ed. (Princeton:
Princeton Publishing Inc., 1978).
7
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This dissertation contributes to four related but distinct historiographies. First, non-state
actors played a key role in the initial turn of the field towards transnational methodologies and
tools and as such provides a key historiographical foundation upon which my project builds. The
second historiography is defined by some historians’ focus on the unidirectional movement of
economics, products, and culture from America to Europe, encapsulated by the term
Americanization. The notion of unidirectional movement has engendered pushback among some
scholars, creating a subset of this literature which argues that Americanization is a myth, and that
Europeans exercised enormous agency over which elements of American culture were integrated.
The third historiography is the conflation of Americanization with imperialism. Lastly, my project
engages a central paradox that divides the field: the seeming incompatibility of Americanization
and globalization. An exploration of the historiographic roots of these key themes serves to ground
my project within the field, but also demonstrates the value of this dissertation.
Historians of American foreign relations have increasingly placed non-state actors at the
center of their inquiries. This has allowed historians to move beyond the state and examine
transnational influences on American foreign relations at a grassroots level. For example, Emily
Rosenberg’s work has demonstrated the influence of non-state actors by focusing on businessmen
who spread American culture with government support while pursuing their own economic goals.9
Frank Costigliola also analyzed American efforts to transmit American culture to Europe during
the interwar years and this early work was later complemented by historians such as Victoria de
Grazia and Kristin Hoganson, who shifted the focus from one type of non-state actor—the

9

Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 38.

6
producer—to the consumer.10 My project bridges the gap between divergent bodies of literature
by examining both the producer, in this case the automobile manufacturer, and the consumer, in
this case the enthusiast. This allows me to tell a broader story. For instance, the automakers of
Europe may have envisioned themselves as selling a particular aspect of the European culture, but
how was this interpreted by the consumer? Did it factor into their decision to consume the product?
When American automakers began to market their own sports cars, what did they attempt to sell
as “European” and was that related to what the European producers thought they were selling?
Indeed, it is questions like these that often go unanswered in other works that examine the spread
of American culture abroad. De Grazia raises these kinds of questions in Irresistible Empire, in
which she examines numerous aspects of American culture spreading to Europe such as the chain
store, supermarket, and Hollywood-star worship.11 But exactly what these developments meant to
the consumers, and what the act of consumption meant to them is lost. This is precisely what my
project seeks to inject into the literature.
The second key historiographic theme concerns the ostensibly unidirectional movement of
culture– from America to Europe: a notion predicated on the balance of power that gave rise to the
interpretive framework of Americanization in the first place. Dissenting scholars tried to
demonstrate that not only was American culture not forced upon Europeans, but also that
Europeans exhibited enormous agency in deciding which elements of American culture they would

10

Frank Costigliola, An Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe,
1919-1933 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), Kristin L. Hoganson, Consumer’s Imperium: The Global
Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007) and Victoria
de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th Century Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2005).
11
Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 376-415.
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adopt and to what extent they would integrate them. 12 My project adds to this literature by
demonstrating the movement of culture in the opposite direction—from Europe to America—and
in so doing it complicates the traditional narrative of Americanization. Using the sports car, I build
upon Richard Pells’ notion of adaption and appropriation, to demonstrate that Americans were
also engaged in these processes.13 This project examines the range of responses to the European
sports car among American automakers, who sought to sell an analogue that would appeal to a
broader American audience while still remaining faithful to that kernel of European culture that
drew the initial enthusiast consumers.
Some scholars of Americanization see a more sinister aspect to the global spread of
American culture, and this defines the third key historiography with which my project engages:
the notion of Americanization as imperialism. Characterizing America’s relationship to the world
as a form of imperial domination has been a popular way of understanding how an increasingly
powerful United States, both in terms of economics and geopolitics, has interacted with other

12

For further examples of arguments against Americanization see Irwin M. Wall, The United States and the Making
of Postwar France, 1945-1954. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the
French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley: University of California Press 1993), Robert J. Golsan &
Alexander Stephan, eds. “From French Anti-Americanism and Americanization to the ‘American Enemy’” in The
Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanization after 1945 (New York: Berghahn Books
2006), and Michael Wildt, Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, & Matthias Judt, eds. “Changes in Consumption as
Social Practice in West Germany During the 1950s” in Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer
Societies in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge U.K.: University of Cambridge Press 1998).
13
Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World
War II (New York: Basic Books 1997), xv.
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nations.14 However, despite using the term empire, nearly all these historians point out the ways
in which American domination looks unlike any other imperial formation.15 Victoria de Grazia
argues that America offered a model of “informal empire” or “market empire”.16 Arguably the
most imperial aspect of de Grazia’s market empire is the limitation on national sovereignty over
public space that it enforces. 17 I demonstrate that this works in both directions: the limited
sovereignty imposed by a free market ethos also affects American public space and the domestic
market. But where de Grazia sees this process as Americans attempting to overspread Europe and
gain control, my project sees it as a function of the capitalist ethos, separate from the state, and an
artifact of globalization.

14

While there are more-or-less uncontested interpretations of earlier U.S. policy as explicitly imperial, such as the
opening of Japan in 1844 by Admiral Matthew Perry, the acquisition, subsequent colonization and administration of
the Philippine Islands following the American victory in the Spanish American War (1898), and the invasion and
occupation of Haiti, it is important to note that these are not the cases referred to as imperial by the term
“Americanization.” The notion of Americanization as imperialism refers specifically to the twentieth-century,
especially interwar and post-World War II, spread of American economic and cultural hegemony. There is an
additional caveat here as well, namely that the historiography of Americanization tends to have a general trend of
focusing on western European countries such as France, Germany, Austria, and Great Britain. For more on late
nineteenth and early twentieth century examples of American foreign relations as more classic imperial forms see
Ronald Steel, Pax Americana (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), Mary A. Renda. Taking Haiti: Military
Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001),
Greg Grandin, Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s Forgotten Jungle City (New York: Picador, 2010),
Michael Adas. Dominance By Design: Technological Imperatives and America’s Civilizing Mission (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2006), and Aims McGuinness, Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). As a perhaps more extreme example, historian Thomas Bender argues that
American westward expansion on the North American continent was itself a manifestation of empire in A Nation
Among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006).
15
For more on the spread of American culture as an imperial form see Ralph Willet, The Americanization of Germany,
1945-1949. (New York: Routledge, 1989), Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural
Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press
1994), Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2002), Andrew J. Bacevich, The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American
Empire (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20 th
Century Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the
American Empire (London: Penguin, 2005), and Michael Adas, Dominance By Design: Technological Imperatives
and America’s Civilizing Mission (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), Alexander Stephan ed., The
Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanization after 1945 (New York: Berghahn Books
2006).
16
Victoria de Grazia. Irresistible Empire, 6
17
This notion is not new, historian C.W.E. Bigsby noted in his 1970 volume that American power rested, “in a
commercial enterprise and dominance which potentially threatens national autonomy.” See C.W.E. Bigsby,
Superculture: American Popular Culture and Europe (Bowling Green: Bowling Green University Press, 1975), 2
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Americanization is a misnomer, and what de Grazia and others are actually describing is
the process of globalization and Europeans’ assimilation into an increasingly global market, albeit
one led by the United States. In this regard my project is aligned with Andrew McKevitt’s
suggestion that “historians frame the U.S. encounter with Japanese products like anime in the
context of contemporary cultural globalization.” 18 In place of Japanese products, my project
examines European products and the sports car. My project also differs in postulating that this
process of globalization begins nearly immediately following the end of the Second World War,
rather than during the latter quarter of the twentieth century. By illustrating how European culture
was transported to America and consumed by Americans affecting a transfer of that culture in the
1950s, my project shows that the contemporary globalization of America began as soon as the
Second World War ended, not as a “shock” that came in the 1970s or 1980s as other historians
have postulated.19
Seeking to integrate transnational and global approaches, the field is now engaging with
the paradoxes of Americanization and globalization, and this delineates the final key
historiography. This new wave of scholarship is denoted by a methodological shift that examines
transnational cultural flows moving into America. 20 This shift is exemplified by Kristin
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Hoganson’s Consumer’s Imperium, In that book, Hoganson establishes middle class households
as “contact zones,” places of international, or more accurately transnational, connections due to
the European or Far Eastern products they consume. 21 It is also supported by McKevitt’s
Consuming Japan, in which he argues that “Consuming all things Japanese helped create a
globalized America…”22 However, he joins with other scholars of American consumption in the
postwar period in proposing that many of the foreign products Americans consumed were
culturally blank, like the VCR, Television set, among other similar consumer electronics. 23 Yet
doing so neutralizes one of the central arguments of the ‘Americanization’ thesis, which is that
consumption aids in the transmission of culture. Therefore, by viewing the sports car as a product
that was imbued with a European enthusiast and motorsport culture, this project grapples with
cultural transmission from Europe to America. My contribution to this historiography is made
possible by multi-national, multi archival research in business, government, and enthusiast
archives which allowed access to the voices of both the producers and consumers of the sports car.
My work thus joins this developing body of scholarship by both arguing against the notion of
American cultural expansion as empire—demonstrating that not all foreign imports were culturally
blank—and expanding upon Hoganson’s and McKevitt’s work to study the cultural and economic
effects of the domestic consumption of a specific foreign product.
This dissertation comprises five chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion. It is temporally
bounded by the beginning of limited production sports car manufacture in the 1920s and by the
opening of a Volkswagen production facility in Pennsylvania in 1978. Until 1978, all foreign
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vehicles imported into the United States were built and assembled abroad and arrived in American
ports as complete vehicles. These vehicles were designed and manufactured in the country in
which the brand was headquartered, and were therefore assumed to be imbued with certain tangible
and intangible qualities derived from their nation of origin, even if some of the major components
were manufactured elsewhere. However, after these brands began manufacturing in the United
States, the seemingly clear boundary lines separating imports from domestic manufacturers began
to blur. It was no longer clear what “Made in America”, or Germany, or anywhere else really meant
when a vehicle could be designed in England, its chassis made in Germany, with an engine
manufactured in Brazil, to be sold only in the United States. 24 Even though Volkswagen’s
production facility in 1978 turned out to be a failure, the boundary that it marks—the end of
production largely within a single nation—is very much a clear separation of different periods in
automotive, and indeed American, history.
The beginning, however, is more nebulous. As early as the late 1890s, automotive ideas
and technologies flowed between Europe and the United States. By the 1920’s an early automotive
culture had developed in which the power and luxury of a personal automobile was a signifier of
social status. In Europe, as automotive technology became more reliable, the car as a provider of
leisure or pleasure, and not merely a motive device, grew in popularity. This spawned early
European racing series. From there, ideas and practices of speed and performance began to enter
the motoring mainstream. In the United States, however, automotive development took a different
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turn; mass production and the focus on utilitarian design (exemplified in the Ford Model T) meant,
with few exceptions, that consumers looking for a taste of performance would have to train their
eyes upon automotive developments in Western Europe. It was not until after the Second World
War in the United States that the rise of the personal sports car, associated with a racing pedigree
but designed entirely for street use, truly began.
Therefore, the first chapter, “A European Phenomena: Development of the Sports Car and
Enthusiast Culture,” establishes the separate paths that automotive development took in the United
States and Europe. It demonstrates that the sports car was a vehicle with a distinctly European
heritage which lacked a direct American analogue due to differing tax frameworks, industrial,
social, and cultural ethos, and interwar contingencies such as the economic depression of the 1930s.
Furthermore, it illustrates an established European enthusiast culture in the form of organized
single marque owners and amateur racing clubs, which in turn demonstrates that these vehicles
were not culturally void. Therefore, the meeting of Americans and the sports car, a result of
wartime service either in the Second World War or during Cold War deployments, constituted a
catalyst for a process of cultural globalization among Americans. This is illustrated by an
examination of American enthusiasts’ response to meeting the sports car in Europe, and how they
brought back elements of this European enthusiast culture, along with the cars, to America.
The second chapter, “A British Invasion,” uses the intersection of international economic
pressure, domestic legislation, the British sports car, and their American consumers, to shed light
on the British attempt to regain economic power in an era dominated by American economic
strength. This chapter traces the economic and political forces behind Great Britain’s policies of
‘Export or Die,’ and the resulting increase in exports of British sports cars to the United States.
Next it examines the efforts of the British Government to aid sales of British automobiles. This
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came in the form of changes to two significant automotive tax schemes, which were designed to
make the British automotive industry more competitive in the export market, and to be able to sell
British cars to visiting Americans, especially American servicemen. The third section of this
chapter examines the culture that British sports cars brought with them to America and its adoption
by American enthusiasts. European enthusiast culture, complete with factory support for singlemarque driver’s clubs and amateur motorsport events, aided in the dramatic expansion of sports
car sales in the American market. Finally, this chapter examines the ways in which the idea of
‘Europe’ was used to increase sports car sales by British brands. This illustrates how the initial
penetration of British brands, and the resultant exposure of the sports car niche, was made possible
by the concerted effort of the British government and its Board of Trade. This complicates
narratives of Americanization as empire by demonstrating that the American market was not only
susceptible to outside influence, but in this case the process of globalization was actively aided by
the British government.
The third chapter, “Der Porsche vas Pushin’,” examines how Porsche broke into the
American market in the 1950s after British export policies had demonstrated the potential of the
sports car niche. Porsche, alone amongst its competition, only produced sports cars and therefore
serves as an ideal case study to examine the ways in which the design, engineering, and marketing
of a German performance vehicle served to transport elements of European automotive and
German culture to American consumers. This chapter also examines the way in which Porsche
products were transformed by their contact with distributors and American consumers. Porsche
adapted for the American market while simultaneously retaining the kernel of European
authenticity which both appealed to American consumers and served to transport elements of
German culture to Americans. Particular attention is given to the Porsche Club of America, an
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American enthusiast organization which grew around the cars and provides a unique lens into how
much German culture was imbued in the cars and transferred to their new American owners. These
processes illustrate the fluidity of global cultural exchange, fostered through consumption, and
clearly demonstrate a type of globalization taking place within America that begins in the 1950s.
The fourth chapter, “American Adaptation and Appropriation of the European Sports Car,”
examines the response of General Motors and Ford to the challenge of competing with the
European sports car. It focuses on the Chevrolet Corvette, the Ford Thunderbird, the Opel GT, and
the Opel Rallye. By examining the influence of European automotive design and culture, I take
the interpretive model of ‘Americanization’ and invert it to examine how the importation and sales
of the European sports car influenced the American automotive industry. The Chevrolet Corvette
appeared in 1953 as a copy of a British design aesthetic and performance ideal. Ford had been
caught off guard by the release of the Corvette, and sought to quickly create a competitive product,
and the Thunderbird, released one year later, was a copy of copy. This chapter complicates the
traditional narrative of ‘Americanization,’ demonstrating that American industries and consumers
were influenced by European products through consumption, and that American manufacturers
adapted and appropriated these products to enter a niche of their own domestic market, even in
one of America’s largest and most powerful industries.
The fifth chapter, “’Goes Like Schnell’: Regulations, Nixon Shock, and BMW,” illustrates
how one European brand, BMW, navigated the treacherous years of the Oil Shocks, rode the
economic waves generated by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and built a profitable
brand in the United States by injecting European sports-performance into the sedan platform, long
thought to be a sector of the American market secured by domestic manufacturers. It begins by
tracing the disillusionment many American consumers felt towards domestic automakers, a
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process which began in the late 1960s and only grew more pronounced in the 1970s. Here I use
the Corvair crisis as a case study to examine how American manufacturers laid the groundwork
for increasing safety and emissions legislation through their own inaction, poor engineering
decisions, and their incredibly poor approach to public relations in their defense. I then shift to
examine BMW’s approach to entering the US market from the company’s perspective, illustrating
how, despite clear warning signs, they sought to use Max Hoffman as a distributor to build their
brand in the United States from 1960-1975, and despite success, BMW’s ultimate decision to end
their relationship with Hoffman. Finally, the chapter explores how BMW used a factory racing
team entered in an American GT racing series to bolster their brand image of performance when
American emissions regulations blocked the importation of their most powerful cars. In so doing
BMW redefined what a sports car could be to American consumers and created a new market
niche, the sports-sedan that continues to form the basis of their brand image worldwide.
The epilogue provides an overview of the establishment and failure of Volkswagen’s
assembly plant in Pennsylvania, before undertaking a brief examination of the growing Japanese
competition in sectors of the American automobile market usually dominated by domestic
manufacturers. Both of these factors contributed to the nationalistic ‘Buy American’ advertising
campaigns of the late 1970s and illustrate the severity of growing foreign competition in the
American automotive market, the decline of American industrial dominance, and the globalization
of the American automotive market. However, even in an era of global production, questions of
national origin and national difference are still relevant. In this final section, I examine
contemporary automotive enthusiasts, who continue to grapple with the nationality of automobiles
in an era of truly global production, demonstrating that issues of cultural authenticity and
nationality are still relevant to American enthusiasts.
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This dissertation therefore offers an original contribution to the historiography of the
United States in the world by examining domestic consumption of a particularly European product,
the sports car, and the subsequent adaptation, reflection, and refraction of that product and its
associated culture by American automakers and the Americans who consumed them. The timeline
is also significant in that it complicates the traditional narrative of Americanization; certainly,
American products travelled abroad in a vast torrent that carried with it aspects of the consumer
driven society that produced them, however, American popular culture was never untouched by
its European encounters. If we accept that the consumption of American products “Americanized”
Europe then we must consider that the consumption of European products may have
“Europeanized” America. In this light, my dissertation demonstrates that the globalization of
popular culture was something that occurred within the United States, not just beyond its borders,
even at the postwar height of its international prestige and power.
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A EUROPEAN PHENOMENA: DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SPORTS CAR AND ENTHUSIAST CULTURE

“Mr. Vanderbilt was one of the first, if not the first, American to import an
automobile, use it on the superb highways of Long Island, assist in educating the
minds of the public to its limitless possibilities, and maintain his interest in its
development both at home and abroad. His interest in its development at home was
the cause of his offering for competition, open to the clubs of the world, the cup
bearing his name, and in the possession of which there is and will be displayed so
lively an interest.” – Vanderbilt Cup Race Pamphlet, 1904

In the autumn of 1904 William K. Vanderbilt II—heir to an impressive fortune and an
automotive enthusiast—sponsored one of the first international road races ever held on American
soil. It was his intention to use the massive (by the standards of the day) prize purse to lure
European racing drivers and factories to bring their machines across the Atlantic and expose an
American audience (and American manufacturers) to European automotive engineering prowess.
The race took place in October of 1904, over roughly 30 miles of public road around Long Island.
The route began in the Village of Westbury and proceeding through Jericho, the Village of
Hempstead, Queens, and New Hyde Park, before finishing back in Westbury. This circuit was to
be repeated ten times for a total race distance of 284.4 miles. At six-am the first car left the starting
line and nearly seven hours later, at 1:08pm, American expatriate driver George Heath, famous for
his racing exploits in Europe, crossed the finish line first in his French-built and factory sponsored
Panhard.25
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The Vanderbilt annual race series fell far short of its intended goal: influencing automobile
manufacturers in the U.S., and promoting European style racing events in America. This was
despite its popularity among American ‘automobilists’ – the initial term for people who would
later be called automobile enthusiasts – and despite its fairly long and consistent run; the race was
held most years from 1904 to the beginning of American involvement in World War I in 1916.
Rather, the Vanderbilt series, billed as “the great international struggle of 1906,” brought concerns
over the safety of road racing to the fore after a spectator was killed in that year’s running of the
race causing the event to be cancelled for the following year.26 Far from promoting the cause of
motor racing in the United States, the Vanderbilt races promoted the isolation of Americans from
European-style motorsport and derived automotive technology. In 1908 the Vanderbilt Cup Race
was held again, this time with protective barriers erected along the route. However, in solidarity
with new rules set by the Automobile Club of France, a powerful sanctioning body within Europe,
the event was boycotted by the “great firms of Europe,” again frustrating Vanderbilt’s intentions.27
While a quantity of races that would give rise to the sports car were being held in Europe within
the first two decades of the 20th century, American events would be far fewer. Furthermore,
concerns over safety largely relegated races to tracks designed solely for the purpose of motorsport,
thus hindering the development of a true ‘sports’ car, in America.
This chapter chronicles the development of a distinctly European vehicle, the sports car,
from the turn of the century to the interwar period, and its limited exposure to Americans. The
divergent development of the automobile in the United States and Europe had several contributing
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factors. Firstly, the industrial ethos of American manufacturers lent itself to the development of a
single model type that could be mass produced on an automated line rather than a more traditional
European style of production in small factories by skilled craftsmen with most of the assembly
process involving little more than simple hand tools. This meant that European manufacturers were
better suited to take on limited-production projects, like the sports car, in addition to lending a
more exotic, bespoke nature to the vehicles in the eyes of American consumers. Secondly, the
nature of the European driving environment with its narrow and often winding roads required a
vehicle to have certain driving dynamics such as agility and road-holding, in addition to smaller
overall size. These attributes were reinforced through participation in European motorsport, which
in much of Continental Europe took place on public roads. This can be contrasted with the United
States which generally featured wide thoroughfares and long distances of relatively straight roads.
This was mirrored in emergent American motorsports like the Indianapolis 500 which focused on
maximum sustained speed on a simple oval course. The European sports car was also shaped by
legislation in the country in which it was produced. For example, taxes on engine displacement or
power output which influenced the size and design paradigm of the engine. This, in turn, directly
influenced the driving dynamics of the vehicle. The ‘horsepower tax’ devised by the British, for
example, placed greater emphasis on bore size rather than stroke and therefore most British engines
produced under this tax scheme were undersquare, or long-stroke. These engines produce strong
torque at low and midrange rpm, but tend to have a lower redline and lower horsepower output at
high engine speeds. 28 Finally, due to the sporting nature of the cars and friendly competition,
Europeans developed a distinct automotive enthusiast culture oriented around participation in
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enthusiast clubs based upon a manufacturer or the practice of certain types of amateur motorsport
such as the Grand Prix, or road race, and the Rally. This enthusiast culture would be transported
through the purchase of European sports cars and explode in popularity in the US, demonstrating
the permeability of American culture in the postwar period.
This chapter will begin with the genesis of the sports car in European motorsport. It also
establishes the three significant precursors of the postwar European sports car: the Bentley 3-Liter
sports-tourer, Bugatti as a marque, and the MG M-Type Midget as lenses through which to analyze
the development of the European sports car.29 I argue that each of these vehicles and/or their parent
marque contributed significantly to the development of the sports car as a popularly recognizable
category of specialty vehicle, even if that category is constantly contested by enthusiasts. Through
the analysis of the three brands and vehicles I highlight the key differences between the European
environment in which the development of the sports car took place and automotive development
in America, thereby demonstrating the unique ‘European-ness’ of the sports car. Furthermore, I
demonstrate that these vehicles and manufacturers play significant roles in the establishment of a
European enthusiast culture which will also travel to America as the cars found their ways to
American consumers. Lastly, this chapter will examine how Americans became aware of the
European sports car through military service in Europe, or amateur motorsports in America, each
case demonstrating the uniqueness of the European sports car as seen from the perspective of an
American consumer.
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In so doing this chapter supports three key pillars of my overarching argument. Firstly, this
chapter establishes the difference in automotive development in the United States and Europe,
demonstrating that the sports car was a distinctly European type of vehicle which lacked a direct
American analogue due to differing tax frameworks, industrial, social, and cultural ethos, and
interwar contingencies such as the economic depression of the 1930s. Furthermore, the European
sports car also had an established European enthusiast culture in the form of organized single
marque owner’s and amateur racing clubs. Therefore, the meeting of Americans and the sports car,
a result of wartime service either in the Second World War or later Cold War deployments,
constituted a catalyst for a process of cultural and economic globalization. As Americans
purchased sports cars they also bought into a quasi-European enthusiast identity, evidenced by the
formation of American enthusiast organizations and activities along European lines. In so doing
this chapter complicates the narrative of ‘Americanization’ by demonstrating that America (and
Americans) were never as isolated from foreign products and cultural influence, even at the height
of American global power in the late 1940s through the 1950s, as has been portrayed in extant
literature.30
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1.1

Motor-Racing and the Development of the European Sports Car

The postwar European ‘sports car’ has its roots in a long history of prewar automotive
development, and, as automotive historian G.N. Georgano argues, European motorsport played a
significant role in the development of the sports car as a sub-category of the automobile. Georgano
notes that while there were vehicles in 1914 whose performance was, “exceptional by the standards
of the day,” it would not be until the 1920s that the, “sports car [was] established as type.” 31
Critically, he still situates the genesis of the sports car as an idea in the International Touring Car
Competition for the Herkomer Trophy, an annual race held in Germany from 1905-1911.32 This is
not surprising considering contemporary Europeans viewed Germany in the early 1900s as a leader
in the development of the fast automobile. After Wilhelm II purchased a 1903 Mercedes the
wealthy German aristocracy followed suit and the patronage by the rich resulted in the
development of technically advanced cars whose owners, “were not slow to organize local highspeed competitions…”33 The Herkomer race featured a road section of 500 miles, a hill-climb, and
a speed trial at the finish. While the cars entered in the initial 1905 running were largely standard
touring cars, the rules were changed in 1906 and vehicles no longer received competition points
for ‘coachwork.’34 In the name of lightness doors were replaced with canvas, seats were removed
or lightened, and flared wings appeared over the wheels. Georgano demonstrates that these halftouring, half-racing cars foreshadow the cars of the next five years and generated the ‘sporting car’
as a category of vehicle.35 However, it is key to note that these early vehicles were not ‘sports cars’
and not thought of as such by contemporaries. Rather the two classes of vehicles for much of the
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first two decades of the Twentieth Century would be touring cars and racing cars. The crossover
of these two categories of vehicles would be the sports car, and as automotive enthusiast Ken Purdy
argues in his work Kings of the Road, a book contemporaneous with the ‘British Invasion’ of
postwar sports cars, it would not emerge in its final form until the end of the 1920s with the MG
M-Type Midget. 36 However, Purdy’s argument is clouded by the contemporary atmosphere in
which the book was written at the height of the ‘British Invasion,’ a time when British marques
(and MG in particular) dominated American sports car sales. Therefore, in focusing on the early
MG, Purdy’s work misses the critical contribution of the specialty vehicles of the 1920s which
ultimately influenced the driving characteristics by which the sports car category would be defined.
Therefore, I situate the genesis of the European sports car in the 1920s. This development was
characterized by a combination of the driving characteristics of the major specialty marques of the
era, Bentley in England, and Bugatti in France, and the cost-effective design and production
techniques that emerge from Morris Garages in the form of the MG M-Type Midget of 1928.
The period from the turn of the century to 1914 saw rapid technological development in
the field of automobility, however, by the middle of the 1920’s a name was beginning to be readily
associated when one mentioned ‘sports-touring’ as a category of vehicle – the precursor of the
sports car – W. O. Bentley, founder of the English company Bentley Motors. Bentley was a British
businessman and engineer who had started the firm Bentley and Bentley with his brother in March
of 1912 as the London sales agency of three French automotive brands and would go on to design
two engines for use in aircraft. During his stint as salesman Bentley had relied upon motorsport as
a method of advertising which was not as capital-intensive as traditional print advertising and
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equally, if not more, effective.37 Essentially, by entering the cars he sold in local and regional races
he showcased their performance and build-quality to a large audience without having to create
costly print materials. After the war Bentley would take what he had learned in the design of
aeronautical engines and apply those lessons to the design of an all-new 3-Liter powerplant for
automotive use. Not content to sell or license his design to other manufacturers, he also designed
an automobile around the new engine. When it came to marketing the new car Bentley fell back
on the sales philosophy he had used in 1912: entering his cars in European road races.
The presence of Bentley vehicles in prominent European racing events meant that “the
Bentley was ‘news’ to a greater extent than any other sporting car of the period. Nor did Bentley
aim low when it came to the races he entered, “the Bentley Le Mans victories in 1924, 1927, 1928,
1929, and 1930 resulted in front page headlines… in which patriotism, snobbery and the worship
of speed were equally mixed.”38 The endurance race at Le Mans was, for Europeans, the most
well-known international race of the period, and it was widely covered in both the European and
American press. The effectiveness of Bentley’s strategy is noted by automotive enthusiast Malcom
Bobbitt who asserts, “The Bentley victory at Le Mans was covered to good effect by the motoring
press and a number of sales resulted from the publicity.”39 Aside from the performance of the cars
themselves, the Bentley’s sporting image was further enhanced by the cars association with a
close-knit group of automobile enthusiasts, wealthy young English sportsmen and racing drivers
known by contemporaries as the ‘Bentley Boys.’ The racing exploits and success of the Bentley
Boys supported the high-performance reputation of the brand. However, the Bentley Boys also
imbued the Bentley brand with an association to British high society and the aristocratic class,
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linking European motorsport directly with associations of wealth. With the vehicle’s image
established, both through racing victory as well as by its association with British high society, the
Bentley ‘sports-touring’ car soon became a much sought-after item among wealthy Europeans.
A further element which was made the Bentley automobiles a critical component in the
development of the European sports car is that the models which Bentley raced at Le Mans and
elsewhere were essentially production cars. Unlike the racing cars of the period which tended to
feature sets of redundant components and extensive (for the time) instrumentation, there were only
a few instruments and backup components added to the Bentley competition vehicles. This was a
fact that was quickly noted by the public as indicated by a newspaper report on the 1922 Isle of
Man Time Trial, the first European race in which Bentley participated as a manufacturer, which
read, “The most outstanding feature of this race was the running of the Bentleys… their
unquestionable claim to glory is based on the fact that, for all practical purposes, they were
standard stock cars as sold to the general public.”40 Therefore the Bentley cars combined highspeed track performance with street-driving capability, what would become essential components
of the modern postwar sports car. Of course, one must keep in mind that Bentley also sold the
chassis, the frame and powertrain of the car, to be bodied by coachbuilders in a wide variety of
styles, some of which were large, heavy, and clearly intended for touring use.
American enthusiasts were also exposed to the Bentley more directly, again as a result of
Bentley’s use of racing as an arena for marketing. In 1922, as one of his first major racing events,
W.O. Bentley decided to enter one of his 3-Liter racing cars in the 10th International 500-Mile
Sweepstakes Race, better known among modern enthusiasts as the ‘Indy 500’. Despite

40

The Sunday Times 25th June 1922 quoted in Arthur F.C. Hillstead, Those Bentley Days (London: Faber and Faber,
1953), 61.

26
‘International’ being in the name of the event it was largely an American affair, out of the twentysix vehicles lines up at the start of the race, only 4 were European: three from France (two Ballots
and one Peugeot) and the British Bentley.41 The Bentley finished 13th, a respectable outcome for
the relatively new auto manufacturer, but not impressive enough to generate demand for the
Bentley 3-Liter among American consumers. As Bobbitt demonstrates, “the episode really did
very little to establish Bentley sales across the Atlantic. Recalling the event W.O. admitted that the
car simply wasn’t fast enough compared to the American machines…”42 Due to the relative failure
of the Bentley at Indianapolis, the extreme costs of competing in America, and the Bentley’s
consistent cash shortages, the 1922 Indianapolis 500 would be both the first and last time Bentley
would officially compete in an American race. Continuing financial hardship ultimately resulted
in Bentley being bought-out, first by wealthy friend and racing driver Woolf Barnato who
sustained the company until 1931 when Bentley was sold for the second time to Rolls Royce.
Under Rolls Royce Bentley was reduced to a shadow of its former self, a platform for Rolls to
market performance vehicles in the few years before war came again to Europe. As rapidly as it
had come on the scene in the years after World War I, the Bentley marque receded in the late 1930s;
however, the influence of the Bentley brand on the marketing and sustained high-speed
performance associated with the European sports car remains. Amateur racing, the type
popularized by the ‘Bentley Boys’ would continue to be a key aspect of enthusiast culture and,
therefore, a marketing tool used to sell sports cars to Americans following World War II.
It is surprising, considering the English dominance in the sports car segment in the
immediate postwar period, that the first foreign automobile marque that most Americans would
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identify as a sports car hailed from France. Even more curious, its designer and namesake was an
Italian. Ettore Bugatti was an Italian expatriate who began building automobiles around the age of
17, first in Italy and later in France.43 By 1910 he had begun to build automobiles under his own
name, founding the Bugatti marque, although his brand’s image would be built on the cars of the
interwar period. While Ettore Bugatti had little interest in racing in terms of winning and brand
rivalries, he was aware of not only the publicity that could be garnered from racing, but the
opportunity it provided to test or improve technical aspects of his vehicles. 44 This was, of course,
in keeping with the prevalent trends of specialty automobile manufacturers of the interwar period
which had been already established by Bentley.
By 1939 Bugatti vehicles had won nearly ten thousand European races, both major and
minor, and established thirty-seven records for speed, indicative of the importance in motorsport
to Bugatti as a development and publicity tool. The fame earned on the racetracks of Europe
succeeded in carrying the Bugatti name across the Atlantic to American enthusiasts, albeit mostly
those who were attuned to European motorsport. The association of the Bugatti car with the ‘sports
car’ class of vehicle among American enthusiasts is demonstrated by the numerous articles written
and re-printed about the marque in postwar editions of Sports Car, the official publication of the
Sports Car Club of America (SCCA). The SCCA was an organization which had its roots in prewar
racing and general enthusiast clubs, but which was not tied to a specific marque or manufacturer,
and became increasingly prominent in the late 1940s and 1950s. The writing which appears in the
SCCA publications thus serves as a bellwether for the interests among the broader swath of
American sport-automobile enthusiasts. For instance, out of seven ‘want’ ads taken out in the
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May/June 1945 issue, six are for European sports cars or European parts, and three of those are for
Bugatti vehicles or parts specifically.45 It should also be noted that this issue of Sports Car was
printed right at the end of the war in Europe, before any postwar vehicles could be manufactured.
This indicates the close association of Bugatti with motorsports by American enthusiasts, and
furthermore that European motorsport was a key aspect of the early development and marketing
of the European sports car.
Morris Garages – the company which would produce one of the first ‘mass-market’
European sports car, the MG Midget in 1928 – was significant for the way it approached motor
racing. Both Bentley and Bugatti relied upon factory sponsored racing to provide advertising as
well as test components under stress. Essentially the Bentley and Bugatti racing vehicles were
owned by the company, and they both paid their drivers a fee to race their vehicles. MG too was
initially involved in this style of European racing in the late 1920s and early 1930s, however its
participation was “intermittent and patchy after 1935.”46 This coincides with the sale of MG to
Morris Motors Limited, and while acknowledging the importance of racing activities in the
development and marketing of the sports car, Cecil Kimber, the manager of MG, also proclaimed,
“’with regard to racing, our policy has always been to let other people do this for us.’” 47 Indeed
after 1935 MG built no more racing cars, however it did keep its brand image associated with
motorsport by sponsoring trials racing teams. Rather than own or develop the racing cars as a
company, MG relied upon enthusiast teams, and sponsorship was limited to offering specialty parts
or limited financial assistance to these teams. This development is significant, it would also be the
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way in which MG sports cars were marketed to Americans. Due to the popularity of the MG among
American consumers in the immediate postwar years many of them ended up competing on
American tracks in amateur racing series and British brands such as MG (and Triumph) would use
this as a marketing tool to introduce even more Americans to a European image of performance
motoring. Essentially a British brand would ‘sponsor’ American drivers by offering them cars and
parts at a discount, or allow these drivers to be the first customers offered a new model. This
process will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter, “A British Invasion: The Sports
Car Americans Loved First.”

1.2

Taxation and European Engine Design

A second key factor which influenced the development of the sports car in Europe was the
way in which vehicle registration taxes were calculated, particularly in France and Great Britain.
In both countries, the taxes levied on vehicle purchase and registration penalized the production
of larger and heavier vehicles by calculating the registration tax based on some measurement of
engine size. Indeed, the effect of such methods of taxation were well-known by 1945, “Heavy
horsepower taxation has encouraged the British production of small cars,” a statement which was
equally, if not even more-so true, of France. 48 However, in the British case specifically, the
outcome was much more complex than simply a smaller, lighter car. In fact, the British method of
calculating the registration tax influenced the very driving dynamics of the sports car by essentially
mandating the ‘under square’ paradigm of engine design.
The key to understanding the significance of the British tax is that it was technically not
calculated as a measurement of the size of the engine, but rather on its output horsepower.
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Furthermore, output power was not actually measured, but rather derived by a complex
mathematical formula that took variable aspects of engine design and treated them as constants.
Specifically, it assumed, “a mean effective cylinder pressure of 90psi, a mechanical efficiency of
75%, and a mean piston speed of 1000ft/min.” 49 Engine displacement and output power are
certainly related, however as the technology and engineering of internal combustion engines
advanced the formula became less and less applicable. As a result, actual horsepower differed from
taxable horsepower and the gap widened as time went on. By the late 1920s some British car
models were named with a distinctive two-number moniker – like the 1927 Vauxhall 20/60 – the
first number is the taxable horsepower, the second is the actual output power. These gaps were
possible because the R.A.C. tax formula effectively ignored stroke, or the length of piston travel,
in determining output power. Therefore, the simplest way to produce an engine with a low R.A.C.
tax rating, but more actual output power was to build ‘under square’ engines, the technical term
for an engine with a longer piston stroke than bore diameter. This has other effects on the engine’s
dynamics; an under-square engine tends to produce good torque at lower revolutions, however it
does not like to spin at high revolutions which means that overall output horsepower figures are
lower, and the engine feels less willing to rev. This also effects the overall driving dynamics of the
total automobile, under square engines tend to feel most powerful in the low- to mid- rpm ranges,
which coincidentally is where most engine operation takes place, albeit with felt power dropping
off at higher rpms.
The tax was originally formulated in 1909 as a way to fund road development and
improvement in Britain, however, in 1920 it served as a protector of the British automotive
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industry. While not insubstantial in its first iteration the teeth of the British horsepower tax, or
‘R.A.C. Tax’ as it was referred to by contemporaries, were sharpened in 1920 when the rates were
fixed proportionally at £1 per horsepower. The increase came at a significant point for the British
automotive industry. By 1920 the American Model T was not only one of the cheapest passenger
vehicles for sale in Britain, but it was also the most versatile; a myriad of bodies could be fitted to
the T chassis allowing it to become a truck, or a delivery van, or a passenger car, etc. Seen in this
light, the T’s utility, quantity (through mass production), and price seemingly represented a threat
to the British automotive industry. However, the Model T had been designed with American
consumers in mind, American consumers who paid no horsepower or displacement taxes.
Therefore, the engine had not been designed to take advantage of the antiquated R.A.C.
calculations and, “the Model T Ford, rated at 22.5 h.p. under the RAC formula… [paid] £23 (the
same for a Roll Royce Phantom which was several times more expensive) adding roughly 10 per
cent to its 1921 price. In this way, apparently by historical accident, British cars received an
advantage over American imports.” 50 It seems curious that economic historian Roy Church is
willing to chalk what was essentially a protective tariff on American imports, and specifically the
Model T up to a happy coincidence. Rather, it is far more likely that the change in the R.A.C. tax
in 1920 was specifically designed with economic protectionism in mind, a point which the
scholarly debate as to its effectiveness seems to substantiate.51 Regardless, the horsepower tax
essentially created the paradigm of British engine design in the 1920s.

50

Roy A. Church, The Rise and Decline of the British Motor Industry, New Studies in Economic and Social History
No. 24 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 17.
51
Susan Bowden, “Demand and Supply Constraints in the Interwar UK Car Industry: Did the Manufacturers Get It
Right?”, Business History, #33 (April 1991): 242-267 see also M.A. Riley, B.A. Lilleker, & N.P. Tuckett, The English
Model T Ford: A Century of the Model T in Britain (West Yorkshire: The Model T Register of Great Britain Ltd.,
2008).

32

The effects of the R.A.C. tax can be clearly seen in the design of the Bentley 3-Liter engine,
and thus the Bentley sports cars. Immediately after the First World War Bentley decided to make
his own car and he was primarily interested in designing a high-quality sporting vehicle capable
of reliably sustaining high speeds over long distances. Notably, this is a key portion of the formula
for the British postwar sports car. To accomplish this goal W.O. Bentley designed a new fourcylinder engine of large displacement (3-Liter), bucking a growing continental trend for smaller
engines and setting the Bentley apart from its competition. In keeping with his experience in large,
slow-turning aeronautical engines and the influence of the R.A.C. tax structure the 3-Liter engine
was incredibly under square. While the R.A.C. rated the 3-Liter at 15.9 tax horsepower – less than
the 1921 Model T – its real output was much closer to 70 horsepower. Considering the purchase
price of a Bentley in the early 1920s represented three to four years of an average British skilled
worker’s salary – incidentally, one of the first Bentley customers was wealthy enough to also
purchase his own private island, Brownsea – the effect of R.A.C. taxation on the design of the 3Liter powerplant is certainly open to dispute.52 However, despite the probable fact that thoughts
of registration tax rarely, if ever, entered the decision-making process of the average Bentley
customer, the paradigm of under square engine design imposed by R.A.C. policies certainly
effected the milieu in which the Bentley engine was designed. Therefore, the paradigm created by
the R.A.C. tax predisposed the 3-Liter Bentley engine taking its final form as a severely under
square engine.
France, due to its less restrictive and progressive tax on engine displacement rather than
‘taxable horsepower,’ turned out to be an ideal environment for the early development of the sports
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car. Typical French sporting vehicles were smaller and lighter than comparable types from
England or Germany, due in large part to this progressive tax on engine displacement as well as
the taxes levied on fuel. These taxes kept trends in engine displacements low, under 1,100cc which
was combined with a lack of a general speed limit outside urban areas. 53 Thus the Bugatti
automobiles were much smaller and lighter than most sporting or racing class automobiles of the
period, and demonstrated superior handling, or the, “ability to hang to the road at high speeds.”54
These early Bugatti vehicles display two of the key qualities that will come to define the European
sports car: a small, light-weight vehicle powered by a correspondingly tiny engine (relative to
American automobiles), which praises handling over outright power and acceleration. As noted in
review originally published in The Motor, an English enthusiast periodical, “unlike our own
manufacturers [in England], he [Bugatti] never made a four-cylinder engine larger than 1,500cc
and has never sold a six at all.”55 European racing of the late 1920s demanded an increase in power,
therefore Bugatti began building inline, 8-cylinder engines of between 2.5 to 4 liters to provide it.
Again, demonstrating the importance of European motorsport on the design of the sports car, these
new engines were based on the international Grand Prix rules of 1921.56 However, it is the light
four-cylinder ‘pre-sport’ cars intended for road use, and thus subject to the registration tax, rather
than the strictly racing cars that Bugatti is most fondly remembered and thus the models which are
most coveted by enthusiasts.57
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1.3

The Development of Enthusiast Culture

The Bugatti sports car was indirectly responsible for fomenting another key development
of European sports car culture, the single-marque sports car club. The Bugatti vehicle inspired
such enthusiasm from its owners that on March 4th, 1930, the Bugatti Owners Club (BOC) was
founded, one of the first of its kind, “with the three-fold object of racing, distributing the latest
information on the Bugatti firm and collecting designs and photographs of all the Bugatti
models.”58 The club also produced the quarterly journal, Bugantics, which kept contemporary
readers abreast of developments at the factory, and facilitated the sale of parts and Bugatti
automobiles through advertisements placed by club members. Ettore Bugatti himself encouraged
BOC club activities by offering the Challenge Trophy in 1931 to the BOC competitor who gained
the highest number of points in club racing events during the year and in 1939 by donating a new
Type 51 Grand Sports 2.3 Liter sports car to the club for those members who wanted to race, but
didn’t own a Bugatti.59 In 1937 the BOC purchased the Prescott House estate, a large piece of land
roughly ninety miles from London, in order to facilitate its own racing activities. While owning
land and a track is a trait that would not be typical of sports car clubs in postwar America, the
organization of club motorsports events would be a crucial aspect of the American enthusiast car
club. Furthermore, these types of events, when adopted by American enthusiast clubs, serve as a
demonstration of the transportation of a European enthusiast culture to American consumers while
at the same time furthering that same transportation of culture.
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Indeed, the 1930s is significant for the further development of a European automotive
culture which would find its locus in the enthusiast clubs which sprang up in an increasing number
of locations within Europe. During this decade sports car ownership expanded dramatically,
fostered by the increasing accessibility of ‘sporting’ vehicles like the M-Type Midget. Following
the increase in sports car ownership there was also an expansion of European car clubs such as the
Bristol Motor Club in England. As membership in these clubs rose more amateur motorsports
events were organized, in the case of Britain under the auspices of the Royal Automobile Club
(RAC). In the interwar period the Bristol Motor Club, “built no less than three hill climb venues,
the best known of which was Blackwell near Bristol…”60 The importance of motorsport in the
form of amateur racing was going to be one of the hallmarks of an interwar European automotive
culture, and the hillclimb serves as a stereotypically British example. The British hillclimb is a
short race, run on an uphill course where competitors compete individually to complete the course
with the quickest time possible. The building of the BOC racecourse at Prescott Estate in 1937,
discussed earlier, is a further example of the expansion of amateur club racing activities within
Europe.
Club racing activities were of course curtailed by the war due to the shortage of quality
fuel, rubber, and metals, all key components for a racing automobile. In Britain, the Royal
Automobile Club passed a resolution in 1940 which banned motorsports for the duration of the
war. However, by October of 1945, only five months after the war officially ended, the
Competition Committee of the RAC rescinded the ban and solicited “Clubs,” – meaning the single
marque clubs in addition to motorsports specific clubs – to “apply to the R.A.C. for the necessary
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permit, and the [RAC] will help in every possible way to get motoring sport restarted.”61 While it
is difficult to ascertain when exactly the first postwar amateur motorsports took place in Britain,
by 1947 the British enthusiast clubs were beginning to get back together. The M.G. Car Club, an
international club organized by owners predominantly in the UK (though there were ‘active centres’
in the US as well), restarted itself on January 1st, 1947 to, “foster the sport and pastime of motoring,
to promote social events and further the interests of the M.G. owners.”62 The pace of recovery in
Britain among enthusiasts was quite rapid, doubtlessly aided by the fact that their country was in
much better shape than either France or Germany.
The emphasis on these clubs being European is intentional and serves to highlight the
differences between Europe and America. while there were some American enthusiast clubs in the
interwar period most focused entirely upon racing. The Sports Car Club of America is itself an
outgrowth of the interwar Automobile Racing Club of America, and was not founded until late
1944 when, “seven car enthusiasts from Boston, Mass., met at the home of Chapin Wallour with
the intent of forming a new club specifically for those with an interest in the new breed of
automobile that many were calling ‘sports cars.’”63 The comparatively late start of the SCCA was
not, however, an indication of a lack of interest among Americans, within a year a second ‘regional’
chapter had been founded in Connecticut by Russ Sceli and the club began to rapidly expand in
both scope and membership. As a brief example of the rapid growth in numbers, by the end of
June 1945 club membership was such that Article III of the SCCA’s constitution was reinstated,
which “restricts membership to owners of sports cars… This action will raise the standard of cars
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in the club to be in keeping with its name and principles.”64 By the end of 1946 the club had 102
members and 27 who, lacking a sports car of their own, were limited to just being subscribers of
Sports Car. 65 By 1948, the club would move to sanction its first European style road race at
Watkins Glen, New York, and in so doing demonstrating its Europeanizing influence as a conduit
of European enthusiast culture.

1.4

The Effects of European Contingency

The creation of the European sports car was also dependent upon the contingencies of
interwar Europe. The economic prosperity of the roaring twenties gave rise to early forms of the
sports car, like the Bentley and Bugatti, were followed by the crash of 1929 and the lingering
economic depression of the 1930s. The effects of the crash were multifaceted and long-lasting,
influencing both the type of vehicle produced as well as the manner of its construction; the
dominance of bespoke, hand crafted cars like the Bugatti and Bentley gave way to the massproduced (at least in European terms) MG Midget, commoditizing the sports car. Lastly, the
coming of a Second World War in 1939 profoundly affected European automakers, none more-so
than Bugatti. A marque which had been at the cutting edge of sports car development, and had
succeeded in capturing the imagination of American enthusiasts was essentially destroyed by the
war.
One of the factors which had enhanced the Bugatti’s image among both European and
American enthusiasts was that the car was not mass produced, rather all Bugatti automobiles were
built by a small number of highly skilled craftsmen and only a few complete vehicles were built
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each year. In the preface to Ettore Bugatti’s biography, Louis Armand, an engineer who trained
with Ettore, would write, “Bugatti maintained and vindicated the rule that quality production
depended upon a small number of skilled workers and a small output.”66 Importantly, this assertion
came at a time when the dominance of mass production in the automotive industry was clearly on
the horizon. The Ford Model T, the first examples of which rolled off the production line in 1908,
ushered in a new era in automotive production which praised sheer quantity and economics of
scale over individual hand crafting. The movement towards mass production would even bear his
name; ‘Fordism’ swept across the United States and Europe, upsetting entire industries and social
orders.67 However, the 1920s were still early days for mass production and Bugatti was particularly
opposed to this new system of industrial organization. Akin to works of art, “…cars were handbuilt for the most part, each an expression of a creator’s personality,” as L’Ebé Bugatti, Ettore’s
daughter would note in his father’s biography, “But probably none was as concerned as Bugatti to
perpetuate this situation.”68 The downside of this manner of production is that it was costly, and
thus early sports cars were out of reach for most of the rapidly expanding motoring public.
However vehement the response of automotive enthusiast then or since to mass production, there
can be no doubt that it served to open automobile ownership to a much broader segment of the
population both in Europe and America. While the association of the sports car with artisanal
production methods is one that would certainly continue in the immediate postwar years – partly
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due to the circumstances of an industrially devastated Europe – industrialized production, even if
in small batches, would make the postwar sportscar available to the bourgeoning American middle
classes in a way that sports cars of the 1920s and 1930s simply were not.
The American fascination with the interwar Bugatti sports cars is reflected in the enthusiast
literature of the immediate postwar period. Ken Purdy, automotive enthusiast and author chose to
open his work, Kings of the Road, itself an ode to the interwar European sports car originally
published in 1949, with a chapter dedicated to the Bugatti cars – this is of course after a brief
chapter, titled “What Did We Lose?”, a romantic lament on the lacking state of the massproduction based American automobile industry for automotive enthusiasts. 69 Based on the
prevalence of material on the prewar Bugatti sports cars in American enthusiast publications, it is
clear that they played a role in exposing American automotive enthusiasts to European standards
and styles of performance vehicles. This is nowhere more apparent than in Russ Sceli’s frequent
contributions to early editions of Sports Car in which he captures in witty and amusing prose the
emotional connection he feels to sports motoring and his Bugatti. Notably, the Bugatti always
breaks down in some way, and, usually, a piece of “Detroit Iron” – a somewhat derogatory term
for an American car – comes to the rescue, yet it is clear that the emotional attachment to the
Bugatti only grows stronger. At the end of one of these Bugatti parables, Sceli closes with the
observation that all the adventures he has had due to Bugatti ownership, “are the things that make
life worthwhile.”70 While Sceli never overtly states that his emotional attachment to the car is due
to its hand-assembled method of production, it is clear that the quirks which this production method
usually leave in a vehicle (which are also the cause of its frequent failures) are what draws him to
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the car. It gives the car an intangible element that Sceli and Purdy both value as enthusiasts, one
which American cars lack due in part to their mass-production.
Unfortunately, Bugatti’s sports car and racing success in the interwar period would be
interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War. The Bugatti factory, located in the Alsatian
town of Molsheim, near the city of Strasburg, was taken over by the Germans and turned into the
Trippel Werk before being looted for machinery as the Germans retreated across the Rhine. At the
end of the war the factory fell into the hands of the French government since Ettore was an Italian
national. Litigation began in 1945, and it would take three years for the French government to
reinstate Bugatti’s claim to his land and factory. 71 Before the litigation process had concluded
Ettore Bugatti died on August 21st, 1947, depriving France of one of its leading automotive
designers and engineers. The man who had done more singlehandedly to bring French automobiles
to the forefront of sporting and motor racing passed on before he could continue expanding his
automotive legacy into the postwar period, a time when the market for sport cars expanded wildly.
A testament to the importance of Ettore himself is that even after the reacquisition of the factory
the Bugatti company was unable to survive in the postwar sellers’ market. In 1952, a year when
European automakers like MG, Jaguar, and Porsche were unable to produce enough sports cars to
meet American demand, Bugatti quietly shut down the factory they had worked so diligently to
reacquire and went out of business. It was a disappointing end for a marque which, despite very
low production numbers, had done so much to shape European perceptions of what a sports car
could be and was indirectly responsible for the development of a European automotive culture that
would be transported to America in the postwar era.
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At the close of the 1920s, a high-water mark for the international renown of specialist car
marques like Bugatti and Bentley punctuated by economic depression, another significant
development took place: the low-price, mass-produced sports car derived from the standard family
model. While vehicles like the Bugatti and Bentley were important developments in terms of
technology, design, and in the establishment of a specific category of performance vehicles, they
were out of reach for most consumers. British manufacturer Morris Garages (MG), managed at
that time by Cecil Kimber, a British automotive engineer who provided the push for a sporting car,
changed that dynamic when they introduced the M-Type Midget in 1928. It was a small two-seat
body made of fabric and powered by a miniscule 847cc four-cylinder engine producing only
twenty h.p. Georgano argues that the M-Type Midget was not a sports car, however “it was a
remarkable value at £175… it had the sporty appearance that hundreds of young buyers wanted.”72
In this he does have a point, the actual performance of the M-Type Midget was nowhere near as
potent as that of the Bugatti. However, the key significance of the M-Type Midget was that it was
not a standalone design, rather it had the engine and chassis of the Morris Minor, a small family
car from allied manufacturer Morris Motors Limited, with a light-weight and sporty looking body.
By using existing parts to produce a new model MG kept the costs of production low, and expand
its market beyond the wealthy.
This combination of sporting appeal, combined with a limited form of mass production
marks the genesis of the modern sports car as a category of vehicle. This assertion is supported by
the fact that more Midgets were sold, roughly 300, in the first year of its production than the total
number of vehicles MG had produced prior.73 While interwar sports cars like the Bentley and
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Bugatti were highly influential in terms of the driving dynamic associated with ‘sporty’ driving,
the MG Midget brought about the commoditization of the sports car: a vehicle with the outward
appearance of being designed for performance – an image supported by light weight which
therefore featured a good power-to-weight ratio and excellent handling – but one which was in
fact derived from the family saloon. Sharing from the family car parts bin also meant that the MG
was more reliable and more easily (and cheaply) repaired than the highly-strung high-performance
cars like the Bentley and Bugatti, both of which required frequent maintenance.74 Furthermore,
MG was lucky with the timing of the Midget’s debut. The crash of 1929 closed many of the deep,
aristocratic pocketbooks which had funded Bentley and Bugatti in the 1920s, while cheaper cars
like the MG retained their appeal among a broader swath of European consumers.
The combination of sporting pretensions with even this modest form of mass production
would certainly remove some of the intangible elements which had traditionally been associated
with the sports car as a category of vehicle. As American sports car enthusiast and author Ken W.
Purdy wistfully noted, “I have driven many other great cars of the period: Duesenbergs, Bentleys,
Mercedes-Benz cars, but none have produced this sensation in me. They appear to be splendid
machines, but they do not seem to be alive. The Bugatti does.”75 While this is certainly a romantic
hyperbole extended by an enamored enthusiast it does demonstrate the importance of the emotional
aspect of sports car enthusiasm. An MG may well be a fine sports car, but for the ultra-purist the
handmade, bespoke aspect of the vehicles production was just as important and contributed an
intangible element which supplemented the vehicles’ driving characteristics. As will be
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demonstrated in a later chapter, the German firm Porsche would gain a significant amount of
advertising cachet from the fact that its postwar cars were still largely assembled by hand.

1.5

The Divergent Path of Interwar American Automotive Development

While European manufacturers were using European forms of motorsport, such as the road
race, to advertise and test their production vehicles, leading to the development of a class of
vehicles known as sports cars, major American manufacturers like Ford and General Motors, were
focused on the mass production of a limited number of general purpose models.76 The American
‘Big Three’ (Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler) would largely ignore the sports car niche until
the exploding popularity of the small British sports cars, like M.G., Austin, and Triumph reveal
the size of this niche market in the late 1940s. However, there were small American manufacturers
that were engaged in the small-batch production of specialty performance vehicles, the two most
significant in terms of a sports car of sorts were Stutz Motor Company and Mercer. Both
companies inadvertently fed a niche market, the small but expanding community of American
automotive enthusiasts in the interwar period. However, despite the connotation of Stutz and
Mercer models with motorsport by contemporary American owners, they were not sports cars in
the European model. Rather these early American performance vehicles, known as speedsters,
focused on the attainment of high top speed to the essential exclusion of all other driving dynamics.
An example of this American model of performance is perhaps best demonstrated by the Packard
Model 734 Speedster. The only Packard that, “could undoubtedly be called a sports car,” according
to Georgano, featured an 8-cylinder inline engine displacing 6.3 liters, developing 106 bhp, and
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was produced for only one year, 1929-1930.77 Compared to the MG M-Type Midget, any of the
Bugatti models of the same period, or even the Bentley 3-Liter, the differences are profound. The
larger engine of the Packard produced significantly more power, but would have also been much
heavier, which would have detrimental effects on the driving dynamics of the car. This
demonstrates a different conception of performance which prevailed among American
manufacturers and consumers of the period, speed and power vs. European agility.
Despite some success of American performance oriented cars, the overall situation of the
sports car in America was deteriorated further by the lingering economic depression of the 1930s
which cemented American cultural ideas about the automobile. Historian John Heitmann notes in
The Automobile and American Life that as early as 1906 automotive pioneer Henry Ford
determined that the American automotive market would be structured differently to Europe’s due
to the lack of rigid class stratifications; Ford’s notion was that for Americans the automobile would
become a necessary tool to increase one’s social, economic, and physical mobility, rather than
primarily a toy for the wealthy. 78 Therefore, the vehicle which would be best suited for Americans
was one that was mechanically simple, cheap to mass-produce, and offered the most potential
utility, essentially the opposite design philosophy from the sports car. As historian Douglas
Brinkley argues in Wheels for the World, Henry Ford’s notion about the American automotive
market was not only correct, but also inexorably linked with mass-production, “Ford’s scheme was
based on a well-established formula: increased output allowed for lower prices, which accounted
for the rise in sales… that combination also drove out competition.”79 General Motors and Chrysler
followed a similar philosophy based on mass production, therefore. when competitive and
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economic pressure exerted by the ‘Big Three’ intensified as the American economy slumped, they
effectively wiped out the American specialist vehicle industry through superior economies of
scale.80 The lack of any real competition in terms of performance specialty vehicles by the end of
the 1930s would leave the American consumer largely unfamiliar with performance motoring, and
the market fertile ground for the intrusion of the European sports car in the postwar period.
The close of the 1930s brought cataclysmic change to Europe in the form of another world
war, resulting in the temporary halting of production of automobiles for private use. Therefore, it
would largely be prewar sports models that initially caught the eyes of young, impressionable
American GIs as the war ended. Interwar Bugatti sports and racing cars, among others such as the
interwar Bentleys, MGs, and various other small marques, left on the roads and in the barns of
Europe introduced young American GIs to the sports car, which would feel distinctly European.
The sports car was, of course, a vehicle category which few would have had a chance to see or
experience for themselves in the US, and the novelty of light, agile, and speedy performance
machines would certainly appeal to the predominantly young American men. Indeed, the exposure
to the European sports car in its native environment was one of the keys in the migration of the
sports car and a European style motor sports and enthusiast culture to America following the
Second World War. As Ken Purdy notes, “but the GIs who came back from Europe to report that
there were other kinds of cars than American in the world, and that some of them, like the British
MG, were a hell of a lot of fun to drive started, without knowing it, as big a revolution as the
automobile industry had seen.”81 This is an idea supported by American newspapers of the period
which reported increasing engagement with European cars by American GIs, illustrated by this
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excerpt from a 1956 Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly article, “Another source of
converts to the foreign-car idea is the American army divisions still stationed in Europe. If a GI
buys a car overseas, he generally will keep it for use in the States when his tour of duty is
complete.” 82 The importance of overseas service in the spread of the sports car cannot be
understated, due to the divergent development of the automobile industry in the United States
along the Fordist model, a small, lightweight performance-oriented vehicle designed for road use
would have been a novelty to Americans.
An infamous example of this was the purchase of one of the rarest sports cars in the world,
a Bugatti Type 57SC by Robert Oliver, at the time a Private in the U.S. Army Medical Corps.
Oliver maintained close ties with what would become in 1945 the Sports Car Club of America,
and his purchase was featured in “The Cutout” section of the March-April 1945 issue of their bimonthly newsletter, Sports Car. The brief paragraph was direct, and made clear Oliver’s plans for
the vehicle, “The car is now being thoroughly overhauled by Louis Giron in England… With its
maximum of 135 m.p.h., it will be one of the fastest, if not the fastest sports cars in this country,
when it finally is shipped to California.” 83 While unfortunately the impressions of Mr. Oliver
regarding his Bugatti at the time are unavailable, we do see the acquisition of his European sports
car have other consequences. He was enticed to join the Bugatti Owners Club, which was of course
based in England, and through this we see one of the ways in which the purchase of the European
sports car promoted the creation of a transnational network of automotive enthusiasts. This
connection prompted the BOC to send over “several years of back issues of BUGANTICS, the
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excellent bi-monthly publication of that very active British car club.”84 These connections clearly
fostered an exchange of information which, given the roots of the sports car in a distinctly
European automotive culture, contributed a globalizing influence on American enthusiasts who
had previously been insulated from European automotive developments. It should also be noted
that this was not limited to Americans joining established European organizations either, the
SCCA has its own European member, then Captain T.A.S.O. Mathieson, a wealthy Scottish
enthusiast and amateur racing driver of international renown.85 This illustrates the complexity of
the web of transnational contacts which were fostered by the sports car, an essential part of the
globalization of America brought about through contact with at least one of its products.

1.6

Cold War Military Service as a Conduit for the European Sports Car

American contact with European sports cars in Europe should not be thought of as just
occurring in the late 1940s and ending with mass demobilization between 1945 and 1946. For
many American servicemen victory in Europe brought a single overpowering desire: to get back
to the US and out of the military as quickly as possible, and in this charged atmosphere it is hard
to imagine American servicemen seeking engagement with European motor vehicles. 86 Victory,
however, would not lead to the complete exodus of American military personnel. The need to
stabilize a war-torn Germany coupled with rapidly destabilizing relations with the Soviet Union
led to the American occupation of large swaths of German territory, and the creation in 1949 of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, establishing a framework for permanent U.S. forces
stationed in Europe. These twin developments would keep a steady flow of young American men
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to and from Europe, especially to bases in England and the Allied occupation zones of Germany.
This would put young American men with steady paychecks (and little parental or matrimonial
oversight) in a perfect place to experience European enthusiast culture and modern postwar sports
cars as they came off European production lines in ever growing quantities. It would be during this
type of military service that most Americans would really get an opportunity to immerse
themselves within a European enthusiast culture and bring those attitudes (and perhaps cars) back
to the US with them. Indeed, one enthusiast’s relationship with the sports car was defined as, “…
a love affair that began in Germany in 1952… his first Porsche, a 1300 Coupe, was purchased right
there in Germany… while he was with the Army. This Coupe, which Tom drove over 200,000km
is still running somewhere in Minnesota.”87 For Tom Countryman, the enthusiast described above,
his infatuation with a European standard of performance began when he first saw a sports car, in
this case a Porsche, on the German Autobahn passing him again and again. Clearly Countryman
also enjoyed the handling qualities of the Porsche, he would go on to enter it in numerous club
racing events in the US, for example, “ice races… [road racing] Nationals at Elkhart Lake, and
airport races such as those 2 at Iowa City.”88 Despite the cost of shipping, Countryman not only
brought the Porsche back to the US with him, but then sought out places where he could drive it
as he had in Germany. The process illustrated here is quite clear, exposure to the European sports
car in its native environment contributed to the transfer of elements of a European enthusiast
culture through the purchase and use of the sports car itself, even in America.
A perhaps more perfect example of Americans meeting the sports car for the first time in
Europe as a result of military service is illustrated by Tom Herren, a US Army Captain who
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graduated from West Point in 1955, a decade after the Second World War ended. Herren spent a
Cold War deployment in West Germany and began his connection with the European sports car:
Tom’s association with sports cars began while he was stationed in Germany His
first one was a [Triumph] TR3 that lasted about 2 years. In his words, ‘… its
downfall was due to my participation in the Scuderia Hanseat drivers school on the
Nurburgring during Sept. 1959…’ He purchased his first Porsche, a Super coupe,
and entered the Norisringrenne, held in Nurnenburg, July 1960, and placed 2nd from
last! Returning to the States in 1960, he joined PCA and SCCA and drove his first
race with the coupe in Savannah, placing 2nd in class.89
Herren’s experience in Germany, while perhaps not entirely typical, is illustrative of the deep
impact that experiencing the sports car in Europe could have. It began at the entry level with a
British sports car, likely due to the vehicle’s relative affordability and sporty image, then graduated
to the more intensely performance oriented German Porsche after a firsthand immersion in
European motorsport. Not only did he bring one back with him, but he also brought back a desire
to participate in European-style amateur racing, as well as joining two enthusiast clubs. One can
clearly see that overseas military service created the opportunity through which Tom Herren was
able to experience the European sports car in its native environment. Furthermore, Herren’s case
demonstrates the transfer of a European automotive motorsport culture, through the car, to
America when he involves himself in European style motorsport in America upon his return.
While both Toms, Herren and Countryman, provided illustrative examples, they were far
from being the only US servicemen to return with a European sports car. Don Wester offers another
example of the importance of military service as a vehicle to meet the European sports car in its
native environment. A native of Illinois Don explored an early interest in mechanics through the
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rebuilding of a Ford Model when he was 14, and later the restoration of a 1939 Ford Coupe at age
16. After attending college for engineering in California he joined the Air Force in 1950 and while
stationed at Brooks Air Force Base in Texas he, “helped to organize drag racing in conjunction
with the San Antonio Police Department.” 90 Clearly then Don Wester was one who had a long
interest in automobiles and at least American style motorsport. However, it wouldn’t be until he
shipped to Germany that, “As time went on new words and phrases began appearing in Don’s
letters. Words like sports cars, Stuttgart and Porsche. In 1954 Don bought a Porsche Super 1500
coupe.”91 The Porsche served as Don’s introduction to the wider enthusiast community, and in
1958 he traded his Porsche Super for the higher performance Porsche Carrera 1500 Speedster and
became involved in amateur racing in the mid-west as well as helping to form the Michigan Region
of the Porsche Club of America. However, Don’s involvement with European sports cars doesn’t
stop there, in late 1958 he moved to Monterey, California and opened a service shop for Porsches
and VWs and got involved in the California amateur racing scene. By October of 1960, Don (and
his brother, Jim), “became the authorized Porsche and Volkswagen dealer for the Monterey
Peninsula.” 92 Since this article was published in the PCA’s national magazine Sports Car a short
paragraph was included to assuage any doubts about his brother’s suitability for such a position,
“Brother Jim is a real Porsche man, having bought a 1600 Super Coupe in Germany while in the
U.S. Army several years ago…” and it goes on to detail some minor amateur racing
accomplishments.93 Through this one can also see some of the more negative aspects of the cultural
transmission of the European sports car, namely the feeling of belonging which fostered a certain
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sense of snobbishness if not outright animosity towards outsiders. It is necessary to reinforce that
Jim is not just a shady salesman, or simply riding the coattails of his brother’s enthusiasm for the
European sports cars. Instead he is carefully presented as one of the insiders; one who experienced
the Porsche through his military service and is therefore somehow more qualified to sell the sports
cars than one who had not had these experiences.
For Don Wester, experiencing a European sports car while attached to the U.S. military in
Germany not only influenced his interests as an enthusiast – from his original interest in the
American motorsport of drag racing to European-style motorsports including hill climbs and road
racing – but also formed the basis of his livelihood. Through the experience of Don Wester one
can see just how large of an impact the sports car could have on an American enthusiast, especially
on a man who was already interested in automobiles. Clearly, the sports car served to transfer a
European automotive enthusiast culture to Don, who would remain immersed in amateur racing,
at least for the rest of the 1960s, all while holding the hope that, “he may some-day be invited to
drive with the [Porsche] Factory team at Sebring and the Nürburgring.”94 Despite being steeped in
American amateur racing both in the mid-west and in the thriving California enthusiast scene, the
allure of racing in Europe still reigned supreme. This is illustrative of the fact that for many
American enthusiasts Europe, and European tracks, would shine as a beacon of sports car
authenticity, the birthplace of the motorsport and enthusiast culture Americans were imitating in
the US.
The process of American servicemen being exposed to the European sports car was also
one that, at least in the case of the British manufacturers, was overtly aided by government policy.
Through an agreement between the British automotive manufacturers and the British government,

94

Ibid.

52

which will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, MG sports cars appeared in the
Post Exchange of American military bases in England.95 As a jubilant article in News Exchange,
an official publication of the export arm of the Nuffield Organization, the umbrella corporation
which controlled several British automotive marques including MG, proudly proclaimed, “Within
six weeks of the scheme by which American servicemen in Great Britain can purchase M.G.s
through their Post Exchange… 150,000 dollars have been earned in this way by this popular sports
car.”96 These sales also included the provision that any car purchased under this scheme could not
be re-sold in Great Britain; the export drive and subsequent shortage of cars for the British
domestic market meant that there was a thriving black market for export cars which had been sold
to servicemen in the UK. Therefore, many of the cars purchased under this scheme would find
their way back to the US as their owners’ deployments ended and, being unable (or unwilling) to
sell them in the UK, were forced to take the cars with them.
It is also important to note that while some enthusiasts, or future enthusiasts, met the
European sports car on its home turf during a European deployment, many others were introduced
to the sports car in the United States. These encounters could be just as significant in terms of the
spread of a European automotive culture, even without the experience of driving the car in Europe.
One such enthusiast was Bruce R. Jennings, an avid amateur club racer who would go on to win
the SCCA Class C Championship in 1960, who was introduced to European performance as a
spectator at the sports car races at Andrews Field, Maryland. After being impressed by the
performance of a Porsche 1500 coupe, “Bruce, due to his intense mechanical interest, bought a ’55
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1500N Speedster to see what these Porsche’s were all about.”97 In 1957 he acquired a temporary
competition license, and a higher performance Carrera engine for his Porsche. By 1958 Jennings
was completely absorbed into the amateur racing scene, and after a crash destroyed his car, bought
another Porsche from a retiring driver and continued in the series. In 1960 Jennings would win
twenty-six regional and national races in his class, however despite his prowess, “I have no
thoughts of turning pro. I would like to do some racing in Europe for the experience, mainly the
Nürburgring. I’m SCCA and PCA all the way.”98 For enthusiasts like Jennings, using the vehicle
in European-style competition was the reason that he purchased his first Porsche, demonstrating
very clearly the transfer of an automotive culture through vehicle, but also the importance of
enthusiast organizations like the Sports Car Club of America and the Porsche Club of America
acting as conduits to aid in the transfer of European enthusiast culture beyond simply the vehicle
itself. Despite never having driven in Europe, the desire to do so is indicative of the way in which
many American enthusiast-consumers looked toward Europe as a sort of metropole for racing and
sports car development.
Lastly, there were those Americans who were introduced to the European sports car simply
by seeing one in an American dealership. Phil Hill, an American professional racing driver who
got his start in postwar amateur motorsport, was introduced to the European sports car through his
purchase in November of 1947 of an MG TC from the Los Angeles distributor International Motors.
Asked why he chose an MG in an interview in the Fall of 1960, he replied, “… it was the only
thing that had any real attraction. It was the only different kind of automobile that was available.”99
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Phil had harbored an enthusiasm for automobiles, becoming a mechanic after dropping out of the
University of Southern California, a prestigious engineering school, to become a mechanic,
however he showed no real inclination towards racing until he owned the MG. By 1949 he was
racing in professional series in Los Angeles, and would go on to race as a factory driver for Ferrari
in European Grand Prix. Perhaps Hill was swayed by the advertising which began to appear in the
Southern California region, such as a billboard on Wilshire Boulevard, one of the major roads in
Los Angeles, which proclaimed “Driving is fun again,” and featured an artist’s rendering of a
prewar American sporting car, the Stutz Bearcat, with a superimposed rendering of an MG TC.100
This billboard is interesting in that we see the attempt to make the very different and European
MG appear to be part of an American sports car tradition, while testimony from American
enthusiasts like Hill demonstrate that for American consumers one of the main selling points of
the sports car was its difference and novelty, both in design and in driving experience.
This chapter has traced the significant developments leading to the creation of the modern
European sports car, as well as situating that development within the framework of European
motorsport and legislation. It has also explored the formation of the single-marque automotive
enthusiast club, another development situated within Europe, demonstrating that both the sports
car and the particular style of motorsport and enthusiast culture have their origins in a European
automotive and cultural milieu. This establishes the basis for one of the central arguments of this
dissertation: that the sports car was a development of European design and production ethos and
therefore transported these attributes to the Americans who consumed them. This is then supported
by an examination of how American enthusiasts became increasingly aware of European sports
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cars following the Second World War, in some cases due to their service abroad, and transported
not only the vehicles back to the US, but also elements of European enthusiast culture such as
involvement in amateur racing in European-style motorsport as well as active participation in
enthusiast clubs.
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A BRITISH INVASION

The end of the Second World War brought with it the first coordinated exportation of the
European sports car to American consumers. The process was driven not only by the sales efforts
of the manufacturers and American distributors themselves, but also by multiple levels of the
British government. In fact, active participation of the British Foreign Office, Board of Trade, as
well as Customs and Excise in export promotion was crucial as most, if not all, British automakers
wanted to concentrate primarily on the ‘home market’ of Britain. This was due to the British
government’s motor vehicle taxation policies, often called the ‘horsepower tax.’ The horsepower
tax, discussed in the preceding chapter, established a paradigm of under square engine design and
meant that British vehicles were underpowered compared to their American counterparts. Due to
the nature of immediate postwar automotive production in which prewar designs were simply put
back into production to satisfy immediate demand, British automakers were concerned that their
designs would not sell well overseas and were unwilling to take the cost burden of designing and
producing a vehicle for the export market only. This reluctance meant that well into the 1960s,
British sports cars would have distinct driving dynamics due to their optimization for the British
home market. This in turn aided in the transport of a distinctly British automotive driving
experience and associated culture to the Americans who consumed them.
This chapter examines the intersection of international economic pressure, domestic
legislation, the British sports car, and their American consumers, to shed light on the British
attempt to regain economic power in an era dominated by American economic strength. I argue
that this process led to a form of cultural globalization and was driven, in part, by the British
government’s two-pronged effort to expand industrial exports, especially automobiles. The first
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prong was to compel manufacturers to establish an export program through policies of ‘Export or
Die’ and the control over rationed raw materials such as steel and rubber. The second prong was
to alter tax structures to aid in actual sales of export cars, with particular attention paid to American
servicemen stationed at American military bases in the United Kingdom. Therefore, this chapter
initially traces the economic and political forces behind Great Britain’s policies of ‘Export or Die’
and increasing exports of British sports cars to America. Next it examines the British governmental
effort to aid the actual sales of British automobiles. This came in the form of changes to two
significant automotive tax programs. First, the horsepower tax was replaced in 1946 with a
displacement tax, and only a few years later significant purchase tax concessions were made to be
able to sell British cars to visiting Americans, especially American servicemen. In its third section,
the chapter examines the culture which British sports cars bring with them and its adoption by
American consumers. European enthusiast culture, complete with factory support for singlemarque driver’s clubs and amateur motorsport events, aids in the dramatic expansion of sports car
sales in the American market. Finally, this chapter examines the ways in which the idea of ‘Europe’
and ‘European’ were used to increase sports car sales. Contemporary American enthusiasts in the
1950s and early 1960s viewed ‘Europe’ (including Britain) as a sort of metropole for sports cars
and a culture of amateur racing. The idea of ‘Europe’ and the ‘European’ sports car were mobilized
to increase the sales of sports cars, as well as American tourism through Britain.
By weaving these seemingly disparate threads together, this chapter demonstrates that not
only did the British sports car bring elements of a European automotive culture to a rapidly
expanding body of American enthusiasts, but that this process was aided and abetted by the British
government as well as British automotive manufacturers. Yet this chapter also complicates a topdown narrative by demonstrating the importance of contingency. British export promotion efforts
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were not aimed at aiding sales of sports cars, but rather of family cars, and the only reason why
British sports cars were exported in the immediate postwar years was that those were the models
which could most rapidly be put back into production with a minimum of raw materials. 101 After
the startling successes of sports models in America more effort was taken to expand their sales,
yet the focus of the government and many leading industrialists in the automotive industry
remained on attempting to increase sales of mass-market British family sedans due to the fear that
demand in the enthusiast market would soon be satiated. This failure to stay competitive within
the sports car niche moving from the 1950s into the 1960s meant that by the early 1970s British
sports cars were seen as increasingly irrelevant by American consumers. Declining sales left
British automakers without the stable sales footing that they would have needed to survive the
global economic turbulence of the 1970s and by the end of that decade all British manufacturers
had simply abandoned the American market.
This work is not, however, another narrative of the decline of the British automotive
industry which has captivated scholars of British economic, business, industrial, labor, and
automotive history. For instance, historian Timothy Whisler notes in his monograph, At the End
of the Road, “The UK was the leading exporter during the 1940s and early 1950s due to the world
dollar shortage and prostrated Continental producers. Although Britain remained the second
largest exporter behind Germany from the mid-1950s until the mid-60s, its percentage of the
market steadily decreased.”102 However, outside of Whisler’s work many of the industrial, labor,
and economic histories focus, much like contemporary industrialists and government officials, on
the failure of the mass market sedans to gain any real acceptance in the American market and on
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the labor disputes that plagued British factories.103 William Maloney and Andrew McLaughlin
argue along these lines in their work The European Automobile Industry; while British automakers
enjoyed a considerable number of advantages in the postwar period such as the inheritance of
government funded shadow factories and the decimation of European competition, “the industry
was suffering from a number of serious inefficiencies. These included high costs, lack of
rationalization of models and factories, antiquated working practices and under investment.”104
The narrative of inefficiency and management missteps works well as an approach to understand
the decline of the British automotive industry in the mid-1970s. However, this teleologic approach
casts a long shadow back to the early postwar period. Not much effort has been made in the realm
of academic work to chart the incredible successes of the British automotive industry, especially
their successes in the American market.
British success in exporting automobiles, even if only sports cars, complicates the
traditional narrative of American economic and cultural hegemony in the postwar period by
showing that America has never been as impermeable to foreign influence as traditional
historiographies have argued. Historian Victoria de Grazia’s work, Irresistible Empire: America’s
Advance through 20th-Century Europe, exemplifies this hegemonic, quasi-imperial interpretation
of American economic and cultural power. For de Grazia, American economic hegemony is a
model of “informal empire” or “Market Empire,” despite the fact that this empire is committed to
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the same free market policies it foists on Europe. 105 Historian and political scientist Andrew
Bacevich argues in his monograph American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S.
Diplomacy that “America today is Rome, committed irreversibly to the maintenance and, where
feasible, expansion of an empire that differs from every other empire in history.” 106 Key to both
variants of this argument is that American ‘hegemony’ is committed to economic openness through
free market trading polices which paradoxically leaves the hegemon open to the same type of
imported influences which these authors trace going from America to Europe. It is this very
openness that British automakers exploit, with the significant help of the British government, to
successfully open a niche in the American automotive market.
Furthermore, while the decline of the British automotive industry, beginning in the late
1960s and accelerating in the 1970s is historical fact, the narrative of decline ignores impact of the
sales success of the British sports car on American enthusiast culture in the late 1940s through the
1960s. As Whistler argues in At the End of the Road, “Until now few have taken a holistic approach,
where design and development, the resultant characteristics of the car, and the degree of market
acceptance are given equal weight with production methods and industrial relations.”107 However
in this effort Whistler himself never moves beyond an industrial and economic analysis to
interrogate the actual consumers of these products. I argue that, in fact, an even more holistic
approach is required, one in which the consumers of the sports cars and the simply incredible
amount of enthusiast material is also considered. That is especially true when it comes to the
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cultural significance of the British sports car to American enthusiast consumers and the ways in
which British automotive imports helped shape the American automotive market. This is a facet
of British automotive history which is obfuscated by the narrative of decline. In the teleologic, and
at times myopic, effort to explain British industrial decline these studies hide the very real
successes and cultural significance that specialty products, like the sports car, enjoyed in the
American market. By examining the sales success and appeal of British sports cars the downcast
narrative of decline can at least be complicated by the significant influence of the British sports
car on the enthusiast culture of American consumers and the domestic automotive market.

2.1

‘Export or Die’: The Push for Automakers to Export

The British Automotive industry – one of the leading sectors of Britain’s prewar industrial
economy – was first requested, and later more forcibly compelled, to increase its export ratio to
help bring hard currency dollars into British coffers. At the root of postwar British economic woes
was the drain on dollar reserves caused by an inverted balance of trade. Having borrowed
significantly to finance the war effort and needing to borrow still more to cover the transition to a
peacetime economic footing, Great Britain was left in the unenviable position of having to ask for
yet more financial aid.108 The United States, under pressure from the British Embassy, extended a
credit of 3.75 billion dollars in the Financial Agreement of 1945 and British ministers looked to
the future with an optimism which was not entirely unfounded. Yet in very short time there were
clear signs that the recovery was faltering, and that the drain on hard currency dollars – an artifact
of the Bretton Woods financial agreements – continued to grow throughout 1946. By March of
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1947 the deficit had reached 200 million dollars per month, due largely to the required importation
of foodstuffs from American markets.109 Within a year’s time, Britain was at risk of defaulting on
the loan and therefore sought to dramatically expand its exports in dollar markets, primarily North
America, in an attempt to achieve a more favorable balance of trade. Government intervention
focused on the export of British automobiles to the United States, especially mass-produced family
sedans. The predominant attitude was perhaps expressed best in the late 1930s by Cecil Kimber,
the main managing executive of M.G., “’In selling a specialty car it has always to be remembered
that there is only a definite size market for it, and it is merely foolish to be unduly optimistic…’”110
Among British industries, especially the automotive industry, these combined policies became
known as ‘Export or Die,’ and despite their emphasis on family sedan exports, they would
ultimately function to help push the British sports cars across the Atlantic to enthusiastic American
consumers.
Initially British automakers were not very receptive to the demand for increasing the export
ratio. As Board of Trade documents circa 1945 reveal, British automakers resisted the initial soft
push for more exports which came in the form of verbal requests at meetings of the Society of
Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) and the President of the Board of Trade. The soft push
approach was hampered by the exceedingly short tenure of Oliver Lyttelton as President (May to
July of 1945), by issues of taxation, and by a general recalcitrance of both leading industrialists
and the Board of Trade to put the potentially difficult export market ahead of an easily profitable
home and imperial market. In response to the Board of Trade request for an export ratio of at least
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50% production, the British automotive industry responded that they foresaw a maximum of only
40% without changes in policies of taxation, specifically the ‘horsepower tax.’111 Additionally, the
automotive industry sought to make the export push a short-term consideration, wanting any
concessions to include a return to ‘normalcy’ in the form of a 30% export ratio. Indeed, the motor
industry was so unresponsive to the Board of Trade requests that Sir Charles Bruce-Gardner, the
Chief Executive for Industrial Reconversion, lamented in June of 1945 that, “I am afraid I have
never expected this approach to the motor industry would be very useful. All the ground has been
gone over with them so many times already.”112 His disillusion was warranted since by November
the situation had changed little, as an internal Board of Trade note documents, “So far as the private
car side of the industry is concerned, whilst a target of 50% has been set there have been no serious
discussions with the industry as to how they are to achieve it… This state of affairs is in clear
contrast with the position in the majority of the other engineering industries…”113 However, the
Board of Trade was clearly determined to take an active role in shaping postwar British industrial
policy, indicated by the note which closes with an ominous question of, “whether steps should be
taken to enforce the 50% export percentage…”114 The pressure of the dollar crisis was already
mounting, and that pressure would be passed down to Britain’s leading industries.
The British automotive industry was particularly recalcitrant based on the high demand of
the home and imperial markets and felt further secure in the knowledge that not much innovation
or improvement on prewar models would be necessary to achieve a high volume of sales. This line
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of thought is evidenced in more detail by the minutes of a Board of Trade meeting on the 23rd of
September 1946, attended by leading members of the automotive industry:
The manufacturers were likely to advance three arguments in particular. They
normally sell to export markets at a slight discount and to some extent subsidize
their exports from their sales on the home market; their prices were high in relation
to U.S. prices and in order to develop a better competitive position they wished to
see the proportion of their home market sales beginning to approach what they
would regard as its long term normal. Manufacturers were also a little afraid that
this country might, through its international agreements, have to permit import of
foreign cars here at a time when the home market was still very large.115
In this excerpt two significant facts are abundantly clear. First, the British automotive industry was
far more focused, and would remain more focused, on the demands of the home market. Secondly,
British automotive manufacturers understood that their products in the immediate postwar years
were inferior to those of other industrial nations, but more specifically, to those of the United States.
American mass-produced automobiles frightened British manufacturers who had neither the
technology nor the raw materials to produce personal vehicles as quickly as American
manufacturers like General Motors, Ford, or Chrysler could. Therefore, in 1946 British automakers
feared that mass-produced American cars, which were cheaper and more powerful, would satiate
pent-up postwar British demand before British industries had a chance to profit.
In the face of such recalcitrance the British government had two methods available to
compel its industries to export. On one hand, using tariffs and export licensing, the Board of Trade
could have mandated not only an export quota, but also heavily influenced the destination market.
On the other hand, control could be passed through the Ministry of Supply, which controlled raw
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material allocations. Between these two methods The Board of Trade was quite reluctant to use
traditional export incentives and controls, insisting instead that while, “It is not the intention of the
Government to exports into different markets by an extension of export licensing or other controls,”
the onus of increasing exports must be borne by industrial leaders, a sentiment expressed as, “room
for a conscious and deliberate effort on the part of manufacturers and exporters to take stock of
the possibilities open to voluntary action.”116 This message was repeated to the U.S. government,
which British authorities wanted to keep appeased. Freedom of trade was a key ideological and
diplomatic point which the United States sought to uphold, and therefore Great Britain could not
risk alienating her closest ally even to alleviate her own economic distress. Therefore, British
diplomats made sure to point out to their American counterparts that, “A system of comprehensive
export licensing is clearly out of the question… we can, therefore, seek to influence exporter’s
choice of markets only by exhortation and by such indirect means as are open to the
Government.”117 While the Board of Trade was able to exert some pressure on British automakers
through negotiation, they would never exercise any real control, especially not over the product
produced or the destination market.
Therefore, as British manufacturers began to design the first postwar models they focused
entirely on the criteria and constraints of the home market, all the while resisting the push for
exports. The considerable focus on the home market meant that the British sports cars that are
initially exported or otherwise acquired by American consumers are identical to those sold in Great
Britain. For instance, the MG TC, the first postwar production sports car to be exported to the US
in large numbers, was right-hand drive only throughout its entire production. The driving dynamics
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of the vehicle, especially in power output would also remain unchanged from the original, designed
for use in Britain. Power output from the long-stroke 4-cylinder XPAG engine was strong in low
and mid-range torque, but only produced around 54 horsepower, and had a propensity to overheat
in warmer climates like the American southwest.118 In terms of driving dynamics this made the car
quick at lower speeds, and agile due to its light weight, conversely. early British sports cars like
the MG TC would struggle to cruise long distances at American highway speeds. In many ways,
the early MGs were entirely unsuited for American driving conditions, yet that did not deter the
American enthusiasts who consumed them.
The Board of Trade’s lackadaisical position on the issue was countered by the Ministry of
Supply, which exercised control over the allocation of rationed raw material and had certainly used
its authority to compel export production. Steel, a resource which was in critically short supply
after the war provided the Ministry of Supply with its most powerful tool to exercise control over
the British automotive industry. However, the Ministry of Supply’s ham-fisted approach to export
quotas and raw materials allocation sometimes frustrated British manufacturers attempts to
increase production of certain models, like the sports car, and seemed to interfere with the export
push compelled by the Board of Trade. This is illustrated by an intercompany memorandum from
C.E. Aldridge, the general manager of Nuffield Exports (the exporting arm of MG), to Sir Miles
Thomas, the Managing Director of Morris, in which he complained:
I started off by telling Mr. Welch [of the Board of Trade] that really we were
anxious to help and as a result were putting forward this suggestion for a special
M.G. programme for the U.S.A. only, if we could get the material, but that we could
not afford to do that out of our existing material programme. I further pointed out
to him that although they were asking us to cultivate hard currency markets, we
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were doing our best in this respect but could not attempt to do so entirely at the
expense of some of our best friends who might come under the category of soft
currency, so far as the Board of Trade were concerned…119
The project in question is increased production of the MG TC sports car, which Nuffield Exports
personnel noticed were selling quite well in the American market despite their deficiencies, a major
one being that they were produced in right-hand drive only. However, increased steel allocations
for a special version of the TC that would have been dedicated to the US market were not granted
by the Ministry of Supply, rather they expected MG to use its existing steel allocations for export
production. In essence, MG was trying to reserve it steel allocations for home market production,
and get additional steel for exports to the United States in a clumsy maneuver to get around the
constraints of the export drive. Ministry of Supply control over steel allocation frustrated British
automakers, however it served as a way for the British Government and Board of Trade to more
forcibly compel export production without resorting to methods which would arouse international
animosities. This method appeared to have worked quite well, by July of 1947 British automakers
had reluctantly agreed to an even more aggressive export program in which 60% of passenger
vehicles would be designated for export markets.120 However, while the Ministry of Supply could
allocate steel resources to be used only for export production, they still could not control which
export market goods were ultimately sold in.
The Ministry of Supply enforced export quota, led to a shortage of automobiles for the
home market and saw many efforts by British citizens and companies to thwart export controls in
order to get export quota vehicles delivered in Britain. While British automotive companies were
only too happy to fulfil these orders, the position of the Ministry of Supply as the allocator of all
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raw materials provided some automotive industry executives cause for concern. As Nuffield, the
parent company of MG, reported to the Board of Trade in May 1948, “Lever Brothers have ordered
a whole fleet of cars for delivery and use in the United Kingdom. Payment will be made in foreign
currency by one of the overseas branches.” Technically, the sales of these vehicles still gained the
valuable foreign currencies, yet, “Nuffield’s worry, however, is that since there are likely to be
large numbers involved… it may soon be discovered that their export returns will differ materially
from the official Trade and Navigation returns, with consequent reactions from the Ministry of
Supply when it comes to deciding upon steel quotas based on export performance.” 121 This is
indicative not only of the power which the Ministry of Supply held over British automakers, but
also the dysfunction between the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Supply. What emerges here
is an interesting question, does export production necessarily mean that the product must leave the
country as it appears the Ministry of Supply believes, or is the goal purely to earn hard dollar
currencies as the Board of Trade seems to believe? While eventually it was conclusively decided
that earning dollars was main goal, and that export quota sales within the UK territories for hard
currencies were acceptable, one clearly sees the influence of the Ministry of Supply wielded in
compelling production for actual export markets.
America was readily understood by both the British government and by British automotive
industry leaders to be a top export market, both for its size and for the hard currency dollars it
would generate. Even such small events as the shipping of five MG TC sports cars to America
made trade magazine articles, albeit ones that were clearly designed to placate Board of Trade
officials. As one such example reads, the shipment of these five sports cars, “gives further proof
of the determination at Nuffield Exports Ltd. to ship their vehicles overseas in the quickest and
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most efficient manner possible.”122 The small initial numbers and shaky distribution system were
only temporary impediments due to the small number of available cars for export. As Reginald
Hanks, the new Chief Executive of Morris Motors, indicated in a letter to Sir Miles Thomas,
“Please do not take our present M.G. sales policy seriously. Collier Brothers are just enthusiastic
amateurs, and we shall carry on with them only so long as we have such few cars to offer. I see
they have had ten to date.”123 However, despite the realization of the potential market which they
uncovered, British automotive executives at M.G. moved conservatively. H.A. Ryder, a General
Manager for M.G. recommended having a new M.G. T-series model ready to go into production
sometime in 1947, but to wait until the “present ‘TC’ Midget shows signs of fading public
interest.”124 This hesitation to really engage with the American enthusiast market was an initial
handicap, and was driven by the fear that the American enthusiast market would quickly be satiated
with a small number of vehicles. There is also the sense that British manufacturers don’t
necessarily understand why the TC is selling as well as it is, and are waiting for the fading public
interest to tell them what aspects of the design need updating. However, by the 1950s the
importance and permanence of the American enthusiast market to British manufacturers would be
made clear by a steady yearly increase in sales numbers.
In addition to the vehicles, Nuffield also sent personnel to America to lay the groundwork
for increasing exports. Donald Harrison and J.T. Forsyth, sales manager and technical
representative respectively, were sent on an American tour in August of 1947, stopping in the cities
of New York, Washington, Cincinnati, New Orleans, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle
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before continuing into Canada. According to Nuffield Exports, their goal was to, “visit Distributors
already holding Nuffield franchises and will appoint a new chain of Distributors throughout…
America.”125 Yet it is telling that the vehicles they initially brought with them for the journey were
both family sedan types, not the sports cars that were actually selling to an expanding crowd of
American enthusiasts. By the time the duo reached New Orleans they had changed tactics slightly,
making sure to leave an MG TC sports car in a conspicuous public spot in every city they stopped
in to expose more Americans to the tiny sporting vehicle. As News Exchange jubilantly reported
on the visit, “The first large shipment [of MGs] is now on the way, and America has well and truly
joined the big M.G. markets like Australia, Switzerland and Belgium.”126 As a byproduct of this
tour, the MG TC was introduced to a much broader range of American consumers than enthusiasts
alone. Where possible, local VIPs were photographed with the car including the Governor of Texas,
and the “Cotton Queen” of the Texas State Fair as she stood (somewhat stiffly) in the passenger
seat smiling at the gathering crowd.127
As stated earlier, by the 1950s the importance of the American enthusiast market as a
profitable export market for British automakers was becoming clear. Indeed, by 1952 even the
British government had noticed that sports cars were selling well to American consumers. In the
Monthly Economic Summary for May of 1952, produced by the Commercial Relations and
Exports department of the Board of Trade for the Foreign Office special attention was paid to the
development of sports car sales, “Within the general demand for British cars there is a special
demand for sports cars. This is a new market in the U.S.A. which… one British car, the M.G. [T
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series] has created. The new development still has great possibilities…”128 In fact, the Board of
Trade attempted to define the American enthusiast consumer – apparently a “young man without
too much money…” – to further aid British automakers in developing their products to be more
competitive.129 What this illustrates is a government push on multiple levels, including the foreign
office, to aid British automotive imports. While the potential demand for British family cars failed
to materialize in any meaningful way, and despite British motor industry recalcitrance, the export
push from the Board of Trade and Ministry of Supply had succeeded in getting relatively large
numbers of British sports cars in front of American consumers. In fact, these policies, which had
coerced British companies like M.G. to export vehicles they normally wouldn’t have, like the righthand drive only MG T series, exposed a new market niche.
At the end of 1953 the importance of the enthusiast market was finally made clear.
Increasing American domestic automotive production had begun to catch up to demand and the
prices on new American cars trended downward slightly. This widened the already extant price
gap between an American family car which was larger and more powerful, and a British family
sedan which was smaller and underpowered. This, of course, led to a substantial decrease in the
sales of British family sedans in America. However, as the Commercial Department of the British
Embassy in Washington noticed, sales of British sports cars continued to do well, despite the
‘softening’ of the American automotive market. In a confidential memorandum to the Foreign
Office and Board of Trade it noted, “With the help of the new Triumph [sports car], the AustinHealy [sports car]… and the hotted-up M.G., coupled with the ever increasing popularity of the
Jaguar, our exports of sports cars should move upwards again… prospects for the new M.G. and
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for the Jaguar sports cars seem brightest of all, in spite of the fact that recent sharp price
reductions… appear in some areas to have temporarily unsteadied the market.”130 This serves as a
further reminder that the sales of British sports cars in America were supported by all levels of the
British government, from the Board of Trade’s export push to British Embassy officials provided
an eye into the American automotive market.
This section has demonstrated the importance of the British government, specifically the
Board of Trade and Ministry of Supply in coercing British auto manufactures like M.G. to produce
for export sale. One should keep in mind that the eventual expansion of British automakers into
the American market was quite likely. However, if left to their own devices it is not likely that this
would have happened much before 1950. Indeed, it is likely that the long-term presence of
Americans in Britain as a result of Cold War military deployments would have eventually created
sufficient demand, or at least legendary tales of sports cars, that small numbers would have been
imported and eventually exposed the larger market niche. However, due to the efforts of the Board
of Trade and Ministry of Supply, relatively large numbers of British sports cars came to the U.S.
in the immediate postwar period of 1946-1950 which served to expose a clear niche market that
was much larger than British or even American manufacturers realized.

2.2

Changing Tax Policy: A Push to Aid Automotive Sales

Compulsion to export through the machinations of the Board of Trade and Ministry of
Supply were not the only two ways in which the British Government sought to increase exports,
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especially during the critical ‘Export or Die’ years of 1946-1949. Policies of taxation were also
seen as key methods through which automotive export sales could be increased. Two key taxes,
the ‘horsepower’ tax and its detrimental effect on engine design and the value-added tax which
applied to vehicles sold for long-term use in Europe were either abolished or modified in order to
increase the sales of British vehicles to American consumers. While these policies were not aimed
specifically at the sports car, they did serve to increase sports car sales, especially to U.S.
servicemen station in Europe on Cold War deployments.
Taxation of automobiles calculated in relation to horsepower had been in place in Britain
since 1910, although the relation of ‘taxable horsepower’ in relation to actual output horsepower
had diverged. However, these policies functioned to shelter British automakers from outside
competition as well as to encourage the production of small, low-powered automobiles. Historian
Peter Dunnett argues in The Decline of the British Motor Industry that, “Before World War II
engine taxation policies and protective duties had given the UK manufacturers a virtual monopoly
of the home market, but had encouraged the production of designs largely ill-suited to overseas
markets. Consequently… less than ten percent of [prewar] production had been exported.”131 The
‘horsepower’ tax, as discussed in the previous chapter, tended to make British engines have a long
stroke and small displacement. This made them ‘torquey’ in the parlance of automotive enthusiasts,
but ultimately low on horsepower, top speed performance, and efficiency. Automotive industry
executives realized in 1945 that if Britain was to significantly develop its automotive export
markets then engine design would have to change. However, it could not do so if cars developed
on that model would be unsaleable within the British home market, “[the tax] was a definite
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handicap as regards larger engine models, which, with a much smaller home market demand, could
not be produced in sufficient quantities to make their export economical., except in the higherpriced range.” 132 Therefore reform was necessary, and due to the pressure within the British
government to boost exports a change in policies of taxation was not only possible, but politically
expedient.
The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) promoted a new taxation policy
in the postwar period, initially one based on engine size alone. The new cubic capacity tax appealed
to the British Treasury, which the SMMT assured would lose no revenues and that the new tax
would be easier to administer.133 The new tax succeeded in removing the engine design distortions
caused by the horsepower tax, however, it still put pressure on automobile manufacturers to
produce vehicles with smaller engines. The British Government realized in one short year the
failure of the new tax policy to create the kind of design freedom which had been originally
envisioned. The frustration is perhaps expressed most eloquently by R.R. Holditch, General
Manager Personal-Exports Division, of the British Motor Corporation:
We, as a nation, cannot afford to sell Britain short. Today we are engaged
commercially in a life-and-death struggle with Germany. France, and Italy and, to
a lesser degree, the other car-producing countries for world markets, without which
prices in Britain must rise. We cannot afford to lag behind them in offering to the
visitor those goods and services he comes to purchase. Britain needs the millions
of pounds he spends; they are essential to our continued prosperity.”134
Therefore in 1947 another change in vehicle taxation policy was made, this time to a simple flat
registration fee, without reference to engine displacement. Sir Miles Thomas, the President of the
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SMMT reacted favorably to this development, reportedly saying that, “designs have been freed...
[having] been hampered by the horse-power tax for too long.”135 In the end, this turned out to be
a mixed blessing, as British automakers concentrated on medium-sized vehicles with larger
engines which were hoped to have more market potential overseas.
While the engines of British sports cars would increase in displacement and potency from
the early 1950s to the 1960s due to this changing policy, they were never completely independent
of the need for automobiles intended for European consumption to be more efficient due to the
higher costs of fuel in Europe. For example, the MG T series, the first British sports car to arrive
in the American market in any appreciable numbers came, in 1945, with a 1.3 liter inline 4-cylinder
engine producing roughly 55 brake horsepower. The first major redesign of this model, in 1955
came with a 1.5 liter inline 4-cylinder engine producing 68 brake horsepower. Only a few years
later in 1958 displacement would creep up to 1.6 liters, however the stagnation of engine size
despite changes in policies of taxation at the lower end of the sports car market is starkly clear.
However, on the upper end of the specialty car market this tax change resulted in the production
of one of the most iconic postwar sports cars: the Jaguar XK120. The XK120 was a two-seat
roadster which featured a 3.4 liter inline six-cylinder engine, developing 160 brake horsepower.
The vehicle, and its powerful engine, found much praise among American enthusiasts lucky
enough to afford one.136
While the change in the horsepower tax was significant for the higher-priced version of the
British sports car produced by Jaguar, the development of policies to aid the actual sale of British
cars to Americans overseas were perhaps even more significant. The previous chapter has outlined
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the importance of military service as a prime conduit for introducing potential American
consumers to the European sports car. However, while sales of export quota cars to Americans for
temporary use in the UK was made possible by Section 22 of the Statutory concession in the
Finance Act of 1946, the regulations currently in place mandated the export of any British vehicle
sold for dollars from the export quota, “on, or about the time of, the visitors leaving the country,
or 12 months after delivery of the car, whichever is the earlier.”137 While it allowed sales to tourists
and other visitors, this legislation largely locked out the largest potential source of dollars for
export sports cars on the home market, U.S. servicemen. The goal of the hard limit on time in the
country was intended to keep export quota cars away from the home market, which was suffering
from a desperate shortage of new vehicles. However, it certainly frustrated sales efforts, both to
servicemen as well as other American businessmen who would be staying in England on contract
longer than a year, but not permanently and therefore were technically unable to purchase a vehicle
from the export quota.138 A compromise was quickly affected by the Ministry of Supply, which
formally allowed sales of export cars for ‘permanent retention’ in the UK for dollars on June 10th,
1949. However, this arrangement was only for Americans or Canadians, and was framed as a
diplomatic measure, “This agreement has been made because of the supreme importance of
increasing our trade with Canada and U.S.A. and the Government is not prepared to extend the
arrangements to nationals of other countries.” 139 The compromise was that the American (or
Canadian) purchaser must sign an agreement to not sell the car within the UK for a period of at
least two years; it had to be sold to another qualified American/Canadian or exported from the UK.
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With the ability of American servicemen in the UK to now purchase British cars from the export
quota, and without the one-year export restriction, by August of 1949 the British government had
cleared a major hurdle in increasing sales to Americans overseas.
However, a second hurdle loomed ahead, the purchase tax which was applied to all British
vehicles sold in the UK, unless they were sold for export and removed from the UK within twelve
months. This came under scrutiny in the early summer of 1949 when British manufacturers were
also actively looking for opportunities to separate Americans stationed in the UK from their
valuable dollars. Nuffield, the manufacturer who owned M.G., began to send salesmen to
American military bases to demonstrate their vehicles. However, they noticed that American
servicemen were able to purchase through the Post Exchange (PX) French and American
automobiles duty free. In response, the manager of Nuffield Exports complained, “It has not as yet
been possible to ascertain the number of cars imported in this manner, but visual observation
indicates the numbers to be considerable… May consideration be given please, to the suggestion
that our cars supplied to Post Exchange for resale to U.S.A.A.F. personnel based in the country be
supplied Purchase Tax free.”140 While the vehicles were now legally able to stay in the country for
the duration of their owners’ deployment, those that stayed longer than twelve months would need
to pay the purchase tax which priced British vehicles out of the range of most servicemen.
The purchase tax concession would be the second major tax change which the British
government undertook to aid export sales. In the case of the purchase tax it was undertaken
specifically to aid the sales of British cars to American servicemen. By the end of August 1949,
the details of the purchase tax concession had to be ironed out. British cars would be sold through
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PX locations on U.S. military bases only to, “military members of the U.S. Forces,” with the
guarantee that the vehicle would be exported at the end of the purchaser’s term of service in the
UK and that, “Purchase Tax will, therefore, be paid by the Post Exchange Authorities who will
claim refund from the Foreign Office.”141 This made British cars not only much more affordable,
but also kept them prominently in display at nearly all U.S. military facilities.
The positive outcome of these policies in terms of sales was clear. Roughly 3,600 British
vehicles were sold to American servicemen in 1952, of which 129 were reported to have been
subsequently exported as per the sales contract.142 The British automotive industry also noted the
importance of the PX sales scheme, evidenced here by an article in News Exchange, “1,000
Nuffield cars have now been delivered to American Servicemen in Britain against dollar
payment…and it has contributed 1,286,988 dollars to date.”143 These vehicles were all sold on a
‘tax concession’ basis which meant that the American purchasers signed a contract which stated
that the vehicle was intended for export, although by the 1950s legislation had changed again to
allow the sale of the cars in the UK to another qualified serviceman. As a letter from Henlys
Limited, the British distributor for southern England, illuminates, “sales to American service
personnel enjoy the highest priority. So much so that the manufacturers have arranged to allocate
a quota of their production for the express purpose fulfilling the orders of the American Service
personnel.”144 The change in purchase tax and the legislation allowing the sales of British cars to
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American soldiers and airmen at on base PX facilities contributed to expanding sales of British
sports cars to Americans, of which at least a percentage returned to the US with their owners.
Later in 1952 American servicemen would be given another concession, the ability to own
two cars for retention and use in the UK free of duty fees and Purchase Tax. The issue originally
arose out of the desire of senior staff level officers’ desire to have a car for themselves as well as
a car for their family. One such example was Lt. Col. Joseph Adams, attached to the 3rd Airforce
in the summer of 1952. Adams asked to bring his personal Ford car to England customs and duty
free, in addition to the “1952 Austin Convertible Car… purchased from the Ruislip PX
recently.”145 The British government, unwilling to lose the potential dollar sales from Americans
who simply brought cars from the US with them quickly formulated a new policy to cover this
contingency. The agreement, initiated at the behest of Lt. Col. George Cechmanek, Staff Judge
Advocate of the US 3rd Airforce, was along similar lines. One, the vehicles must be exported from
the UK at the conclusion of the US serviceman’s service in the UK; secondly, they must be sold
to a qualifying service member or the second vehicle must be exported as well. In order to appease
the British this new facility was only extended to allow for the purchase of a British manufactured
car, “The entitled person may also purchase, in dollars… thru the US Army and Air Force Post
Exchange system (UKES) or US Navy Ship Sales Store… one (1) British manufactured
automobile (not previously exported.)” 146 The rapidity of legislative changes displays the
aggressiveness of the British government and automotive industry in expediting the sales of British
automobiles to American military personnel. It should also be noted that many of the automotive
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sales to American service men were British sports cars, even the case of Col. Adams and his 1952
convertible Austin which was, most likely, an Austin-Healey 100.
While ironing out this process for the vast numbers of American military personnel
stationed in the UK assumed top priority, sales of British vehicles to American civilian tourists
were also seen as another way to help increase dollar sales. The problem for American civilian
tourists was the Purchase Tax; unlike military personnel whose tax would be refunded by the
Foreign Office, civilians faced the reality that, “Export quota cars cannot be delivered in U.K.
legally free of P.T. [purchase tax], legislation would in fact be necessary to provide the facility.”147
The confusion over this legislation is perhaps best illustrated by the case of Mrs. Leo S. Moore
and her husband, American tourists who purchased an M.G. sports car for use during their vacation
in England in the spring of 1949. Their tale of automotive woe is long, after the initial extra fiveday wait to pick up the vehicle they had already bought and paid for – which was supposed to have
been ready to drive away when they arrived – a major element to their misfortune was the purchase
tax:
But what they did not expect was that they were required to pay L146 purchase tax,
although in signing all the various forms in America they had understood they were
exempt from this payment. They were assured of course that this sum was
refundable on taking the car out of England, so they paid this too… Their
reservations to return to the United States were direct from Paris, and they had no
intention of returning to England so they applied to Nuffield House [the
manufacturer] for refund of their Purchase Tax. They were informed that this could
not be returned to them unless they returned with the car to England and turned to
Nuffield House for shipment back to the United States. They had no alternative but
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to comply although it meant altering all their reservations and going to the
additional expense of freighting the car back to England.148
The lack of a clear policy in this regard demonstrably complicated sales of export quota vehicles
to American civilian consumers in the UK. It is a sign of just how important sales of British
automobiles to American tourists were that Mrs. Moore’s unsatisfactory treatment was taken up
by the British Consulate in Los Angeles which then reached out to the Board of Trade and Customs
and Excise in order to find a less complex solution. Unfortunately for American tourists, the
Purchase Tax issue was never completely simplified, however, British automakers provided a
workaround in the form of the organized tour groups which will be discussed in greater detail in
the following section.

2.3

The Effect of the British Sports Car on American Enthusiast Culture

This chapter has so far outlined the two main ways in which the British government used
policy and legislative tools to expand the sales of British automobiles to Americans, especially
American servicemen or civilian tourists in the UK. It is now time to examine the significance of
the British sports car in terms of its impact on American enthusiast culture. Perhaps more than any
other single foreign industry, the British automobile industry exerted an incredible influence on
American consumers following World War II through the importation of the sports car. While
there certainly were American automobile enthusiasts who had been exposed to European
performance vehicles in the prewar period of the 1910s-1920s, either through the Vanderbilt series
or other international racing events, most had never owned a sports car. Sports cars simply were
not available to the average American until British manufacturers began importing them by the
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thousands after 1946. As ownership expanded so did American participation in facets of European
automotive culture such as the enthusiast club and amateur racing. Early enthusiasts would form
the backbone of the Sports Car Club of America (SCCA), one of the first major enthusiast
organizations in the United States. Despite the SCCA’s elitist beginnings an expanding group of
American enthusiasts would influence the direction of the club move it from a social organization
to a sanctioning body for amateur European-style motorsport in America.
The SCCA emerged as an enthusiast organization in late 1944 as an Allied victory in
Europe seemed to loom on the horizon. It was outgrowth of the now defunct Automobile Racing
Club of America – a prewar association which is unrelated to the organization of the same name
currently responsible for American stock car racing – and the US faction of the M.G. Car Club
intended to serve as a social group for American enthusiasts.149 From its inception the focus was
on automobiles produced in Europe, even though some prewar American automobiles were also
represented. In early 1945 it renamed its newsletter Sports Car, a change from the previous
Sportwagen, a German term of the same meaning, which is again demonstrative of the European
focus of American sport car enthusiasts. 150 It early members were mainly wealthy East Coast
Americans who seemed to pride the exclusivity of their organization, only owners of European
cars were allowed to become full SCCA members. These lucky few would meet monthly, at least
while the weather was favorable, to discuss their automotive passions and engage in some
impromptu road racing of their prewar sports cars.
By 1948 the club had expanded remarkably. From the initial meeting of three enthusiasts
in the Washington D.C. area in 1945 the club had grown to a membership of a few hundred, and
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into new geographic regions like Miami and Los Angeles. This rapid growth had been fostered by
the expansion of sportscar ownership due to the affordable British M.G. T-series which was being
imported in ever increasing quantities. For instance, in a review of the Miami regional meeting a
note is made of, “New member Bill Doble,” who, “owns a 1946 MG Midget [MG TC], one of the
first postwar sports cars to arrive in America from England.”151 In the same year the Boston region
of the SCCA noted that the only sports car actually on the road in Boston was an MG TC.152
Through these tiny regional snapshots of expanding early postwar SCCA membership the MG’s
role in democratizing American access to the sports car is clearly demonstrated.
As ownership of European sports cars like the MG T-series expanded so too did American
enthusiast interest in motorsport, especially motorsport based on a European model. The
performance advantages of the European sports car were mainly in its agility; the small,
lightweight European sports cars could corner significantly quicker than American production
vehicles of the period. However, European sports cars did not necessarily excel in tests of
acceleration or top speed, therefore limiting their use in emergent forms of American motorsport
such as the drag race and circle-track racing. Indeed, European racing tended to focus on the
technical elements of driving, as American Wilbur Shaw noted in a letter to a fellow enthusiast
back home:
The trip abroad was very interesting since we were able to attend the Sports Car
Race at Pescara, Italy, and although the speeds were not high, it was a very
interesting race from a spectator’s point of view because of the trickiness of the
course. Continental people have been brought up on that kind of racing and
appreciate the technique and skill required negotiating difficult turns, no matter
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how slow the turn might be. This is something I am afraid we will never be able to
sell in this country [United States].153
Shaw’s fear that European style events would never expand in America proved to be unfounded,
however it serves as an additional demonstration of the European focus of American enthusiasts
in which the idea of ‘Europe’ functions as a metropole of sorts for sports car development and
motorsport. In any case, American sports car enthusiasts looking to experience the true
performance abilities of their vehicles needed a road course, in other words a race track which
featured many turns of differing angles and severity. A road race, or ‘Grand Prix’ imitated the old
town-to-town races common in the 1910’s and 1920’s in Europe: the twisting course laid out along
town or rural roads stood in for the traditional country roads of Europe, and the overall race
distance, over multiple laps of a much smaller race circuit, were usually at least 30 miles to imitate
the distance between European towns. Initially, these courses would be created by closing public
roads in close cooperation with local authorities to create a safe (and legal) environment for racing,
however, by the 1950s this type of racing would be increasingly relegated to purpose-built racing
tracks entirely separate from public roads.154
The creation of the first sports car road race in America offers a clear example of how
increasing sports car ownership by American enthusiasts created the environment for the
expansion of amateur motorsports in America influenced by European-style motorsport. By the
summer of 1948 the SCCA executive committee was under increasing pressure from a growing
membership base which wanted more out of the club than social meetings and were themselves
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tired of holding questionably legal regional enthusiast ‘racing’ events on public roads, unsuitable
tracks, and the estates of some of their wealthier members like Briggs Cunningham. Therefore, on
June 12th, 1948, the executive committee travelled to Watkins Glen, a small town in the Finger
Lakes region of New York State, to investigate the possibilities of staging the first postwar road
race for American enthusiasts, to be called the ‘Grand Prix’ at Watkins Glen. The executive
committee found an enthusiastic local Chamber of Commerce eager to create a surge of tourist
traffic late in the season, which went so far as to host a banquet dinner for the SCCA delegates,
and influential members of the local community. One of them was Cameron Argetsinger, a local
lawyer who was quoted in a later interview in 1998 that, “’It’s been said, and it’s not entirely
wrong, that I did it [helped establish the Grand Prix] because I had an MG-TC and didn’t have a
place to race it...”155 The Mayor himself even offered to secure the necessary State and County
cooperation to hold the race along routes which passed through those respective jurisdictions,
although he was not a sports car owner himself. To mollify those in the community who may not
have been as excited to have a road race held in their town, the SCCA, under advisement from the
Mayor, designated the local Schuyler Community Hospital as a charity which would receive all
profits from the sales of the race program. As the SCCA reported in the My-June issue of Sports
Car, the bi-monthly club newsletter, “Here is a chance to have a real annual event comparable to
what the Europeans have been doing for years...”156
The Watkins Glen Grand Prix, scheduled for the 2nd of October 1948, was a tremendous
success. Given the SCCA’s predominantly East Coast membership, enthusiast attendance was high,
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an estimated ten thousand people, and some fifty sports cars were on display, although only
twenty-seven cars were entered in the race. Of those, fifteen were entered in the main event, the
eight lap, thirty mile Grand Prix. Eight of them were MG TCs and all eight crossed the finish line.
The Watkins Glen race was covered in local newspapers such as the Elmira Sunday Telegram,
which despite it not being an enthusiast publication noted that, “The course was patterned after the
Grand Prix courses of Europe. A portion of the route was through the village.”157 First place went
to a prewar Alfa-Romeo, and second went to Briggs Cunningham’s modified ‘BuMerc,’ a
homebuilt racing car made by a combination of Buick drivetrain components on a Mercedes
chassis. However, third place went to an MG TC, also owned by Cunningham, but driven by a
fellow enthusiast and friend Haig Ksayian. The podium finish would of course help to sell more
MGs to American enthusiasts, however, even by 1948 results of the British export push are clearly
demonstrated: over half of the vehicles entered in the first postwar American road race are post1946 production British sports cars.
The event was also quite popular among the American enthusiasts who participated. Denny
Cornett, an SCCA member and MG owner from Kentucky who had driven to New York to
compete, wrote that despite his crash on the course which nearly destroyed his car he fully intended
to race again the following year, “I now call her [the MG] ‘Lucky 7’ and I would like to put in a
request for that same number when we race next year… Here’s to many more such races.”158
Another American enthusiast, Bill Galagher from Massachusetts opined that the Watkins Glen
race, “was the grandest affair I have ever attended from every standpoint,” although he did offer
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the suggestion that in future iterations of the Grand Prix at least one race be set aside specifically
for foreign sports cars only. 159 His contention was that despite the SCCA’s proclaimed
organization around the European sports car, the first two places went to vehicles which were
really full racing cars, heavily modified. Indeed, the second place ‘BuMerc’ hardly qualified as
being either European or a sports car, having more in common with American hot rods than a
European sports car. In a bit of passive-aggression Gallagher suggested, “If this type of car is
encouraged [heavily modified or racing-only cars] the true foreign car, sports enthusiast, will have
to take a back seat. I understand the original idea of the club runs along the idea, and it would be
wonderful to see it continue so.”160 Through this quote one can see the struggles and complexities
inherent in the transfer of culture due to increasing globalization. The importance of amateur racing
as an arena in which to use the sports car for it intended purpose – performance driving – is
abundantly clear. However, racing is, at least in theory, about having the fastest vehicle on the
track, which necessitates modification. Modification, however moves the vehicle away from a,
perhaps imagined, European sports car purity. Therefore, these vehicles are not seen as sports cars
since elements of the ‘European’ driving attributes are stripped away in the pursuit of pure
performance and that kernel of ‘European-ness’ is lost. This is really at the heart of what Gallagher
is trying to express; the pure racing cars are impure, they are not the ‘true foreign car’ which the
club is supposed to promote. This then is one of the clearest indications of the importance of the
British sports car in the transfer of an enthusiast culture to American consumers in the postwar
period, a demonstration of the inseparability of ‘European-ness’ when it came to the credentials of
the ‘true’ postwar sports car.
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Similar road racing events began to appear with ever increasing frequency around the
country as the SCCA began its transition to being more of an amateur racing organization. In
January 1950 the Palm Beach Shores Race, a road circuit on the streets of the town of Palm Beach
Shores brought out 62 entrants, 22 of which were British production sports cars, 14 MG T-series
(one coming from as far as Washington state), 5 Jaguar XK-120s, and 3 Healeys. Of the other
entrants, all but 7 were cars of European manufacture.161 While the increasing number of entries
dilute the percentage of the sports cars of British manufacture, it is still clear that in terms of
postwar production sports cars British manufacturers were leading in the American enthusiast
market. While MGs continued to be represented in large numbers, the Jaguar XK-120, introduced
to Americans in 1948, was larger, more luxurious, more powerful, and significantly more
expensive than the MGs and exposed a new facet of the American enthusiast niche market. The
Jaguar appealed to wealthier automotive enthusiasts, however it was certainly a performance car,
and soon established a successful racing pedigree. The Healey, by contrast, was an evolution of
the MG model, a small, lightweight sports car powered by a small engine with a more modern
body and chassis design for the 1950s. Both new models built upon the sporting image of British
manufactured vehicles established by the MG T-series in the eyes of American enthusiasts,
illustrating the success of the export drive. These new sports cars helped further establish the idea
that performance motoring came from Europe.
As more and more British sports cars became readily available to American enthusiasts,
amateur racing began to dominate the focus of the SCCA. The regional meets, which had begun
largely as social events with impromptu motorsport thrown in for fun, became amateur racing
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events with the non-racing social activities taking a back seat. The types of motorsport practiced
by American enthusiasts also began to diversify, although still borrowing heavily from European
trends. Rallying – a European motorsport popularized in 1911 by the Monte Carlo Rally, were
‘races’ in which a driver and navigator attempt to maintain a predetermined speed over a set route
of public roads broken into legs of varying distance by control points (or checkpoints) – exploded
in popularity in postwar America. Rallies were not about all out speed, rather it was about
maintaining the predetermined speed for each leg of the route with points deducted for arriving at
checkpoints too early or late. They usually covered long distances and required meticulous
planning on both the organizers’ and drivers’ part, a win or loss could come down to a tenth-second
variance in checkpoint arrival time. A few rallies had been held in the immediate postwar years in
America, however the Los Angeles Spring Rally of 1950 is particularly illustrative of this new
trend and the significance of the British sports car in spreading it. The rally was held of Sunday,
February 26th, 1950 and organized by the Los Angeles Regional Group of the SCCA, which is
itself indicative of the rapid expansion of the organization. The route covered roughly 130 miles
of Southern California mountains and desert, proceeding through the small towns of the coastal
mountains, La Cañada, Tujunga, and Sunland before reaching, “a bewildering succession of steep
grades and hairpin curves that traversed two mountains. Not even the descending sections offered
a respite from continuous gear changing and tiller work, while any excursion off the pavement
might mean a sheer drop of several hundred feet.”162 Clearly the organizers were aiming at a rally
with a European feel, and making the most of the mountainous terrain of Southern California. It is
also important to note that the majority of the vehicles entered were MGs – 33 out of 43 – and they
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swept first, second, and third finishes. Through this event, and the many others which followed, it
becomes clear that the British MG sports car provided an access point to a broader European
enthusiast culture. Whether the consumer’s interest was aroused before or after the purchase of the
vehicle, the vehicle itself still was an essential component in the spread of this European enthusiast
culture, seen here in the form of rally racing, to American enthusiasts.
The 1950s was a boom period for the expansion of racing led by the SCCA, even beyond
the rally and road race. The Milwaukee region organized a type of race called the ‘gymkhana,’ a
motorsport in which a very small course that emphasized a driver’s knowledge of and ability to
precisely control the car at low to medium speeds is created, usually in a large parking lot or airfield.
This type of racing suited the small British sports cars of the time, top speed and acceleration
outside of the first two gears was irrelevant, and much more rested on the driver’s ability to
precisely control the car within the confines of the track. Indeed, as American enthusiast Carl
Mueller notes in his report to Sports Car, the Milwaukee meet represented, “a new type of event
patterned after the lines of the very popular English trials, or Gymkhana.”163 At the Milwaukee
event a familiar pattern emerges yet again, 22 of the 27 entries are of British manufacture, and 15
are MG T-series, 4 Jaguar XK-120s and 1 lone Healey. The is illustrative of the fact that in many
cases the appropriation of European-style motorsport by American enthusiasts was intentional, the
Milwaukee SCCA members were knowingly attempting to recreate an English-style motorsport
event for the benefit of American participants, the majority of whom arrived driving a British
vehicle.
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The rapid growth of the SCCA, in membership numbers and regional scale, as well as its
evolution from a social organization to a sanctioning body for American amateur motorsport
illustrates the complex currents of cultural globalization. On the one hand, the spread of a European
enthusiast and motorsport culture within and among American enthusiasts is a process
intentionally carried out by willing participants. After all, it is American consumers, exposed to
British sports cars during military service or seeing them in action in the United States, who
purchase the sports cars with no form of overt compulsion and who take great pleasure in
experiencing the performance these cars can offer in European-style motorsports events. However,
on the other hand, this process is influenced by a foreign government’s domestic and export policy,
from the control over steel which compelled British manufacturers to export to hard currency
markets, through to the alteration of tax and customs policy to increase the sale of British vehicles
to American servicemen in the UK on Cold War deployments. The narrative is further complicated
by the efforts of the manufacturers and distributors of British vehicles in the US to increase sales
by co-opting elements of enthusiast culture.

2.4

‘The European Tour’: Using the idea of ‘Europe’ to Sell the Sports Car

The rapid growth of the SCCA and in the popularity of European-style amateur racing
events did not go unnoticed by British manufacturers and their US sales and public relations
departments. In fact, some British manufacturers used the single-marque enthusiast club as
mechanism to increase sales. The most well documented of these attempts was made by StandardTriumph, the British automaker which produced the “TR” series of small and relatively
inexpensive sports cars in the MG tradition, first introduced to Americans with the TR-2 in 1954.
Triumph sponsored the creation of the Triumph Sports Owners Association (TSOA) in the spring
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of 1955 with the idea being to use the already established enthusiast culture of the single-marque
owners club to enhance the image of the Triumph sports car among American consumers. These
clubs had begun to rapidly expand in the US due to the cultural transfer and comradery fostered
by a growing number of American enthusiasts who owned British sports cars. More specifically,
the TSOA was an attempt to establish a brand loyalty to encourage current owners to buy newer
Triumph models rather than moving to a competitor’s brand, such as MG or Healey, as well as
using the experience of current owners to extoll the virtues of the car to fellow enthusiasts to
increase sales of new Triumphs to Americans. The TSOA was firmly under the control of the
Standard-Triumph corporation and its monthly publication was produced by an employee of
Standard-Triumph’s New York office. Both Keith Hopkins and, later, Michael Cook, the
employees assigned to manage the TSOA as part of Triumph’s public relations apparatus for
American enthusiasts were both sports car enthusiasts themselves which helped to guide and focus
the material which appeared on its pages. However, in the end, and unlike the other enthusiast club
newsletters and periodicals, the TSOA and its newsletter were essentially a mouthpiece for the
corporation to spread public relations material and sell more cars.
In the first year of the club’s existence creative membership drives were used with prizes
offered to those who were able to convince fellow Triumph owners to join. TSOA members who
convinced five fellow Triumph owners received a miniature model TR2 as an incentive. Moreover,
it appears as if this drive were successful, the September issue claiming that several TSOA
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members were about to enroll their fifth new member.164 TSOA membership was pushed from the
dealers as well, Michael Cook writes in his partially autobiographical monograph, Triumph Cars
in America, “Dealers were urged to get as many customers as possible to join the Triumph Sport
Owners Association.”165 Furthermore a great deal of space in the monthly newsletters was initially
devoted to noting the success of Triumph drivers in SCCA competitions, attempting to forge a
brand image of motorsports excellence. It should be noted that Cook’s insights come from a unique
position among automotive authors considering he was the US-based advertising manager for
Triumph and secretary of the TSOA. Hired in 1958, he quickly moved up to become the advertising
and public relations manager for Triumph in the United States, as well as the editor of the TSOA
newsletter, which allows a glimpse into the machinations of manufacturers and marketers to coopt enthusiast culture to increase sales.
One of the most significant TSOA projects was establishing, or rather selling, the European
Tour to American Triumph owners and enthusiasts. The Triumph Rallies of Europe originally were
an idea of a California Triumph dealer and taken up by Alan Bethell, President of the US division
of Standard-Triumph. The plan was for a small group which would charter a plane to Britain from
the US, pick up their brand-new Triumph sports cars and embark upon a three to four-week
organized tour of Europe, making sure to hit the key tourist locations: Paris, Rome, Geneva,
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Brussels, etc. Participants would, “Stay in top class hotels; enjoy free sight-seeing tours and lavish
cocktail parties. Never worry about luggage—there’s a van. Never worry about the car—
mechanics will check it and wash it every night!” 166 In the initial announcement to American
Triumph owners through the TSOA newsletter the Rally was sold to prospective participants in
part by emphasizing the European driving environment, “Led by one of the Triumph team’s crack
drivers… the route will pass over many of those very roads and mountains which call for such
skilled driving in the Monte Carly [Rally] and Alpine [Rally].” 167 This connection to famous
European motorsport further supported the feeling of many American enthusiasts that Europe
represented the ‘homeland’ of the sports car. Therefore, the experience of driving a sports car in
Europe was seen as particularly valuable by Americans who otherwise lacked access to this type
of driving environment, in addition to the broader appeal of European tourism. The cost of this
adventure was subsidized by the TSOA and Standard-Triumph, the Triumph Tour of Europe was
a $200 option when ordering a new TR3 sports car at any US dealership, although this obviously
did not include airfare or fuel expenses. Meanwhile, the cost of the car itself was roughly $600
less if delivered in Britain, while the cost of airfare was roughly $300, which meant that for an
American consumer, the added cost of the European tour was really only gas, food, and hotels.168
Furthermore, the American TSOA, itself funded by the Triumph factory, would sponsor a Rally
during the tour, and the winner would have the cost of entry covered.169
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American interest was immediate, and the first Triumph Tour of Europe in the late spring
of 1957 was completely booked well in advance. However, while the tour was sold to Americans
as a way to authentically experience driving a sports car in Europe, the reality was tour participants
were treated like royalty, and the experience was less about sporty driving and more about partying
through European cities. For instance, Tour participants were greeted at the stairs as the
disembarked from their BOAC charter flight and handed the keys to their new TR3s which were
waiting on the next to the plane. In Brussels film cars followed participants throughout the country
and, “five policemen with high powered motorcycles were put at our disposal, and with sirens
screaming they cleared the roads to Aachen, allowing us to proceed at nearly 90 m.p.h.”170 At night
local representatives from British Petroleum, “washed all the cars, checked the oil and water, and
replaced either if necessary free of charge. All the cars were taken away to be filled with petrol
and the bill rendered the next morning at the hotel desk.”171 Rather than immersion within the local
cultures of Europe, participants were whisked through, often times with a police escort, stopping
to party with local representatives of Standard-Triumph, while hardly having to think about their
cars, and certainly not participating in European motorsport. In some locations like Paris the stops
were longer, and tour participants were allowed to explore the city on their own. Yet European
automotive culture and culture more broadly were not emphasized, and in this light the European
Tour can be seen for what it was, a purely marketing move. Indeed, the Tour fulfilled the marketing
desires of Standard Triumph, who just wanted, “publicity… both in the media and word-of-mouth.”
as the event was reported in several local papers in Europe and, with some prompting by Triumph
PR manager Paul Thurston, by the enthusiast press in America.172
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These prompted stories emphasized the parties and the tourism, not the driving, another
indication that this was just an attempt to co-opt an emergent enthusiast culture for marketing
purposes. What is particularly interesting is the discrepancies and differences which appear in the
various versions which were published in American enthusiast periodicals. For instance, the a retelling of the 1957 Triumph Rally which appears in the SCCA’s monthly Sports Car, is much more
detailed and notes the scenery, the road surface type and its variances in different countries, and
regional variances in driving culture. Omitted is any reference to police escorts and speeding
through European towns, although the American participants who penned the SCCA article, David
and Caroline Hebb, certainly enjoyed their share of the partying.173 Perhaps David and Caroline’s
experience was an statistical outlier, as Cook notes, “In general, the participants were not sports
car enthusiasts when they signed up, and many were people in their 50s and 60s trying a sports car
for the first time,” and therefore would have paid significantly less attention to the driving aspect
of the Tour. 174 However, far more likely is that the article which appeared in Sports Car was
targeted towards an enthusiast audience, whereas the others were targets at a more mainstream
American consumer. In any case, the Triumph Tour of Europe was a resounding success for the
Standard Triumph company, in fact, the Triumph Tour of Europe was so successful that it became
an annual event from 1957-1962. From six countries and roughly 2500 miles in 1957 the Tour
grew to “10 countries and covered over 3000 miles,” by 1960. 175 The success of the Tours is
demonstrative of the close association of ‘Europe’ and the sports car in the minds of American
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enthusiasts, and is further reinforced by the ease by which a British manufacturer and American
marketing department was able to use a European vacation to increase sales of a British sports car.
On future versions of the European Tour, Triumph owners were mobilized to help sell
participation, and therefore, the purchase of a TR sports car as well. Announcements for the 1960
Triumph Rally of Europe exhorted American Triumph owners to spread the word to enthusiasts
and non-enthusiasts alike:
In case you hadn’t thought of it yet, there’s no telling how many of your friends
might be interested! What about a trip through Europe with your neighbors, your
close friends from the sports car club or your favorite bridge partners? In the past,
groups of close friends have found a TSOA Rally the perfect way to spend a holiday
together. Ask your friends… they’ll be wild about the idea. And, even if you can’t
go, they may want to!”176
If one couldn’t stand one’s neighbor they need not fear, there were two rallies due to the number
of Americans interested in participating, so a Triumph owner could also convince their neighbors
or anyone else to go and then tour Europe separately. These elements again expose the Triumph
European Rally for the marketing exercise that it was; a coopting of American enthusiasts and
their desire to participate in elements of a European automotive culture, such as the single-marque
owners club, to increase sales. However, through this program American consumers were exposed
to the European sports car who may not have been otherwise. Furthermore, even though the Tour
was very much a preplanned event it still exposed Americans to Europe and European enthusiasts
fostering transnational engagement and a transfer of automotive culture.
European Tours or Rallys were not the only international activities facilitated by the TSOA.
For instance, in 1962 the TSOA offered its members a tour put together by an unaffiliated New
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York travel agency which was set to coincide with the International Racing Car Show in London,
“arranged to cater to the tastes of sports and racing car enthusiasts…”177 Included in the roughly
$500 price was admission to all days of the show, a cocktail party where guests would be
introduced to the “World’s top Grand Prix drivers,” guided tours provided by subsidiaries through
London, and “at your disposal—and completely free—an automobile for the duration of the
tour.” 178 At an event such as this Americans would have been exposed to British and other
European automotive enthusiasts and cultures, doubtlessly forming transnational connections and
informing their decision regarding motorsport or club activities upon their return. Unfortunately,
participation numbers or reports do not appear in subsequent issues of TSOA News Letter, however,
the mere fact that this existed independently of the TSOA indicates its interest to American
enthusiasts.
The ‘British Invasion’ of small, cheap sports cars, was tremendously influential to
American automotive enthusiasts. While European sports car enthusiasts did exist in America prior
to 1946, their numbers were quite small and activities limited. However, the introduction of
postwar limited-production British sports cars in ever increasing number and variety exposed so
many more Americans to a different form of performance and motorsport. This would be further
encouraged by a British industrial policy that mandated a high export ratio, especially to hard
currency markets like the US, and changes in domestic tax policy which had hampered British
engine design. Additionally, the British government also made changes to Customs and Purchase
Tax policy, working closely with American military personnel, to expand sales to American
servicemen stationed in the UK. With an increasing number of sports cars finding American
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owners came a European-derived enthusiast culture indicated by the rapid growth of American
enthusiast organizations like the Sports Car Club of America, and even factory sponsored clubs
like the Triumph Sports Owners Association. The turn of the SCCA towards becoming an
American sanctioning body for amateur motorsport is indicative of the depth of automotive
enthusiast culture coming from Europe with the cars, in other words along with the vehicles come
distinctly European forms of motorsport: the rally, road-race, hillclimb, gymkhana, etc. which
exploded in popularity in the US. In turn, more motorsports events brought crowds, regularly
numbering in the thousands, of Americans who may not have been otherwise exposed to the sports
car and created a new batch of enthusiasts, eager to someday own a European sports car of their
own. By the early 1950s it was clear that the market for sports cars in America was much larger
than anyone, including British and American auto manufacturers, initially thought. While British
cars had faced little competition from 1946 to 1952 that was beginning to change. Competition
would come in the mid-1950s from American automakers Chevrolet and Ford, which will be
explored in the following chapter, as well as from German manufacturer Porsche which appeared
on the American market at the same time.
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‘DER PORSCHE VAS PUSHIN’: A CASE STUDY

What was true at the start is still true today: there is no arena as important to the
success of a brand as the American market. The US has had an informed car culture
from the very beginning and brings the hardest competition as well as the most
potential for starting trends that will have a global impact. Porsche has become a
globally recognized brand, yet its strength is inextricably linked to America. – Dr.
Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG 179

Postwar Germany was a territory destroyed and divided. Industrial production capacity had
been specifically targeted by the Allied powers during the war, and the devastation wrought by
numerous bombing campaigns severely affected the facilities of the German automobile industry.
However, the utter destruction of factories did have a certain benefit. It meant that new factories
had to be constructed, then filled with modern machines and tools optimized for peacetime
automobile production. Furthermore, growing tension with the Soviet Union began to dictate
Allied sentiment and strategy, which led to the United States granting large numerous economic
benefits to Western Europe with the goal of stabilizing their economies as a deterrent to
Communism. This aid came mainly in the form of loan programs such as the Marshall Plan, for
western European industrial reconstruction. However, the effects of losing a world war could not
be entirely mitigated, and therefore the German automobile industry would not only arrive
comparatively late to the American market, but would be produce their initial models in limited
numbers, with much of the assembly done by skilled craftsmen working with hand tools.
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This chapter examines one German automaker, Porsche, and the American enthusiast
organization which grew around its products from 1950 to 1975. Porsche, alone amongst its
competition, only produced sports cars and therefore serves as an ideal case study to examine the
ways in which the design, engineering, and method of marketing of a German performance vehicle
served to transport elements of European automotive and German national culture to American
consumers. This chapter also examines the way in which Porsche balanced their need to appeal to
Americans with the need to retain the authenticity of Europeans performance that defined the niche
sports car market. Ultimately, Porsche sports cars were transformed by their contact with
distributors, American consumers, and were adapted for the American market while
simultaneously retaining the kernel of European authenticity that both appealed to American
consumers and served to transport elements of German culture to Americans. This illustrates the
fluid nature of global cultural exchange fostered through consumption and further complicates
established narratives of ‘Americanization’ by demonstrating that processes of globalization
occurred within the United States, not just beyond its borders in the 1950s.
This chapter is split into three sections, the first of which is an examination of Porsche’s
emergence in the postwar period as an independent manufacturer, in addition to the ways in which
the postwar German economic and political environment shaped their initial models and target
market. The second section focuses on how Porsche sports cars were adapted for an American
consumer, first by independent distributors using their power as gatekeepers to American
consumers, and later how they attempted to find a balance between catering to trends in the broader
American automotive market while continuing to provide an authentic European driving
experience. For instance, the development of the ‘Sportomatic’ automatic transmission, which
complicated the idea of a European cultural ‘authenticity’ in Porsche sports cars, represented an
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attempt to reconcile American consumer trends and European sports-performance. The third
section examines the marketing used to sell Porsche cars to American consumers, specifically the
way in which a history of success in European motorsport was used to establish an image of
performance authenticity to appeal to American consumers. The fourth section of this chapter
analyzes the response of American enthusiasts through the lens of the Porsche Club of America
(PCA). The very existence of the PCA and its growth from 1958 to the 1970s is an indication of
the cultural significance of the Porsche sports car among American enthusiasts. More specifically,
this section examines the transmission of German culture through the consumption of the two most
significant models of the Porsche sports car, the Typ. 356 and the 911, a process intensified by the
activities of the PCA in addition to other enthusiast clubs.
A close examination of the Porsche sports car through its design, marketing, and the
enthusiast community which consumed them, reveals the complex currents and counter-currents
of cultural globalization in America over the course of the 1950s into the 1960s. Together these
four sections illustrate how a European product was sold to American consumers as consummately
European. At the same time, it also illustrates how that ostensibly European product was molded
by the pressures of competing in the American market, and the ways in which this complex
relationship was represented and refracted by the American enthusiasts who consumed them. This
reveals the complex currents of cultural and economic globalization, and illustrates that America
was not immune to the cultural transmission fostered through consumption as some histories of
‘Americanization’ assume. Lastly, this chapter examines the formation of transnational
connections between German and American automotive enthusiasts through Porsche sports car
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and the PCA, revealing a form of imagined community which was created around these products
and connected individuals across both national and linguistic borders.180
Porsche noted the importance of the sports car and its unique position in the American
market in 1952, indicated in its in-house periodical, Christophorus, intended for consumers and
employees alike:
It is true that the leading German automakers have made representations in America,
but it would be self-deception to promise more than a representation. The English
example to be taught is that German industry is giving itself false hopes. The British
automotive industry has made great efforts to make a foothold into the US in the
aftermath of US traffic and parking problems, this seeming to be a chance for the
European small car. The export has never reached substantial numbers, and besides
some snobs who buy every automobile for pleasure, neither the English nor the
experimentally exported German small cars have found serious buyers. Things are
a bit different in the case of sports cars, for which there is a keen interest, especially
since the few American sports cars are only more or less patched-together cars [i.e.
homebuilt, or not mass produced by any major manufacturer], which also have a
correspondingly high price. Porsche is forging ahead here.181
While similar to the small British sports cars that gained serious traction in the American market
in the immediate postwar years, automotive exports from Germany were clearly distinct. Due to
the exchange rate, relatively high labor costs, and labor-intensive construction, German
manufacturers were simply unable to be price-competitive with most British sports cars. Therefore,
they intentionally moved their products up market. To justify the additional expense, Porsche
executives focused on the vehicles supposed technical quality, and later, as their foothold in the
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American market expanded, luxury. Therefore, differing strategies were adopted in their sales and
marketing, many of which were built around German cultural tropes. This can be clearly seen in
the 1951 English language brochure for Porsche, in which the first page focuses entirely on
Porsche’s prewar engineering heritage. 182 Their market position and focus also meant that the
German brands were forced to keep their vehicles updated and modern to be competitive at their
higher price-point. Porsche’s competitive position in the American market would also be
complicated by the emergence of cheap American-made performance vehicles. The dichotomy
between the British cars that were increasingly seen as old-fashioned – an image compounded in
the early 1970s by their struggle to comply with increasingly strict American safety and emissions
legislation – and German sports cars, which appeared to be on the cutting edge of automotive
engineering, further helped establish the stereotype of German automobiles’ superior design and
technical quality which had already begun to be built on the back of motorsports success in Europe.
The German sports cars coming to American buyers in the 1950s also benefitted from the
cultural groundwork laid by the earlier British automotive imports. Firstly, clubs like the Sports
Car Club of America had established a small, but rapidly expanding, fraternity of American
enthusiasts of European cars. The SCCA and other regional European automotive clubs had also
begun to build a network of amateur sports car racing events within the US; event which the SCCA
would eventually take over entirely as they became the official sanctioning body for American
amateur road racing. Therefore, prospective Porsche buyers would already have an established
venue through which they could enjoy their new purchase in the manner in which it was intended,
both on the road and the track. Furthermore, American consumers considering the purchase of a
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Porsche sports car would have more of an opportunity to see them in action at local or regional
amateur racing events. American consumers of German automobiles would also create their own
exclusive clubs, like the Porsche Club of America, in the tradition of European single-marque
clubs of the 1930s. Their group activities could then be tailored to cater to a more German cultural
experience, or at least an American interpretation of it. This is illustrated by the annual American
“Oktoberfest,” and national “Porsche Treffen,” or Porsche meeting, at which PCA members would
stage their own European style driving events such as the road rally and gymkhana, before enjoying
German beer and German food. The amount of enthusiast participation in these events and the
discourse surrounding them in club periodicals – as well as the pulp automotive press more
generally – reinforces the notion that sports cars were not culturally blank. Rather, these German
sports cars served to transport aspects of the national culture that produced them to America and
American consumers, a ‘Europeanization,’ of American consumers, which indicates that American
culture was just as permeable to outside influences during this post-war period.

3.1

Identifying the Market and Means to Entry

As a brand Porsche was unique; it sought to build its entire identity around the superior
performance and engineering of a small sports car. In fact, Porsche was so committed to this brand
image that they would not design or build anything but small, sporty two-door coupes and
convertibles until the late 1990s. Moreover, as evidenced from the quote that opened this chapter,
Porsche targeted Americans as key consumers of their product from the beginning. This is further
supported by a jubilant article from Christophorus, the official Porsche company periodical, in
1954, “…in the year 1953 no less than 680 cars will be exported to the USA, over 35 percent of
the total production from [Porsche] Zuffenhausen! The USA, termed by Porsche, is export country
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number one.”183 While 680 may seem like an incredibly small number when compared to the sales
numbers from larger, more established domestic manufacturers, for Porsche it represented a
significant portion of total production, and the number of vehicles exported would steadily grow.
Perhaps more importantly, those 680 cars very clearly began the process of transporting elements
of German automotive culture, as well as German culture in a more abstract sense, to American
consumers. One needs to only examine the rapid growth of the Porsche Club of America (PCA),
and the close ties between the Club and executive management at Porsche, Zuffenhausen (often
referred to as ‘the Factory’ in contemporary documents) to see the deep influence of the Porsche
sports car on American enthusiast culture, and the transnational connections forged between PCA
members in the US, Porsche enthusiasts in Germany, and Porsche Factory executives. In many
ways, it is Porsche enthusiasts and the PCA which demonstrate a more thorough globalization of
American consumers than perhaps any other brand or organization, as the final section of this
chapter will illustrate.
By focusing solely on the sports car market niche, Porsche avoided the common pitfalls of
other European manufacturers like MG, which attempted to use sports cars to open the market for
their other lines of production small cars. When European manufacturers looked to the US market
in the 1950s most tended to concentrate on the mass market trends, which were towards mediumsized to large sedans that included luxurious optional equipment like automatic transmission.
However, as one anonymous writer for Christophorus discovered:
One must revise the opinion that in the US only cars with automatic gearboxes have
the right to exist when one reads the American automobile sport magazines, some
of which have half a million copies, and in which European sports cars are
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embraced. As far as our American sports car friends are concerned, they are even
more enthusiastic about the matter than we are, and there are a lot more sports car
races per season than in our country - pure amateur races by the way, which makes
things particularly appealing.184
In fact, the rest of the article discussed the various victories of the Porsche 365 1.5L sports car as
it appears in American enthusiast magazines, and included a translated report from one of the
aforementioned enthusiast periodicals, Autosport Review. This supports Ferry Porsche’s notion
that American enthusiast publications were interested in the European racing scene, which itself
demonstrates American interest in European road racing. Additionally, not only German
manufacturers, but also German enthusiasts were paying attention to the rapid development of
amateur sports car racing in the United States, a point of growing transnational connection among
enthusiasts. Also implied is that the American races are of a similar type, which again points to
the European sports car as a transmitter of a subset of European culture and a consumer product
which helped to forge transnational connections among the enthusiasts who purchased them.
Just as was the case in postwar Britain, the need for stable foreign currency enforced an
export-focused industrial policy, one that was implemented through the controlled provisioning of
raw materials. While eventually the rationing would end, this forced Porsche from the outset to
pay close attention to satisfying its potential export market. Porsche’s posturing as a purveyor
solely of fine sporting machines may strike the casual reader as slightly odd. Ferdinand Porsche
Sr., is, of course, the same man who also designed the now infamous KdF Wagen, the “People’s
Car” for Nazi Germany, which would go on to become the utilitarian Volkswagen Beetle to
American consumers. But in the inter-war period he had also designed racing cars for Auto Union,
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a brand that would eventually grow into Audi, and his son, Ferdinand Anton “Ferry” Porsche
always wanted to produce a sports car. After the war ended Ferry Porsche looked to turn his dream
into reality, and due to the economic realities of postwar Germany, that meant focusing on America
as the primary export market.
Porsche was also limited in terms of the materials at hand; Porsche would have to make
use of Volkswagen parts, primarily the ones he and his father had designed such as the engine,
transmission, and suspension. However, acquiring the raw materials and space necessary to
produce even a small number of cars proved exceptionally difficult due to the nature of Allied
occupation and industrial controls. Porsche’s old factory in Stuttgart was being used by the
American military authorities, and was therefore off limits. A further complication was that
Volkswagen parts were in short supply, and any parts requisitioned had to be approved by Allied
authorities. Porsche was not to be deterred, and set up a small production facility in Gmünd,
Austria and turned to Volkswagen distributors abroad to get the parts he needed. Proving to be
quite adept at negotiations within the turbulent administrative structures of post-war Europe, Ferry
acted quickly when opportunities presented themselves, and: “entered into a contract with Herr
von Senger for the supply of VW parts from AMAG and sheet aluminum from Switzerland.
Authorization for the import of these materials had to be obtained from the government in Vienna.
It was granted to us, on the condition that we sold all the vehicles we manufactured abroad, since
Austria urgently needed foreign currency.”185 This further focused Porsche on finding an export
market, specifically America due to the valuable dollar.
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Thus, the Typ. 356 Porsche sports car was born. The vehicle itself was an amalgam of
modified Volkswagen parts under a totally redesigned sleek coupe body made from light-weight
aluminum. The air-cooled, VW-sourced engine displaced a miniscule 1.1 liters, and produced just
36 horsepower. What made the vehicle unique among other European sports cars was its rear
mounted air-cooled engine. This meant that the powertrain was very light since it lacked the
systems necessary for water-cooling, and the simplicity resulted in greater reliability in the sense
that there were simply less things that could fail. Perhaps a sign of high confidence, “just three
weeks after it was completed, it got a chance to prove itself at the Innsbruck City Race, marking
the first demonstration of a Porsche 356.”186 Racing, even at this early stage, was critical to the
development of the Porsche sports car, and the clear lineage from racing machine to street vehicle
would become one of the brand’s defining features.
Correctly realizing that the United States was the one place where a niche vehicle like the
sports car would have a good chance at finding consumers in the immediate postwar years, Porsche
set about finding a way to break into the American automotive market. This was largely driven by
Ferry Porsche, who understood that, “potential exports to European countries with strong exchange
rates such as the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, would not be sufficient for
the long-term survival of the Porsche brand.” He therefore specifically targeted the American
market. 187 As Karl Ludvigsen, an automotive journalist in the 1950s and later an independent
automotive historian, argues in his massive three-volume compendium, Porsche Excellence was
Expected: The Comprehensive History of the Company, its Cars, and its Racing Heritage, there
were three distinct periods which encapsulate Porsche’s engagement with the US market. These
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periods are defined by Porsche’s method of distributing vehicles to American consumers. The first
period, from 1950 to 1958, is categorized by Porsche’s relationship with Maximilian E. Hoffman
as sole distributor for the American market. The second period, from 1959 to 1969 is defined by
Porsche’s attempt to work through multiple individual distributors to try and establish more control
over its own importation, distribution, and dealership network. The third phase, from 1969 on, is
defined by Porsche’s decision to grant distribution rights in the United States to Volkswagen,
which would establish a new “Porsche+Audi” division specifically to sell the cars. 188 This
periodization is useful because it allows one to see Porsche, the company’s, steps to increasingly
direct involvement in the sales and marketing of its vehicles in the American market which is a
microcosm of the complex processes of international business leading to postwar globalization.

3.2

Hoffman, Porsche, and Adaptation for the American Consumer

The path of the Porsche brand in America was initially dependent on one man, Maximilian
E. Hoffman, the owner and President of Hoffman Motors Corporation. M.E. Hoffman was the
same man who first brought Jaguar into the US market and was also involved in the importation
of Fiat, and Alfa-Romeo. By the time of his first contract with Porsche in 1951 he was therefore
already seen as a veteran of the automotive import distributor business. Because of his
commanding position in the American market his input in those early days was very influential on
model design, especially when he was essentially the gatekeeper for the American market.
Therefore, Hoffman would play a significant role in initially adapting the Porsche sports car for
an American audience, first through his control as distributor over ordering the cars for import,
and later by exerting pressure on Porsche to produce a model specifically for the American market,
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the Speedster. However, even after Hoffman was removed and Porsche changed distribution
tactics, they still kept a close eye on the American automotive market, which led to the
development of the ‘Sportomatic’ automatic transmission in 1968, a concession to American
market trends.
Max Hoffman excelled at reading the automotive market trends in the United States,
especially in the niche market of European sports cars, which is why he was initially selected by
Porsche to be their American distributor. The importance of recognizing these trends was not lost
on German manufacturers and even the German automotive press, which noted that, “just as an
automobile factory with a single misconstruction can lose its good name for years, the products of
a whole country may be discredited when gross errors or the peculiarities of a market are not
intelligently recognized.” 189 The ‘peculiarity’ of the US market in this case was that while
European sports cars would sell well, often with limited marketing effort, their other offerings –
usually small to mid-size sedans – would not. Rather than expend marketing resources on what
appeared to be a lost cause, Hoffman focused instead on what he knew would sell well to American
consumers, the sports cars, and urged Porsche, to create them, or modify their current offerings to
appeal to American consumers.
However, the glowing representation of Hoffman as visionary importer presented in
corporate histories and public histories tends to jar with the very shrewd and risk-averse Hoffman
that emerges from Porsche, and later BMW, archival documents. Hoffman was ultimately not
interested in growing a foreign brands’ image within the United States, or in significantly
expanding their market share. Rather, he was content to sell performance cars, primarily to sports
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car enthusiasts in the US, people who didn’t need to have the car sold to them by an expensive
marketing campaign, but who would actively seek out the opportunity to purchase a foreign sports
car and usually pay a premium. Thus, despite his role in establishing Porsche as a brand in the
American market he would eventually be relegated to East Coast imports, before finally being
removed from the distribution network entirely.
When Hoffman began selling Porsche cars in 1951, he chose to import only variants of the
Typ. 356 with the larger 1.5-liter engine, an increase in displacement from the 1.1 liter engine
offered to European customers. Hoffman understood that American consumers who faced none of
the taxes on engine size that had molded the sports car in the 1920s and 1930s, enjoyed plentiful
supplies of cheap, high-octane gasoline, and were in the market for a performance vehicle would
inevitably choose greater power over economy. The increase in displacement from 1.1 to 1.5 liters
increased the power output significantly to approximately 60 horsepower at 5,000 rpm. The larger
engine was still rather small by American standards, however, the weight of the Porsche Typ. 356,
roughly 1,800 pounds, was quite low, which gave the vehicle balanced performance in the
European tradition. 190 This was true even including the other key difference separating the
prototype cars from the production models: the bodywork was now steel, made by Reutters – a
sacrifice necessary to increase production while keeping down costs – rather than the hand-formed
aluminum panels of the Austrian prototype cars. Despite its obvious differences from other
European sports cars like the Jaguars and MGs, the Porsche Typ. 356, due to its light weight and
small, high revving 4-cylinder engine, would ultimately feel very European when driven by
American consumers.
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To appeal to a broader swath of enthusiast consumers, and to make the most of the single
sports car model Porsche offered, Hoffman, on his own initiative, created two quasi-models of the
Typ. 356 by pre-selecting certain options from the list Porsche offered; a tactic made possible by
his position as distributor which gave him total control over Porsche imports and ordering for
American customers. For American consumers looking for primarily for Porsche performance
without such a hefty price tag, Hoffman imported what he called the ‘1500 America’; a Typ. 356
equipped with the 1500cc Normal engine which produced 55 horsepower, cloth covered seats, and
lacking a radio, climate control (heater), metallic paint, adjustable-back passenger seat, the
passenger’s sun visor, the folding back for the rear seats, and aluminum door panels. 191 For those
looking for a more luxuriously equipped sports car for touring, Hoffman offered the ‘1500 Super’;
a Typ. 356 equipped with the 1500 Super engine, a variant that had different carburetors, camshaft,
crank shaft, and other internal parts and therefore produced more power, between 60-70
horsepower, and also included all of the options that were removed from the 1500 America.192 The
tactic proved effective, the America model cost $3,445 for the coupe, and $3695 for the cabriolet
compared to $4,284 for the Super coup, and $4,584 for the Super in cabriolet form. However, even
the lower price of the Typ. 356 America still put the Porsche at the high end of the sports car
spectrum in the American market, so Hoffman felt a new offering was required.
By 1953 it was clear that competition in the sports car market would be fierce, and that
Porsche, still quite new to the American market and lacking an established brand image, would
have to take more drastic action if it wanted to expand sales volume. Therefore, Hoffman urged
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Porsche to produce a new car, one that would be directly competitive with sports cars at the lower
end of the spectrum, cars like the British Triumph TR2, MG, Austin-Healy, and the new American
sports car, the Corvette. With Hoffman’s idea supported by west coast distributor John von
Neumann, and the pressure that both distributors were able to exert considering that, in Ferry
Porsche’s own words, the “most important overseas market was America,” Porsche responded
with the Speedster, a low coast roadster. 193 The Speedster, while retaining its unique Porsche
engineering and design heritage, was also more in-line with the British roadster sports car model
currently reigning supreme in the American market. The Speedster was a 356 cabriolet with new
body panels that covered the area where the rear seat used to be, and fitted with a low windshield
and canvas top. Power came from either the 1500 Normal engine, or, for $500 extra, the 1500
Super engine. The car was specifically designed for the American market and American enthusiast
consumers, as Ludvigsen notes, “The emphasis was on acceleration to suit American driving and
racing conditions, enhanced by special gear ratios and light weight. Weighing 1,750 pounds at the
curb, the Speedster was some 80 pounds lighter than other Porsches.”194 The price of the Speedster
was $2,995 from Hoffman, or an even more affordable $2,550 if delivery was taken in Europe,
although this low advertised price was made possible by listing as optional two pieces of
equipment which actually came on every Speedster regardless, the tachometer and the heater.
Hoffman’s hunch proved correct, and the comparatively ‘cheap’ Porsche was a resounding
success garnering significant praise from American enthusiast magazines, and not simply for its
price. Sports Cars Illustrated called the Speedster optional 1600cc engine, introduced in 1956,
“one of the most significant technical accomplishments of our time.”
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pronouncement was earned primarily due to the Speedsters balanced handling qualities, “you can
wag its tail and get through short, tight-radius turns with amazing nimbleness and speed,” and its
ride quality, “In common with the ride of many continental cars…”196 The Speedster was clearly
able to retain the kernel of European sporting authenticity that appealed so much to the American
enthusiasts who bought them; despite the creation of a model solely to appeal to Americans, and
the slightly dishonest advertised price, the Speedster was still very much a European sports car
and therefore found its way into the garages of many American enthusiasts. Just as Americans
were influenced by European sports cars; the case of the Speedster indicates that European
manufacturers and their products were not untouched by the American market and American
consumers. While there is no direct evidence that Porsche looked at the British competition while
designing the Speedster, the influence of the popular two door, two seat, cheap roadsters cannot
be overlooked in the final product. Furthermore, it is indicative of the level of power held by the
independent distributors, in this case Hoffman and von Neumann, in the early phase of European
automotive manufacturers expansion into the American auto market.
The Speedster was a short-lived vehicle, only in production from 1954 to 1958. Upon
learning of the Speedster being phased out of production and replaced by the 356 “Convertible D,”
one American enthusiast would write in 1958, “I bought my Speedster (I also have a coupe)
because it was the nearest thing to what I wanted, but now I find that the already too fancy
Speedster is to be supplanted by wind-up windows and any day now we will look for an automatic
transmission, push-button windows, air-conditioning, mechanical steering aids and other appeals
to the old ladies.”197 Clearly the Speedster satisfied an enthusiast demand, yet its phasing out after
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only four years of production demonstrates that the effect of the Speedster on broader Porsche
design trends would be quite minimal. The Porsche brand, despite Hoffman’s influence during his
years as primary distributor for most of the United States, was never intended to be a cheap sports
car along the lines of the MG or Triumph. Indeed, Porsche wanted to compete within the upper
echelons of the sports car market alongside the Jaguar X-120 and later American competition such
as the Chevrolet Corvette. The stripped-down Speedster was a compromise to fit a market demand
and increase sales volume in the early days of Porsche in the American market, when Porsche had
little brand recognition among American enthusiasts and simply needed to get more cars into the
hands of American consumers. The other Typ. 356 variants, as well as the successor to the Typ.
356 – the now infamous 911 – would cement the position of Porsche sports cars as premium
models in an increasingly crowded niche market. As one reviewer for an American enthusiast
magazine wrote, “Those who feel Porsches are too expensive should give one a careful looking
over to realize the amount of value received.”198
A much larger concession to the American market came with the offering of an automatic
transmission in 1968, long after Hoffman had moved on from Porsche distribution, and after the
introduction of the Typ. 356’s successor model, the 911. Market trends had clearly established by
1962 that American consumers were beginning to buy Porsche sports cars for reasons other than
European performance. As Porsche distributor and dealer John von Neumann noted in an interview
in Daily Pilot, “We used to sell Porsches principally to people who wanted to race them. Now –
even though Porsche still wins more racing championships than any other make of car – our biggest
buyers are engineers. And right behind them are doctors and dentists…”199 Indeed the source itself,
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the Daily Pilot, is indicative of Porsche’s expansion beyond the strictly enthusiast market; the
Daily Pilot was a regional newspaper for Orange County, California, an affluent area where many
of the new target customers, doctors, dentists, and engineers worked and lived. Essentially, the
market was changing as Porsche’s successor model to the Typ. 356, the 911, expanded Porsche’s
core market from European performance enthusiasts to include wealthy consumers interested in
the prestige that came from owning an expensive foreign marque with a European pedigree.
The changing demographics of Porsche ownership in the 1960s meant that, just as it had
with the Speedster in the 1950s, Porsche would have to make some concessions to increase the
brand’s appeal in America, now its largest single market. Entering production for the 1968 model
year, the ‘Sportomatic’ was a typically German (or European) response to the demands of the
American market; it was a compromise which aimed at retaining the kernel of European
performance authenticity while still satisfying American consumer demand. The Sportomatic
transmission was not a true automatic, but rather an automated manual. The distinction is critically
important; an American automatic transmission was fully automatic, meaning the driver had only
to put the selector in the drive position and would not have to touch the selector again until he or
she needed to park or reverse. The Sportomatic on the other hand eliminated the need for a driveroperated clutch, but one still needed to move the gear selector between the four forward gears –
the same as with a traditional manual transmission – to drive the vehicle. This compromise was
born out of the worry that an automatic in a Porsche would “dilute the pure, sharp image of the
car… It was not easy to shrug off the lesson of the Corvette, which started out with naught but an
automatic and had to struggle painfully to gain recognition as a legitimate sports car.”200 This also
indicates just how closely Porsche was paying attention to the American market, and further that
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they understood a critical aspect of the 911’s appeal to American consumers was the vehicle’s ties
to a European sporting heritage.
The risk of losing legitimacy therefore better understood by viewing a sports car’s
‘European-ness’ as an amalgam of driving experiences typically associated with the European
sports car. A significant part of this European driving experience, at least as many Americans
believed, was the manual transmission which required both skill and experience to drive smoothly
and quickly. For many American enthusiasts the ability to drive a manual transmission well helped
set them further apart from other, mainstream American drivers. Indeed, until the model year 1968
Porsche 911, no European production sports car had been sold with an optional automatic in any
market. Therefore, Porsche’s fear of a negative public response to the release of an optional
automatic transmission was certainly not born out of paranoia. This was a fact clearly demonstrated
by one of the first reviews of the Sportomatic in an American enthusiast magazine which began,
“Putting an automatic transmission in a Porsche is like artificial insemination: It’s no fun
anymore.”201 Even the official magazine of the Porsche Club of America, Porsche Panorama,
which typically could be counted on to run a full article on any major new Porsche development,
was uncharacteristically muted when it came to the Sportomatic, giving it three small paragraphs
in their November 1967 issue but no full article in all of 1968.202 Given this context it is somewhat
ironic that the Sportomatic was better received in Europe, where the manual transmission
dominated sales in cars of all types, than it was by enthusiasts in America. As the English
enthusiast magazine Autocar noted in a 1969 road test, “Sportomatic, then, is a good compromise,
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whether in heavy traffic or on long cross-country journeys… In open country, so good and wellcoordinated is the change that there is every incentive to match ratios to conditions.”203
As this section has demonstrated, Porsche products were always influenced by American
market trends, and in fact they were never as purely German, or even European, as they were
perceived to be by the Americans that consumed them. However, at the same time it is important
to note that Porsche sports cars were never dominated by American market trends either; it was a
fine line that Porsche was able to navigate. Porsche was able to retain the core of authenticity that
satisfied their American enthusiast demographic, as well as adding features like the automatic
transmission, and later air conditioning, which helped broaden the car’s appeal.
A perfect example of the complex nature of market influence on the design process—and
how Porsche was able to retain European authenticity in their products—is the creation of the
successor model to the Typ. 356: the 911. While press coverage in American enthusiast magazines
was still overwhelmingly positive, by 1958, as one reviewer noted, “It’s very hard to write a road
test on a car which has remained essentially the same for so long…”204 The push for a new product
came from America, and due to fears that the market for small, 2-seater sports cars was nearing
capacity, voices within the company called for the Typ. 356’s replacement to be a true 4-seater.
While not directly referenced this is no-doubt based on the fact that by 1958 Porsche would have
seen Chevrolet’s Corvette struggle to gain significant volume sales while at the same time Ford’s
Thunderbird, which gained a rear seat and room for four adults in the 1958 model year, exceeded
sales goals.205
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However, the final design of the 911 selected for production was not a four-seat vehicle.
While carrying-over certain styling cues from the Typ. 356, namely the look of the front of the car
with its distinctive round headlights in prominent fender bulges, the sleek look of the new 911
represented a bold step into the styling cues of the 1960s. As Bernard Cahier – a highly regarded
automotive journalist writing for Sports Car Graphic – would write at the 911’s launch in 1964,
“The 911 bears a definite family resemblance with the current production Porsche [Typ. 356], and
yet its lines are quite different… the car has a longer, lower look. The slim wrap around bumper
emphasizes the fast, clean lines of the car…”206 Although American consumers represented well
over half of Porsche’s market for new cars at the dawn of the 1960s, the 911 eschewed design fads
prominent in American cars of the period. The 911 used little chrome on the outside of the car,
having just thin strips of it around the windows and on the bumpers to highlight the flowing lines,
and lacked the tail fins that were emblematic of American cars of the period.
The ultimate death of the four-seat Porsche, despite all indicators pointing to its probable
success in the American market, is a decision which has perplexed automotive historians.
Ludvigsen, in Porsche Excellence was Expected, argues that this was largely due to the
compartmentalization of the German automotive industry, a relic of the cartel system which
defined industrial organization in Germany in the interwar period and survived despite Allied
controls in the immediate postwar years. He notes that until the introduction of the Opel Kadett as
a direct Volkswagen competitor, the “alignment was clear: Volkswagen built the cheap cars;
Mercedes-Benz the expensive ones; Ford and Opel the middle-class cars; Borgward (and later
BMW) offered alternatives in the upper-middle class; and Porsche built the sports cars.”207 In this

206
207

Bernard Cahier, “Road Test 1/64: Porsche 911” Sports Car Graphic Vol. 4 No. 9 (1965): 41.
Karl Ludvigsen, Porsche Excellence was Expected, 340.

121

light the death of the four seat Porsche would be seen as a deliberate decision taken to preserve the
established order among the cartel of German automotive manufacturers.
While initially compelling, this explanation is undercut by more recent trends in the
historiography of German industry. Historian Gary Herrigel’s work, Industrial Constructions: The
Sources of German Industrial Power, pushes for a new understanding of postwar German
industrial order, what he terms the decentralized industrial order. This system of industrial
organization, characterized by small to medium sized companies, “utilizing the local reservoir of
skilled labor and flexible small suppliers to maintain competitiveness,” fits Porsche’s business
model quite well and explains why Porsche would have eschewed a cartel-type arrangement,
especially in the beginning of the 1960s.208 Furthermore, Ludwigsen’s argument is not supported
by Ferry Porsche’s autobiography, in which the death of the full four-seat Porsche, a story told in
a mere few paragraphs, is framed as the result of an internal struggle which resulted in styling
dictating function.209
An explanation this author finds more compelling is that Porsche, outside of its activities
in European racing, was a conservative company and cautiously protected its budding brand image,
especially in a market as crucial as the United States. This observation is supported by the fact that
the same basic design stayed in production from the Gmünd coupes in 1949 to the final production
year of the Typ. 356 in 1965. Certainly, there were many updates to the vehicles’ chassis,
suspension, and some modifications were made to styling elements but if one were to put the two
cars together their relation would be unmistakable.
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Furthermore, the early 1960s were a pivotal period for Porsche, not only were they
introducing a new model, a first for the company, but they were also changing their distribution
system in America. Porsche had begun the process of taking a more direct role in the importation
and distribution of its sports cars as early as 1957, indicated by a letter to the Baden-Würtemburg
Ministry of Economic Affairs (Wirtschaftsministerium) in which the formal request to open a US
based subsidiary was filed. 210 The Porsche of America Corporation was founded as the main
importer of the cars and spare parts; however, distribution and the establishment of American
dealerships was split into geographic regions. Essentially Porsche divided the American market
into multiple distributorships with their own American organization at the head, rather than have
Hoffman in charge of all American distribution. Hoffman’s last year at the helm of Porsche
distribution in the United States was 1959 and, despite the eventual superiority of this arrangement
for Porsche and their American consumers, it would take a few years for POAC and the new
regional distributors to function well together at the national level. This is indicated by the failure
of national-level marketing as noted by one disappointed Porsche enthusiast in 1960:
Porsche of America and Porsche dealers should hang their heads in shame at the
miserable Porsche display at the International Auto Show at New York’s Coliseum,
April 16-24 [1960]. About half a dozen cars were stuck on one side of the second
floor without any promotion or display except a few enlargements of the emblem
tacked on columns nearby... The general stodginess of the exhibit and lack of
salesmanship and promotion, was exceeded only by Ferrari—and even they had the
hoods open so you could see the powerplants. Isn’t it a bit presumptuous of the
factory, Porsche of America, and distributors and dealers, to expect PCA to carry
almost the entire load of creating good will and promoting Porsches?211
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Therefore, with the new model coming at the same time as a major change in their American
distribution and sales framework, Porsche eschewed a potentially greater volume of sales to
establish a cohesive brand image built on a very particular construction of European style and
performance.

3.3

Marketing European Performance to American Consumers

While the contract with Hoffman was a logistical necessity in getting the Typ. 356 to
American consumers, the publicity which perhaps contributed the most in terms of pushing the
Porsche brand across the Atlantic in more significant volume was a result of Ferry Porsche’s
decision to enter the Typ. 356 in the Le Mans 24 Hours Race in 1951. It was a decision made even
more significant internationally because Porsche was the first German manufacturer to do so in
the postwar period. The endurance race at Le Mans had, by 1951, a storied past, and most critically,
well established international significance among a wide audience of automotive enthusiasts, both
European and American. Despite the destruction of three cars in testing before the race even began,
the Porsche Typ. 356 not only finished the grueling event, but won its class and finished twentieth
overall, a promising result for a small company’s first effort at the demanding endurance race. As
Ferry Porsche noted in his autobiography:
This success also made us internationally known and people began to follow our
development closely, particularly in the specialist publications… There was no
doubt, however, that the press reports that followed our motor racing successes
reached the section of the public likely to consider buying one of our cars... Thus it
was clear from the beginning that we had to carry on with the motor racing.212
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While not explicit, “internationally known,” refers in large part to the growing enthusiast
community and its associated popular press in America, a market that could provide not only a
much-sought source of stable foreign currency, but also a potentially vast base of new consumers.
It is also worth noting that, as with any work of life writing, there is likely quite a bit of hindsight
evidenced here. Be that as it may, the victory at Le Mans in 1951 certainly granted Porsche the
kernel of “sporting” authenticity that would appeal to American enthusiast consumers.
Furthermore, the Porsche sports car would be a direct beneficiary to technical developments by
the Porsche factory racing team, and therefore would be seen, with help from strategic marketing
and brand posturing, as the leading edge of technical development in the sports car market. This
was an image boosted by importer Hoffman’s decision to provide one of the first Porsche Typ.
356 cars in the United States to popular American amateur racer Briggs Cunningham, who would
drive the vehicle to victory in several amateur races organized under the auspices of the Sports Car
Club of America.213 The supremacy in motorsport displayed by the Porsche at all levels of racing
developed the brand image of engineering and technical excellence that would lead American
consumers who wanted advanced sports car on the market to purchase a Porsche.
The growth of Porsche popularity in America is both evidenced and influenced by the
negotiations and ever-increasing import quantities that lead to a revised General Importer contract
with Hoffman in 1954. One of the major points of contention, exposed in a letter between the two
men, was that Porsche wanted Hoffman to “increase the number of your agencies within the
western states. To appoint a good consolidated and representative firm as central agency for the
western states residing in Los Angeles. Highly important to us is the introduction of our cars in
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Hollywood.”214 Ferry Porsche’s desire to have a more prominent sales organization in the western
half of the US was multifaceted. Firstly, California, specifically southern California, was emerging
in the early 1950s as a major hub of American automotive culture, perhaps not a surprising
development in a region with an established pattern of investment in auto-mobility.215 Secondly,
Porsche wanted to use the marketing potential of Hollywood celebrities being seen driving Porsche
sports cars to enhance the image of his cars, adding a dose of glitz and glamour to popularize the
Porsche sports car beyond the enthusiast market obsessed with racing and automotive sport.
However, Hoffman was not amenable to the idea, wishing to retain complete control over Porsche
distribution in the United States. Writing in a letter to Hoffman almost a year later – illustrating
Hoffman’s extreme opposition towards the idea – Porsche states:
My proposal to envisage a subsequent division of the territory of the United States
into East and West, depending on the development of things, as is the case with all
the other European automobile distributors, results from the simple consideration
that concentration of your work on the strong East of the country is more profitable
for you, while I still have no way of making sales in the West possible for you to
be organizationally viable and profitable…216
In the end Porsche got his wish; in 1952 a Los Angeles based dealer and distributor lead by James
von Neumann became the western distributor for Porsche, Porsche Car Distributors, Inc. Neumann
himself was a foreign sports car enthusiast and raced a Porsche, known locally as the ‘No. 3
Roadster’ in Cal-Club and Sports Car Club of America events.217 While Neumann’s racing antics
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were certainly beneficial in introducing the Porsche sports car to enthusiasts in the western US, by
insisting on the establishment of a West Coast based distributorship Porsche enhanced the brand
image of his sports cars, which, as he intended, proved quite popular among American actors. This
connection to a growing class of social elites, in combination with Porsche’s racing connections,
promoted by continuing factory involvement in European road-racing as well as increasing
adoption by enthusiasts in local amateur racing, gave the Porsche brand a consistent and hard to
emulate image that was distinctive among other German and European automotive brands
attempting to build their export market in the United States.
The success of this tactic is demonstrated by American consumers who justified the high
cost of their Porsche vehicles by recalling the established racing heritage of the brand in European
motorsport. Racing had been a key aspect of Porsche vehicle development as Ferry Porsche
himself explained in an interview for Automotive News, 1960:
‘We Get a great deal of experience from our racing activity,’ he [Ferry Porsche]
explained. ‘But we’re not like Ferrari. We pick up information and put it into our
production cars. Racing is a good way to experiment with production cars, we think.
Americans get the same kind of experience on their proving grounds as we do in
racing, except that when my engineers go to a race they have more enthusiasm. It’s
just like during the war—more progress is made than in years of peace because
there is competition.’218
This translated directly into sales success, at least for one American amateur racing driver and
Porsche enthusiast Paul Romano, for whom the vehicle’s driving attributes were enough to justify
the cost: “I have stuck to Porsches because I consider Porsche the finest road and competition
automobile in the world today. Its gearing, brakes, cornering and acceleration make driving a lot
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of fun and an exciting experience.”219 The reasons for owning a Porsche are perhaps most fully
stated by notable enthusiast – and later marketing manager for Porsche of America Corporation –
Bill Sholar, who wrote in 1960:
Why do we drive Porsches anyway? Not for prestige although some will still argue
that the sports car is a prestige car in America—but for the pure joy in its
performance, its appearance, and, if you will, the glamour of its history of quality
and integrity, two characteristics which are fast disappearing from the American
auto market… There are enough adults in PCA who want to match European
attitudes toward engineering and research of fine cars with corresponding maturity
in driving and maintaining those cars.220
The Porsche car’s ‘history,’ meaning its racing prowess beginning with the first major
victory at Le Mans in 1951, and ‘integrity,’ referring to the vehicles unabashed pursuit of
handling and driving pleasure, gave the Typ. 356, and therefore the Porsche brand, its
identity to American enthusiasts. As Sholar indirectly argues, these vehicles contributed to
the transference of European attitudes towards engineering and performance from
European automakers to American consumers. This sense of cultural authenticity further
helped many American consumers justify the high initial cost of purchasing what was, at
least to outside observers, one of the odd little “foreign cars” from Stuttgart.
Over the course of Typ. 356 production. Porsche used the marketing provided by winning
races, along with a small internal public relations department, the salesmanship provided by
Hoffman, and the growing subculture of amateur racing in the United States, to dramatically
expand international sales. In 1952 Porsche exported 21% of its total production of Typ. 356s to
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the United States, but by 1965, the last model year of Typ. 356 production, that ratio had soared
to 74.6%.221 Not only was that ratio of vehicles higher, but total production had increased as well.
To further illustrate the rapid growth of the Porsche company, “In 1949 there were 9 salaried and
3 hourly paid employees of Porsche. The total employment at the end of 1959 was 1,093, of which
442 were salaried employees and 651 hourly paid employees.” 222 Even with the growth of the
company, Porsche made sure not to lose the kernel of European cultural authenticity that came
from small-batch production and appealed so intensely to American consumers. John von
Neumann, president of Porsche Car Distributors Inc., said in an interview for a brief article for the
Daily Pilot, “The Porsche factory is small and family-owned… but it will always produce handcrafted cars in low volume. Porsche will not risk losing control of quality.”223 Porsche had emerged
on the international stage as a force in European racing and had successfully parlayed that into
also becoming a well-known foreign manufacturer in the American sports car market.

3.4

Porsche Club of America

The increasing presence of Porsche and its cultural significance in the American market is
indicated by the foundation of the Porsche Club of America (PCA) by Virginia based enthusiast
William “Bill” Sholar in 1955. The Porsche Club of America (PCA) initially began as a way of
Porsche owners to share maintenance tips, spare parts data or availability, and camaraderie.
However, by the early 1960s it had expanded into a full-fledged enthusiast club, complete with
annual and semi-annual meetings called “Treffens” – named after the German language word for
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meeting –, annual and semi-annual trips to Germany in addition to other regional events, and a
national monthly publication, Porsche Panorama. These events created a sense of community
among owners, who referred to themselves as ‘Porsche-pushers,’ even though they may have been
vastly separate geographically. Importantly, one had to own (or co-own) a Porsche vehicle to be
an active member of the club, and this kept the club’s activities tightly focused around the Porsche
car and German automotive culture. 224 Porsche’s expanding consumer base also expanded the
membership of the Porsche Club of America which served to magnify the German cultural heritage
of the vehicle and its transmission to American consumers.
While ceding much of the control over the marketing of the Porsche sports car in the
American market to Hoffman and his import-distributor company in the critical initial years of
1951-1959, the Porsche company nevertheless sought ways in which to build positive market
presence. For this reason, during the formative years of the 1950s and 1960s, the Porsche factory
maintained close contact with its official clubs at the national level, which was the PCA in the
United States. This was accomplished primarily through “Huschke” von Hanstein (Fritz Sittig
Enno Werner von Hanstein), a German racing driver and Chief of Porsche’s racing department
and public relations department, and Richard von Frankenberg, a Porsche team racing driver,
journalist and chief editor of Porsche’s magazine, Christophorus.225 The two men would travel
between the US and Germany frequently, engaging with American enthusiast consumers in both
locales and reinforcing not only the technical superiority of the car, but also the sense of
community between the Porsche personnel and consumers.
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“Huschke” von Hanstein played a crucial role in helping the Porsche sports car transport
German automotive culture to America by establishing the first “Driving School,” an event
following the Sebring Road Race in 1956 that was attended by several “PCAers,” – a self-given
term for members of the Porsche Club of America – in addition to many other sports car enthusiasts
in the United States. Despite relatively little publicity, “since the sports car drivers in America
represent a similarly conspiratorial community like us, the rumor of the Porsche driver school was
quickly known… and on the scheduled date no less than 300 sports car enthusiasts arrived with
their own vehicles.” 226 This demonstrates two important factors in the spread of European
automotive culture. Firstly, American enthusiasts, despite the geographical distance that may have
separated members, were a reasonably close-knit group and shared information rapidly through
the enthusiast magazines and club newsletters. Secondly, this demonstrates that enthusiasts were
willing to travel great distances to share in the experience of using their sports cars ‘as intended,’
in this case meaning to find the cars’ limits of performance and test their individual skill as drivers.
As the jubilant Christophorus article noted, “This sporty driving school was the first event of its
kind in America and, as the unexpectedly high number of participants showed, attracted the
strongest interest. The Porsche company hopes to make a further contribution to the ever-growing
idea of the sports car in the USA in general and for the popularity of German vehicles in
particular.”227 Important to note here is the acknowledgement of explicit factory support in the
spread of European sports car culture to Americans. While the overall goal was certainly a simple
one to sell more cars, the cultural baggage attached was embraced; no effort was made to strip the
European sports car of its cultural heritage. To the contrary, factory support was given, in the
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Porsche case, to ensure that the Porsche heritage of European racing was passed to, and embraced
by, American consumers.
In this effort Porsche was largely successful, able to use factory support in combination
with latent interest among American enthusiasts and resulted in a greater American interest in
European road racing. This process is evidenced here by an excerpt from a recurring editorial
segment in Porsche Panorama in which their “European Correspondent” promises, “The race of
the 1000kms on the Ring [Nürburgring] is next on the schedule… During the race, I will cut about
one hour of tape recording and you will be hearing something about the race during the PCA
Parade.”228 For those who wanted to experience European road racing in a more visceral way than
a recording, or even spectating the event itself, there was the option, for those who could afford
the travel, to attend an international drivers school in Germany on the Nurburgring itself. While
the experience of driving a sports car on a famous European race course was no doubt exceptional
it is interesting to note that what Frederick Smith, an American enthusiast fortunate enough to
attend a Nurburgring driver’s school in 1960, focused more of his narrative on was the comradery
he found among German sports car enthusiasts, “Also, we were to be the guests of the Weisbaden
Porsche Club… who invited us over for their meeting in the Rathskeller across the street. Several
hours of shop talk, racing, speeches, and delightful German beer followed.” 229 These types of
transnational experiences, in which American enthusiasts were able to immerse themselves in
European automotive enthusiast culture are a further example of the messy, complex steps in which
the transfer of European enthusiast culture to American consumers took place. They are single
parts of the larger concurrent process of the globalization of America made possible by the
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consumption of a European product, i.e. Mr. Smith’s consumption of a Porsche was a prerequisite
to the consumption of a broader European automotive culture.
Another way in which the factory directly contributed to the Europeanizing influence on
American consumers was through the “Treffens,” trips which were organized by the Porsche Club
of America in concert with the Porsche factory in Stuttgart. These trips, the first of which occurred
in 1958, were annual to semi-annual affairs in which American consumers purchased a Porsche
automobile and picked up the vehicle at the factory in Stuttgart before embarking on a planned or
at least semi-planned driving tour of major European tourist destinations. While the entire trip
lasted roughly three weeks, the first three days followed a close schedule and allowed Porsche to
deliver its own narrative and “European-ness” that would be attached to the Porsche sports car.
“You’ll be greeted by Porsche factory personnel as you step from the plane and it won’t be long
before you’ll hop into your brand new, special order Porsche. Yes, it’s true… and then all of
Europe is yours waiting to be discovered. But before you’re off, you’ll visit the fabulous Porsche
assembly line and enjoy the hospitality of Porsche and Stuttgart,” extolled an article in Porsche
Panorama that was perhaps more advertisement than editorial.230
Unlike the Triumph Rally, which began around the same time, the Porsche Treffen was
less a series of parties with some driving in between – although there were certainly parties on the
Treffen as well – and more an event focused around introducing Americans to the Porsche
company, German culture, and building an appreciation of driving the Porsche sports car in its
native European environment. As the itinerary for the three official days of the 1963 Treffen
indicate, the rather packed schedule of events included a tour of the factory, a driver’s school –
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where new American owners would be shown how to drive their Porsches in a sporting fashion –
and a banquet style dinner hosted by Ferry Porsche and key Porsche executives.231 While the focus
of the first full day of activities was solely on the Porsche factory and vehicles, the second day was
less focused on the Porsche car and driving and included a bus tour of Stuttgart and a tour through
a local brewery. This last day of factory planned activities emphasized the local culture of the
region from whence the vehicles came. Here the Treffen again distinguished itself from the
European tours sponsored by the British marques; after leaving the tightly scripted three-day
introduction, most members would then go on a tour of Europe organized by European Porsche
clubs, undoubtedly consuming more aspects of German – and European – culture as independent
tourists. Perhaps a sign of Porsche’s confidence in its products (and consumers) there was no parts
van following behind American consumers in their new Porsches, no factory workers that would
clean and polish the cars every few nights. Porsche Treffen participants relied on local Porsche
dealers and independent service stations, the locations of which were provided in a booklet given
handed out when the cars were picked up by their new owners at the factory. At the conclusion of
the Treffen the vehicles that these American sports car enthusiasts had purchased, picked up from
the factory, and toured Europe in, would be shipped to the United States.
These events allowed Porsche the opportunity to shape customer perceptions of the vehicle
and its production. Factory tours, for instance, reinforced the small-batch, hand crafted production
nature of the Porsche sports car. As one PCA member fortunate enough to participate in the Fifth
International Porsche Treffen and tour the Porsche factory in Stuttgart observed, “This is no
assembly line by any means, everything is custom-made—hand filing, beautiful old world
coachwork and custom engine and transmission assembly. Every car turned out is subjected to a
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very critical road test.”232 As noted earlier, the “handmade” or “bespoke” aspects of the Porsche
sports car was one of the factors by which American consumers defined the European sports car
in general. Enthusiast consumers would struggle to find such attributes in any domestically
produced car. Porsche also allowed photography and video-recordings to be taken during the tours,
correctly assuming that this would be spread amongst enthusiasts and further elevate the perception
of their brand. This was certainly the case, based the observations of Jim T. Seolas, a PCA member
from the Arizona, “All of the precision hand work done on each and every unit is something for
us to see. Mass production and assembly lines as we know them can DROP DEAD!” which was
itself based on a film of the production of Porsche sports cars shot during an international Treffen
to Stuttgart of the production of Porsche sports cars at the factory.233
While the level of Porsche factory participation in the Treffen was high, the brunt of the
financial burden of the trip fell upon the Porsche Club of America and the American enthusiasts
who embarked upon the usually month-long adventure. By 1966 the cost of the chartered flight
alone was $35,000, and that did not include the shipping for the vehicles to (for those who were
not taking delivery of a new Porsche car) or from Germany.234 All of this is to say that while certain
aspects of the Treffen were indeed part of a marketing system designed to sell more Porsche sports
cars, it was not one funded by Porsche, or its distributors, directly. Rather, the PCA was assuming
the burden of deploying a marketing scheme in the US that Porsche was reaping the benefits of.
In the process the PCA increased its membership as in the 1960s participation in the Treffen was
restricted to PCA members and their wives only. Rather the experience of being at the factory and
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using the vehicle in its “native” environs, was seen as justification enough for the extravagant costs
of the trip.
While the international Treffens were extravagant affairs in which only a small percentage
of American Porsche buyers could participate, other enthusiast events organized by American
enthusiasts also point to a form of European influence. While the fortunate few (roughly 80) were
gallivanting across Europe, Porsche enthusiasts at home staged their own Treffen of sorts:
The first country on the tour was ITALY where thoughtful customs officials at the
important landmark of the ‘Leaning Tower of Pizza’ offered delicacies and some
of that famous black coffee. Following a short rest and a ‘secondo di atterimento,’
the tourists continued on to GERMANY and found themselves accosted in the
Black Forest Preserve by Bavarian types never seen before. They were friendly,
though, and served a typical local specialty—bratwurst and beer. Refreshed after a
‘schrecksekunde,’ the travelers then took a long winding tour arriving high in the
FOX River ALPS, where they were greeted by yodeling officials in original
costumes. After paying their dazzle toll and taking their ‘temps de reflexe,’ visitors
nibbled on a special cheese, wandered over the ramparts and across the drawbridge
of the beautiful old castle. All of these control point delicacies merely whetted the
appetite for the feast spread out by our French hosts at the Villa d’Este. Under the
tricolor, beret-topped hand-shakers closed the tour with finesse and a ‘seconde
d’effroi,’ for the weary wanderers.”235
While the passage above may at first appear to be a description of the Second Annual Treffen of
the PCA to Europe, it is in fact an overview of the Chicago-Milwaukee Region “Treffen” event
put on by the Committee for the Advancement of Poor Porsche Pilots, or CAPP, a self-deprecating
jab at the affluence of the average Porsche owner. Obviously styled after the big “Treffen” to
Europe, local members wanted it to “appear to be as much like a Treffen as possible, with travel
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vernacular, local atmosphere, etc. We knew we had a leaning ‘Tower of Pisa,’ an old Chicago
landmark constructed by a wealthy gentleman after a sojourn to Italy in the Thirties. We also had
forest preserves, one of which had the appearance of the Black Forest with a replica of a German
building.” However, to make the outing even more complete participants were given fake travel
documents, called a “Passepartout” and set up fake customs checks and agents at the rally’s main
checkpoints. Met at the Chicago airport by, “PCA immigration officials,” participants had their
photographs:
stapled and embossed into the Passepartout under a hot sun… At each border
crossing (check point), one of the customs officials stamped the Passepartout with
a rubber stamp. Each of the stamps indicated in the language of that country a
‘Moment of Thought,’ a term used in Europe for the time charged on your bill that
a mechanic thinks while working on your car. It was a day of make believe, but
unlike in Alice in Wonderland, the dream had come true.236
When one considers the time and expense involved in planning and executing even local or
regional events such as these it reinforces the idea that it is an element of “European-ness” that
appeals to the owners of (in this case specifically) Porsche sports cars. It was not enough to merely
stage a sports car rally though the greater Chicago-Milwaukee region, even though this was itself
an element of European enthusiast culture, but it also had to include a stylized depiction of Europe
as well. The 90 members of the Chicago-Milwaukee PCA who participated in this event are
indicative of the broader base of American sports car enthusiasts who, at the close of the 1950s,
were clearly chasing after a type of European image and cultural experience that was attached to
sports car ownership, even if when it came to elements beyond the vehicle itself this image was
perhaps more stylized than authentic.
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Not all American interactions with Europe and European enthusiast culture took place in
the carefully mediated environs of a club or factory organized international Treffen, sports car
enthusiasts also, on occasion, found themselves caught up in the realities of Cold War Europe,
exemplified here by the trip taken by Bill and Virginia Sholar, founder of the PCA and wife who
shared an equally enthusiastic passion for Porsche sports cars and European travel. While on
vacation with the Porsche Club of America Tour in Germany in 1960 inclement weather caused
their planned trip to the North Sea region to be cancelled. On the insistence of an unnamed German
friend, the Sholars are encouraged to use the time to travel to Berlin via autobahn in their new
Porsche sports car. Their trip is largely uneventful, and much of it is consistent with other travel
literature written about the Communist East from a Western perspective, in which a bustling, busy
and friendly western zone is contrasted against a guarded, desolate, and cold eastern zone. Care is
taken to point out the, “contemptuous glances… [and] unsmiling characters,” from East German
border security, the empty roads, propaganda billboards, and, in East Berlin, the large Communist
boulevards conspicuously free of pedestrian traffic.237 However, despite the cliché writing style,
indications of shared humanity break though; for instance when the author, Virginia, notes, “I got
the impression that the officials back of those windows in those wooden shacks filling in endless
forms with useless information were just as tired of this whole stupid business as we were,” a
reference not only to the border checks, but to the geopolitical divisions of the Cold War as well.238
This tiny sentence at once reinforces and yet at the same time calls into question Cold War
stereotypes. While Bill and Virginia’s experience was certainly unique, it would be far-fetched to
claim significance in terms of direct transnational contact between East and West. What is perhaps
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far more significant is the way in which Virginia chooses to end the article, “It had been a
wonderful experience and one which I wish all thoughtful Americans could have.”239 It hints to
the open nature of European sports car enthusiasts and a willingness to look past established
stereotypes that tends to come with a more cosmopolitan worldview.
The Treffens continued to grow along with the PCA in both size and complexity as well as
the level of cultural immersion. By the mid to late1960s the PCA was certainly a busy organization,
consisting of 4,668 members in 1968, usually planning one PCA Treffen annually or bi-annually,
as well as at least one Porsche Parade in the United States in addition to the numerous events
organized at the regional level and controlled an annual budget of $75,000 to $80,000 at the
national level to make these events possible.240 In terms of cultural immersion, the 1966 Treffen
was timed so PCA members would be able to take in the Oktoberfest in Munich, as well as a
Porsche Club meet which would include, “the German and European [Porsche] clubs.”241
There did appear to be indications going into the 1970s that this infatuation with the
“European-ness” of the Porsche sports car and Porsche ownership was waning. Initially, American
enthusiast interest in the 1969 Treffen appeared so great that Porsche struggled to support the event.
Initially Porsche tried to split the Treffen; rather than one 150-person group the Treffen would be
split into three 25-50 person groups, each roughly one month apart and lasting 21 days, although
the itinerary for all would be the same. As in years past, the Porsche Factory would provide two
or three days of activities and the remainder of the time would be spent exploring Europe
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individually.242 However this plan fell apart during the winter of 1969, and American enthusiasts
on the West Coast found out in March that their trip in April had been cancelled. 243 An attempt
was made to accommodate them in May, but due to low participant interest – not entirely
unexpected given the last minute cancellation one month prior – the 1969 Treffen was cancelled
in its entirety and there would be no 1970 Treffen either. Another indication that Euro-centric
attitudes surrounding Porsche ownership were shifting was one enthusiasts hunt for a used Porsche
in Europe. As he sadly noted at the end of his article, “While we were rummaging all over Europe
for this object of our affection, I made the discovery that Porsche Country is no longer in the Old
World but right here within the borders of our own land…”244 Implying that ‘Porsche Country’
was not within the actual country in which the cars were manufactured would appear to suggest a
dramatic shift in the way American enthusiasts perceived the
Ultimately, a slight turn away from European travel by American enthusiasts should not
be confused with a lessening of the European cultural interest or the transfer of culture which was
tied to the Porsche sports car. Within the United States the incorporation of ‘German’ culture into
PCA gatherings still played a significant role. For instance, at a West Coast meet in California
which included 11 PCA regions, the informal welcome night event included “a tech session and
beer and German food…” obviously playing up the foreign heritage of the Porsche sports car, an
aspect of its appeal to American consumers.245 At the significantly larger XII Porsche Parade in
Washington D.C. in the summer of 1967 the “deutsche Gemütlichkeit” of the Potomac region was
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emphasized by ‘Bavarian night.’ Participants in the XII Parade would experience elements of
German culture, specifically a menu of traditional German foods – sausages, sauerkraut, rye and
pumpernickel breads, ‘German’ potato salad, and ‘German’ pastry, before “Ten German musicians
in native costume,” provided music for dancing, “Bavarian dances will be performed and
demonstrated. Everyone will have the opportunity to learn the dances… [and] singing… like a
genuine Bavarian.”246
This demonstrates the durability of the cultural connection forged by the consumption of
the Porsche sports car, for even in the late sixties, after the cars had been on the market in the US
for nearly two decades the associations of the owners with aspects of German culture are still quite
strong. Perhaps more importantly than the questionably authentic ‘Bavarian Night,’ the Potomac
region PCA also arranged a reception for Parade participants at the Chancery of the German
Embassy, a noted first, “the German Embassy has never before given a reception to any social
organization such as PCA.” 247 As promotional material for the XII Parade pointed out,
participation in events such as ‘Bavarian Night’ inspired, “that unique bond which makes each
Porsche owner a part of a tradition unmatched by any other marque in the world.” 248 Through
instances like this, it is clear to see the ways in which the vehicle itself, as well as the enthusiast
organization which grew around it, functions to spread aspects of the national culture of the
vehicles production.
By the beginning of the 1970s a general turn towards American affairs was apparent
among members of the PCA. While articles still regularly appeared on European sports car and
racing developments, articles concerning safety and emissions regulations as well as the ballooning
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costs of automobile insurance began to appear with greater frequency. As one enthusiast ranted
early in 1972, “I am afraid that unless we who drive the Porsche speak up and make someone hear
us we will either be regulated to driving the latest model M-3 Tank or we will have to pay a
premium to protect ourselves…”249 Increasing US regulations were encroaching into the design
and driving experience of American consumers, especially among members of organizations
organized around the heritage of European sports car driving who increasingly felt marginalized.
This is clear from the way that the language becomes even more forceful, an enthusiast writing in
1974 argued, “Organizations like the PCA must assume the responsibility for initiating the attack
[on increasing general automobile legislation] … we must begin the fight now, with pen and paper
and intelligent letters to the people that can do some good.”250 The much more militant tone is
indicative of not only the increasing pressure that sports car enthusiasts faced, but also of how the
sports car community saw itself: as a united front against further government restrictions.
These issues were not unique to the United States, as enthusiasts with connections to
Europe fostered by the sports car and motor sport looked to Europe they were dismayed to find
even harsher restrictions already in place or on the horizon. In France, Great Britain, and West
Germany most motorsports, including rallying, had been banned or “severely curtailed” by
December of 1973 in the wake of the Oil Crisis. The Porsche Club of America encouraged
American enthusiasts to support the National Motorsports Committee – a group established to
lobby the Federal Energy Office on behalf of American motorsports enthusiasts – by writing letters
to “state and national government representatives,” and with financial contributions.251 Despite
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this lobbying several well-known international races, like the 12 Hours of Sebring would be
cancelled, and with a dearth of motorsport events in Europe cancelled, the world looked quite
bleak to American Porsche enthusiasts in the mid-1970s.
While the Oil Crisis would end, increasing regulations and escalating insurance premiums
would not. Stricter emissions regulations lowered the power output of engines, and injured
performance while vehicle price increased and the cost of insurance skyrocketed. Fewer
enthusiasts would be willing to drive their Porsches cross-country to participate in meets and
events, and far fewer would drive their cars in the amateur rallies and races that had characterized
enthusiast activities in the late 1950s and 1960s. On the manufacturers end, it would be nearly
impossible for Porsche to bring the same purity of German design and engineering to American
consumers when conformity was demanded to such extensive regulations. At the same time, due
to motorsports regulations and increasing fuel costs within Europe, it no longer shone as the beacon
of sports car culture that it had in the 1950s. All of this culminated in a refocusing of American
enthusiast attention in the mid-1970s around combatting regulatory overreach and keeping sports
car and motorsports alive within the United States.
This chapter has illustrated the ways in which the design and sales of the Porsche sports
car in North America contributed to a transfer of German automotive culture, and German culture
more broadly, to American consumers from the mid-1950s to 1974. The design and engineering
of the two most significant Porsche models in terms of the American market, the Typ. 356 and
911, demonstrated a kernel of European motorsports authenticity that was well received by
American automotive journalists and consumers. However, the complex process of American
cultural globalization, as seen through the lens of the Porsche sports car, cannot be understood
solely by focusing on the manufacturer’s perspective. Key to understanding this process was the
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perspective of the American consumers who purchased a Porsche sports car and became
enthusiasts. As this chapter has demonstrated, American enthusiasts embraced the ‘German-ness’
of their automobiles; from hosting Oktoberfests in the United States to travelling abroad to see the
factory and drive on the roads of Europe in a manner befitting the performance heritage of their
Porsches, American enthusiasts who purchased a Porsche also bought into aspects of the national
culture of the country in which it was produced. Despite the rising tide of American culture
flooding into Europe in the postwar period, Americans consumers could not escape participation
in the same processes of cultural transfer inherent in the exchange of goods across borders.
American culture would feel the touch of European influence, channeled through automotive
enthusiasts and the sports cars they purchased.
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AMERICAN ADAPTATION AND APPROPRIATION OF
THE EUROPEAN SPORTS CAR

By the early 1950s the sports car craze had captivated American consumers. However,
despite all the noise about sports cars, actual sales numbers remained relatively low, just 0.27
percent of all new car registrations in the United States in 1953.252 Yet low sales numbers alone
belie the significance of consumer participation in the culture of the sports car: new regional
chapters of the Sports Car Club of America (SCCA) had blanketed the nation, single-marque clubs
like the MG Car Club were building extensive membership rolls, and perhaps most importantly
the American popular and automotive press was busily printing articles telling Americans they
could expect more from their cars and their manufacturers. The rapid expansion of enthusiast
culture in the United States led American manufacturers to conclude, despite comprising a
relatively low percentage of overall market share, that the sports car craze represented a permanent
feature of the American automotive market.
The situation was complicated by the fact that General Motors was facing intense
competition from Ford for the position of largest domestic automotive manufacturer at the time,
which influenced its decision to enter the sports car niche. Likewise focused on beating General
Motors, Ford was therefore dragged in to the sports car market as well, each vying to produce an
American vision of the sports car. Entering the sports car niche of the American automotive market
forced General Motors and Ford to confront the European sports car and determine not only what
it was in terms of design, performance, and engineering, but also why it was so popular among
American consumers. Their analysis focused on all aspects of the sports car: the general aesthetics
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of the sports car design, engine and chassis engineering, as well as its intended use in the Europeanstyle motorsports events promoted by steadily expanding enthusiast clubs.
However, a stumbling block for contemporary American auto executives was the very
‘European-ness’ of the European sports car, an intangible element which intrigued American
consumers who wanted a car that not only looked different, but also a driving experience that was
more immediate and engaging. This presented a problem to American manufacturers: how to
capture that kernel of ‘European-ness’ while at the same time producing a car that appealed to a
broader percentage of American consumers and could be truly mass-produced. In their formulation
of a competitive response, American manufacturers deliberately adopted and appropriated aspects
of the European sports car into their own products.
By examining the influence of European automotive design and culture I take the
interpretive model of ‘Americanization’ and invert it to examine how the importation and sales of
a European product, the sports car, influenced the American automotive industry, one of the largest
and most powerful American industries of the period. Therefore, I complicate the traditional
narrative of ‘Americanization,’ demonstrating that American industries and consumers were
influenced by European products in much the same manner. This supports the broader argument
of my dissertation, which is that rather than thinking in terms of Americanization, with all its
imperialist undertones, it makes more sense to view the immediate postwar period as a case of the
globalization of economies and cultures. While the United States enjoyed a position of dominance,
it was nevertheless susceptible to the outside cultural and economic influences that accompanied
the consumption of foreign products.
This chapter traces the response of American manufacturers to the European sports car
craze of the 1950s through four case studies. The first section uses the Chevrolet Corvette, the first
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American sports car, as a case study to demonstrate how an American manufacturer attempted to
adopt elements of the European sports car by creating a slightly Americanized copy of a
fundamentally British design. The ten-year evolution of the Corvette from its release in 1953 to
the Corvette Sting Ray of 1963 demonstrates the difficulty that General Motors encountered
essentially breaking-in to a niche of their own domestic market. Despite the fact that the Corvette
is remembered as a quintessentially American car in the American cultural imagination, the
development of the Corvette in indicative of the difficulty inherent in capturing that kernel of
‘European-ness’ which American enthusiasts wanted and General Motors wished to emulate. The
second section uses Ford’s Thunderbird as a case study to examine how an American manufacturer
appropriated the European sports car, selling the image of European style and performance while
adapting the vehicle to an American driving and cultural environment. For instance, the inclusion
of a V-8 engine, in addition to hood scoops and other elements of hot-rod aesthetic created a
uniquely American vision of a performance vehicle. While the Thunderbird was rejected by most
American enthusiasts, it went on to achieve respectable sales figures in a broader market sector
thus demonstrating the complexities inherent in competing in this globalized sector of the domestic
market. The third section examines General Motors other main effort to compete with the
European sports car: the importation of its own captive European brand, Opel. Opel cars were first
imported in 1958, however this section is most concerned with the period from 1964 to 1973 when
Opel’s two most successful models, the Kadett and the GT, were imported and sold through Buick
dealers. The Opel GT was a European sports car. It was designed and built in Germany for
European driving conditions, and certain models of the Kadett economy car were turned into sports
car through the optional Rallye package. Both the Opel cars, and, somewhat ironically, the
marketing approach chosen by General Motors to sell them to American consumers, contributed
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to the transfer of a European motorsport and enthusiast culture. However, the timing for the Opel
venture was poor; the horsepower wars of the 1960s peaked in 1968, and mainstream American
consumer interest favored cheap, powerful muscle cars over European finesse and handling. In
closing, the final section of this chapter examines the enthusiast response to these ventures, and
explores how enthusiasts grappled with American manufacturers trying to recreate and sell a
European product.

4.1

An American Copy: The Chevrolet Corvette

The Corvette, the first sports car produced by an American automaker in the postwar period,
is an excellent case study of one American manufacturer’s attempt to compete with the European
sports car. The Corvette was not initially intended for production. Consumer demand prompted
General Motors to move the car into limited production after the concept vehicle was first publicly
displayed at GM’s 1953 Motorama auto show. From 1953 to the introduction of the Sting Ray in
1963, the story of the Corvette demonstrates General Motors’ attempt to break into a niche of their
own domestic market through a deep engagement with the European sports car and American
enthusiasts. General Motors clearly sought to recreate the European sports car, undertaking
primitive market studies and reproducing the style and design of a typical mid-to-upper end
European sports car, and more specifically the Jaguar XK-120, even down to its odd 102-inch
wheelbase.253 Furthermore, in terms of production the first generation of the Corvette was largely
handmade, and General Motors executives called attention to this fact, lauding the ‘modern’
methods that were being used in the cars assembly process.
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Through the maturation of the Corvette I shine a light on the processes through which an
American automaker, the largest auto manufacturer in the world, adapted a product originally from
Europe for an American consumer. This demonstrates that the processes of adaptation, adoption,
and appropriation that historians use in discourses of ‘Americanization’ are equally applicable to
processes occurring as a result of the consumption of European products in the United States.
While validating the methodological framework which underpins ‘Americanization,’ the story of
the Corvette complicates the type of narratives which it has produced which tend to give the United
States a monopoly on the spread of culture through consumption. For many American enthusiasts
there was something missing despite the Corvette’s performance, clearly European-influenced
style, and handmade production; that kernel of ‘European-ness’ was not there. From its initially
disappointing first few years to 1963 the Corvette matured from a hasty copy of a European sports
car and began to be refracted into an American vision of the sports car. While the Corvette had
gained an optional V8 of 265 cubic inches in 1955, General Motors designers embraced the clear
American penchant for large engines by 1963, offering only a 327- cubic inch V8 which produced
300 horsepower. Furthermore, in 1963 the Corvette gained a coupe body in addition to the
convertible (roadster) in order to appeal to a broader swath of American consumers for which a
convertible car was too impractical.
In the rush to satiate the incredible postwar demand, American manufacturers generally
limited innovation and pumped out massive numbers of heavy sedans. American manufacturers
perceived the sedan to be the ideal platform; it was a general-purpose design that was equally adept
at carrying passengers and luggage, and was optimized for the long-distance driving that typified
American road travel. A speech by Maurice Olley, Head of Research and Design in the Chevrolet
Division of General Motors, is indicative of how American manufacturers viewed the design of
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the American sedan in the postwar period, “… America popularized the sedan in the late 1920s.
For years this appeared the complete solution of the problem [of transportation], combining the
open air with adequate weather protection and adequate space.”254 Furthermore, its wide appeal
meant it could be mass-produced, driving down the costs of production, and, aided by a plethora
of add-ons and options, the sedan could have wide profit margins. As Olley noted a few pages
later, “Logically the problem of American transportation was solved, and the industry could settle
down to pressing out millions of 5 passenger sedans.” 255 Furthermore, Olley was not the only
General Motors executive who felt this way, in a speech given to the Marketing Association of
New York an unknown executive said, “Life in the automobile trade would be serene and peaceful
if we could settle down to the production of black four-door sedans.”256 From a manufacturer’s
perspective the American sedan was a nearly perfect design and there was very clear organizational
momentum in the early postwar period to continue along these lines, especially when pent-up
consumer demand meant that they could quickly sell every car that rolled off the line.
As early as 1948 American consumers, especially enthusiasts, protested what they saw as
the failure, or at least stagnation of postwar American automotive design. In “J’Accuse,” an article
published in Sports Car, enthusiast Alec Ulmann criticized nearly every aspect of the typical
American production car. Beginning with lackluster engines and moving through soft suspensions
and three-speed transmissions, ending with bloated, chrome-encrusted sedan bodywork, Ulmann’s
critique exemplified the feeling of most American enthusiasts that the big Detroit automakers were
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taking advantage of an American consumer who simply didn’t know there were better cars
available. However, Ulmann’s piece is not entirely negative, and ends with a call to action:
So, I say again, ‘I accuse.’ Yes, I do, because this country [United States] has the
talent, has the engineering ability, and has shown in the past that it can produce
such gems as the Mercer, and the Wills St. Clair, the Hispano-copied LaSalle and
Cadillac, the final Stutz, and the Marmon V-16. It has revolutionized the concept
of car configuration with the streamlined Graham-Paige, the last of the Cords, and
the elegant pre-war Lincoln Continental. All we have seen since in the
melodramatic and absolutely purposeless social-climber, ‘Town and Country
Special.’ Well, it might be good enough for you, but it is not a good enough postwar effort to suit me.257
While it is unlikely that any General Motors executive read Ulmann’s piece specifically, what they
could no longer ignore was the general swell of opinion presented in an increasing number of
books and automotive publications. 258 Harley Earl, Head of Design at General Motors even
experienced this type of feedback personally when he took the just-completed LeSabre prototype
– a two-seat ‘Dream Car’, large, heavy, and with styling inspired by jet aircraft which would come
to typify American automotive design – to the sports car races at Watkins Glen. There he was,
“ridiculed by enthusiasts like Briggs Cunningham, who chided Earl for not making a proper sports
car…”259 Earl understood that there was a larger market for the sports car than the limited number
of European imports revealed. In fact, there was a contingent of American enthusiasts who wanted
European performance and style, but from an American manufacturer and at an affordable price.
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This push from enthusiasts combined with General Motors’ increasingly fierce competition
with Ford Motor Company. Both corporations were intently focused on commanding the largest
share of the American automobile market. As historian Ed Cray notes, General Motors was falling
behind Ford, which had undertaken a major redesign in 1952. Therefore, “late in 1951, after seeing
the new Fords, then-President Charles Wilson had directed [Harlow] Curtice to restore aging
Chevrolet’s image.”260 This was all the more significant due to the fact that, in terms of American
market share, only a few percentage points separated the two brands. Charles Wilson was called
to serve as the Secretary of Defense by President Eisenhower in 1953, leaving Curtice, still charged
with rejuvenating Chevrolet’s brand image, as President of General Motors.
Beginning in 1952, General Motors embarked upon a radical redesign program to inject
youth and energy into its lineup, and part of that program was the production of the first postwar
American sports car, the Chevrolet Corvette. Perhaps the best articulation of the design goals for
the Corvette came in a letter from General Motors’ Chief of Research and Development Maurice
Olley to two other executives, written after the car was ready for production, “The need was to
produce a sports car, of attractive appearance, using components of known reliability, with
adequate performance, a comfortable ride, and stable handling qualities.”261 British sports cars like
the M.G.s and Jaguars were incredibly popular among American enthusiasts, and offered a model
to follow to a nearly guaranteed sales success within the emerging sports car niche that Chevrolet
wanted to enter.
Conceptually the Corvette was intended to compete directly with the ‘European’ sports car
and thus Chevrolet designers and engineers sought inspiration from the competition. An internal
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study by Maurice Olley presented in March 1952 to the General Technical Committee, titled
“Notes on European Cars,” explored the common differences between European and American
cars. Firstly, the report noted that, “deteriorating [economic] conditions elsewhere in the world,
and a general lack of dollars, are opening the door to European products.”262 Olley’s point here is
that American manufacturers could expect European competition to grow rather than subside.
However, a key point, expressed in parenthesis at the end of a roughly page-long analysis calls
attention to the fact that the, “emphasis in America is on directional stability – in Europe on
directional nimbleness.” 263 Essentially, Olley predicted that increased European competition
would come in the form of a vehicle with balanced handling. This analysis was not novel in 1952;
the postwar European sports car that was captivating American enthusiasts emphasized balanced
handling over outright power or top speed. In closing, Olley argues, “It is suggested that American
engineering teams visiting Europe can perhaps learn in design…”, a powerful statement coming
from the Head of Research and Development for General Motors indicating the corporations focus
on European competition.264
By the 1950s American automotive designers did not have to visit Europe to be familiar
with aspects of European design. General Motors Head of Design, Harley Earl was no stranger to
the sports car, as journalist Paul Ingrassia observes: “Attending races at Le Mans after the war,
Earl witnessed firsthand the popularity of two-seat sports cars, notably the Jaguar XK-120 roadster,
which had been introduced in 1948 as Jaguar’s first postwar car.”265 In 1950 Earl designed the
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LeSabre ‘Dream Car,’ which was an American interpretation of the two-seat convertible sports
car, however after his embarrassment at Watkins Glen with the prototype, Earl ordered his design
team to create, “a two-seat sporty roadster with clean, simple lines that he hoped would upstage
the XK-120.”266 Thus the Corvette concept was born, Earl’s design team produced a snub-nosed
two-seat roadster body that was very clearly influenced by European design trends. A key member
of Earl’s design staff was Bob McLean, a young graduate of Cal Tech. As former General Motors
Chief Engineer notes in his retrospective monograph, Corvette From the Inside, “McLean, fresh
from California, was very familiar with the sports car racing scene that was already developing
there and knew what it took to make a sports car.”267 It is indicative of Earl’s intent to replicate the
European sports car that he relied upon a member of the design staff who had firsthand experience
in one of the major markets for the sports car, Southern California, and had studied design in that
milieu. Furthermore, the vehicle would be powered by a new “Blue Flame” version of Chevrolet’s
235-cubic inch inline six-cylinder engine, which was a direct influence from the 3.8 Liter inline
six cylinder which powered the XK-120. In fact, when Earl saw the design mockup for the engine’s
placement – which was much lower and rearward that was usual in American car design – he
reportedly asked, “’Is this how the Jaguar and M.G. are?;” and when an engineer responded in the
affirmative Earl replied, “’Well, that’s how we’ll do it.’” 268 Clearly the initial version of the
Corvette was an attempt to copy what General Motors viewed as the key aspects of the European
sports car: a low, two-seat roadster body, powered by a six cylinder engine.
Although much of the Corvette design represented a shameless copying of the XK-120,
there were two areas in which General Motors sought to differentiate its product from the European
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model. Firstly, the body panels for the Corvette were made from fiberglass, a newly discovered
and still fairly exotic material whose properties were not fully known. Fearing a return to steel
rationing due to the brewing conflict on the Korean peninsula, General Motors experimented with
fiberglass as a potential replacement for steel. 269 When the Corvette was drafted, it was as a
concept car, not one that was necessarily ready to go into production, and therefore Earl perceived
it to be a perfect testbed for the new material. A second innovation for Corvette was that it would
feature an automatic transmission. The automatic transmission was not new, introduced in 1939
by General Motors as the Hydra-Matic, however its application in a sports car was novel. The
automatic transmission, and the later decision to only offer the production Corvette with an
automatic, represented GM’s desire to ‘Americanize’ the sports car. After all, automatic
transmissions were a popular, option on most of Chevrolet’s passenger cars, and Maurice Olley
and other General Motors executives, hoped that this would broaden the Corvette’s appeal beyond
just the hardcore enthusiast market.
Despite intense project secrecy, word of the development of an American sports car leaked
and was picked up by agents for the British Board of Trade. This is not altogether surprising,
considering that much of the weight of the British government and Foreign Service was put behind
the export push. However, what is interesting is that British manufacturers, and even the British
Foreign Service saw increased competition, especially with an American manufacturer, as a good
thing. A Monthly Economic Summary produced by the Board of Trade noted that, “Two domestic
manufacturers however are starting production of sports cars on European lines, viz: Chevrolet
and Kaiser-Frazer. Neither of these cars have yet appeared on the market and it seems unlikely
that many sales will be made in 1953. The emergence of Chevrolet as a producer of sports cars
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cannot but help increase their acceptance by people who do not yet regard them as really
respectable.” 270 Indeed, General Motors had set out to do exactly that, and the British motor
industry and Board of Trade must have been positively beaming when they heard about the closing
section of Maurice Olley’s speech to the SAE where he remarked, “The sports car is a serious form
of transportation. It ranks with the chariot, with the tilbury, and curricle of the 1800’s, with the
roadster of the 1920s, as a necessary step in providing convenient, lively transportation for two
people in a smaller package.” 271 General Motors interest, and later production of a sports car,
legitimated the European idea of performance.
Chevrolet showcased the Corvette concept at its 1953 Motorama which began in January
in New York. The Motoramas were new car shows put on by GM to display concept cars and
gauge popular interest in future production models. Public reaction to the Corvette was immediate
and positive, far more than anticipated. As an official press release in the wake of Motorama
described, “The automobile was a major ‘surprise’ of the Motorama… Chevrolet was not only
keeping pace with the GM trend of developing experimental vehicles for engineering research, but
was going a step further to demonstrate to the public what the tremendous resources of the world’s
biggest automaker can do when it assigns engineers to look into the sports car field.”272 While the
final decision to put the car into production had been postponed by Curtice pending the outcome
of the Motorama display, Ed Cole, the new President of the Chevrolet Division anticipated a
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favorable public reaction had already begun working on moving the design from concept to
production.
The Corvette team had high hopes for its American copy of the European sports car. In
planning documents written as early as November of 1952, the team was anticipating high public
interest and noting that, “during that year [1953] 1,000 cars are expected to be produced… If the
new car is well received by the public, it is expected that 10,000 cars will be produced in 1954.”273
It is interesting to note that the estimate of 10,000 cars in 1954 was clearly influenced by the sales
numbers of MG, which were approaching those levels. This reinforces the point that General
Motors was basing not only the design, but also the anticipated sales performance on the model of
MG. It should also be noted that they were not necessarily incorrect in these assumptions, as
Chevrolet reportedly received over 7,000 letters following the Corvette’s Motorama debut from
enamored Americans ready and willing to purchase the car, should it go into production.274
In another instance of MG influence designers were instructed to use existing Chevrolet or
General Motors parts wherever possible as a cost saving measure. For instance, in meeting minutes
from November 26th, 1952, the Corvette team was told that, in regard to the fuel system, “Efforts
should be limited to a simple oval shaped door enclosing a standard filler cap rather than any
design involving complicated tooling.” 275 This cost-cutting even extended to items on the car
which effected performance. The team was instructed to use, “High lift camshaft of small profile
cams so existing bearings can be used.”276 These instructions were given in order to meet the target
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price point, which in 1953 included the already well-established MG. The thinking at General
Motors was that in order to be competitive the Corvette could not be priced significantly higher
than its European competition.
European influence extended beyond design and into production, small-batch production
methods were one of the qualities that American consumers identified as an important aspect of
the European sports car. Of course, small batches of specialty cars necessitated less mechanized
production methods as the cost of tools and machinery could not be subsidized over tens of
thousands of vehicles. Furthermore, the Corvette’s body panels were made of fiberglass, at the
time an exotic material. While not seizing on this as a marketing tool specifically, Chevrolet did
note that:
One of the points of interest is that it is possible for a great mass production
organization to step out of its normal role of producing over 500 vehicles in an hour,
to make 500 specialized vehicles in two weeks. This is an interesting fact even
outside the United States, where it is generally considered that American
manufacturing methods are too inflexible to meet modern conditions. The was well
disproved within our own knowledge… It is [now dis]proved to the whole world
by such a specialized vehicle as the Corvette.277
While General Motors did not directly look to Europe for inspiration in this regard, the similarities,
and therefore European influence, are difficult to overlook. Corvette assembly began not in one of
General Motors massive plants, but rather in, “a vacant customer delivery building on Van Sylke
Road starting at a rate of one per day.”278 In order to compete with the European sports car, General
Motors had to adopt its European methods of small-batch or specialty production as well.
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Despite consumer demand for the new Corvette, and for sports cars in general, Chevrolet
fumbled the car’s public release in 1953 and 1954. Chevrolet earmarked the first 300 production
Corvettes, all the 1953 model year cars, for VIP customers in an apparent attempt to follow MG
and Jaguar American marketing. Early British sports car marketing, as discussed in the second
chapter, tended to feature American Hollywood stars or other local American VIPs driving their
sports cars. As McLellan argues in the case of the Corvette, “The idea was to get these powerful
and high-profile people to tell their friends what a great car the Corvette was, thus setting the stage
for the Corvette’s sales success.”279 Unfortunately for Chevrolet, this strategy was coupled with
lax quality control on those initial 300 cars, which was made worse by production personnel’s
unfamiliarity working with fiberglass. As a result, the first cars suffered from large, ill-sealing
panel gaps, leaks, paint defects, temperamental engine performance due to sensitive carburetors,
and a folding-top mechanism which easily jammed. 280 Therefore, the VIPs did not enjoy their
Corvettes, and most ended up parked in garages rather than out on the street garnering publicity.
Furthermore, when the Corvette went on sale to the general public for the 1954 model year it
disappointed enthusiasts who were interested in performance. Paul Ingrassia argues that, “The first
‘Vette was an embarrassment. It was powered by the… ‘Blue Flame six,’ which… was a lackluster
six-cylinder engine. Instead of a proper manual transmission that a driving enthusiast could shift
with precision, the Corvette had a performance sapping two-speed automatic called
‘Powerglide.”281 In just two short years from a popular public reception at the Motorama, the
Corvette appeared to be a bona-fide flop. Roughly one-third of all Corvettes produced for the 1954
model year remained unsold, over 1,000 cars. In fact, the corporate rumor mill indicated that the
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Corvette was about to be cancelled.282 It appeared that the American attempt to create a sports car
by simply adopting most of the design elements would be a failure.
The Corvette was saved two factors, the first of which was the timely intervention of a
Chevrolet engineer, Zora Arkus-Duntov, a European immigrant who had extensive experience in
automobile racing. Duntov was born in Brussels, raised in Saint-Petersburg, and, fortunately for
his engineering ambitions, taken to Germany by his step-father’s diplomatic assignment in 1927.
After a few years attending university in Germany Duntov bought a 1922 Bugatti and proceeded
to practice driving around the streets of Berlin, where he met fellow enthusiasts and developed his
reputation as an engineer and aspiring driver.283 Duntov emigrated to the United States following
the onset of war in Europe and brought his passion for motorsport and automotive performance to
work for General Motors after seeing the Corvette concept on display at the 1953 Motorama.
Importantly, Duntov had not quit racing, in fact, he had impressed Porsche racing manager
Hutschke von Hanstein with his performance driving for Allard at Le Mans in 1953 enough so that
he was asked to drive for the Porsche team at Le Mans in 1954. Granted permission to do so by
Ed Cole on Chevrolet’s dime, Duntov returned with a class victory, as well as, “a technical analysis
of the major entries as well as his theories on aerodynamics…”284 Duntov would take this practical
experience in European racing and use it as a benchmark to enhance the performance of the
Corvette seeking a balance between European handling and American power.
The second key factor saving the Corvette was the fact that by 1954 the competition
between Ford and General Motors had grown incredibly fierce and General Motors could not be
seen losing any ground to Ford. Indeed, the competition was so intense that historian Ed Cray calls
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to attention the fact that both manufacturers spread the burden beyond their corporate headquarters,
putting, “increasing pressure on their dealers, delivering unordered cars, threatening cancellation
of franchises if dealers were deemed laggards, and drastically cutting margins near the end of the
year to deal off the last of the 1954 models.”285 The Thunderbird therefore represented a significant
challenge, it was a two-seat roadster, and although it was not advertised as a sports car, the intent
to compete in the same market as the Corvette seemed clear. This gave Duntov a practical angle
to exploit in his memos to senior executives, pressuring them to keep the Corvette alive. As Duntov
noted in his blunt style, “Ford enters the field with the Thunderbird, a car of the same class as the
Corvette… If Ford makes success where we failed, it may hurt.” 286 In this highly competitive
environment Chevrolet could not appear to be weak, especially by not being able to compete with
comparatively miniscule manufacturers such as MG, Jaguar, and Porsche in a niche of its own
domestic market. This notion was repeated to the Marketing Association in New York in late April
of 1954, in which the speaker for General Motors remarked, “How could the American automotive
industry, with its tradition of achievement, allow European manufacturers to create and dominate
a new market right in our own front yard?” 287 With the Corvette model saved by these
contingencies, Duntov and the rest of the Corvette design and engineering team set out to make
improvements, adapting the original heavily European-influenced design to appeal to a broader
American consumer base.
During the period from 1954 to 1962 the Corvette underwent styling, design and
engineering upgrades as General Motors turned from copying the European sports car to adapting
it for an American audience. The first, and most important change came in the offering of

285

Ed Cray, Chrome Colossus, 364.
Zora Arkus-Duntov, quoted in Paul Ingrassia, Engines of Change, 46.
287
Address to the Marketing Association of New York, 28 th April 1954. Chevrolet Engineering Speech File, Sports
Car Speeches, 4139.01, General Motors Heritage Center and Media Archive, Sterling Heights.
286

161
Chevrolet’s new 265-cubic inch V8 as an optional powerplant. The V8 produced more power,
around 195 horsepower, which increased to 210 for the 1956 model year.288 That was coupled with
the addition of a three-speed manual transmission rather that the two-speed Powerglide, which
appealed to sports car enthusiasts. The changes kept coming steadily, in 1958 the car grew a few
inches in overall length giving better interior ergonomics at the cost of additional weight. Nearly
all the changes in the first generation of the Corvette, known as the C-1 among enthusiasts, made
the car a more potent performer in terms of acceleration and power, however Chevrolet designers
struggled to maintain a balance of European and American touches to preserve the cars sporting
image. As McLellan argues, by 1958 the, “formula for a sports car that the public would buy was
now starting to become clearer. Not only did the car have to perform… it had to offer its civilian
owner reasonable creature comforts. Customers would not put up with water pouring in on them
during a rainstorm…”289 For instance, the addition of the manual transmission also came with the
inclusion of glass roll-up windows, instead of the clear plastic screens which had to be buttoned
or zipped into position on the earlier cars. These changes made the Corvette more viable to a
broader range of American consumers, however it did erode the European feel and image of the
earlier cars.
The Corvette’s first major re-design for the 1963 model year, however, represented a clear
shift in strategy. Where the first generation had copied an existing European performance and
design archetype, the second generation of the Corvette appropriated the best aspects of American
and European design and engineering to articulate a truly American vision of the sports car. While
the Corvette’s low sales numbers, roughly 10,000 per year since 1956, left the team straddling a
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fine line between turning the Corvette into, “an affordable, but unsophisticated sports car and a
costly state-of-the-art sports car which would meet the demands of the sports car enthusiast,”
several key changes had been made to boost the Corvette’s performance. 290 In a nod to American
customer preference, Chevrolet offered only a V8 engine in 1963; nearly all Corvettes ordered
after 1955 had the optional V8. Furthermore, it was a comparatively large V8, 327-cubic inches
which produced nearly 350 horsepower. As Paul Ingrassia argues, “the new V8 offered the chance
to transform the Corvette from a pretty toy into a European-type sports car with an American
flavor.” 291 In addition to the improvements under the hood, the 1963 Corvette would also be
available in a fixed-top coupe body style for the first time. The coupe as a package was much
friendlier to a wider range of American consumers, especially those in the mid-west and east coast
regions who had to deal with severe weather. However, at the same time this distanced the Corvette
from its European competition which were still predominantly soft-top convertibles. The other key
development for the 1963 Corvette was an independent rear suspension (IRS), however it was not
the European, swing-axle type which had been used on the Porsche, Mercedes 300SL, and 19601965 Chevrolet Corvair. In fact, there was some question of the origins of the design among
automotive journalists, “Did he [Duntov] come by the idea from English designs of the same
type?”292 In fact, it was a new design, taken from the Chevrolet Experimental Research Vehicle
(CERV I), a mid-engine development mule, and represented a significant improvement in
engineering. It also demonstrated that while Chevrolet’s design team was still seeking to compete
with European performance, it was no longer simply looking to European automotive
developments. Instead, the Corvette design team was seeking new, American solutions in the
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pursuit of European sports car performance, hybridizing aspects of the original design philosophy
to suit a broader range of American consumers.

4.2

An American Appropriation: The Ford Thunderbird

The Ford Thunderbird represents another American automaker’s attempt to compete with
the European sports car, however it was motivated by Chevrolet’s Corvette project. The Corvette
caught Ford off-guard, and due to the intense competition between the two largest automakers in
the world, forced a rapid response. Therefore, the Thunderbird was an attempt to compete with an
American copy of a European sports car, and furthermore, Ford’s lateness in entering the market
meant that Ford was able to observe the release of the Corvette and avoid some of its more costly
failures. The Ford Thunderbird therefore represents an American appropriation of an American
adaptation of the European sports car ideal; it borrows styling cues from European automakers,
but, in terms of utility, performance, and handling, represented a more typical American
production car. The Thunderbird was intended to be a quick car, but it was not intended to be a
sports car – to be competitive in the types of amateur motorsports that an increasing number of
American enthusiasts were beginning to enjoy in their European imports.
Ironically, it was a General Motors executive who foresaw that the sports car market in the
United States would move away from pure performance machines and more toward luxury, but
Ford Motor Company which actually provided the product to take advantage of market trends.
General Motors’ Maurice Olley, speaking in 1953 predicted that, “As the sports car appeals to a
wider and wider section of the public, the center of gravity of this theoretical individual is shifting
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from the austerity of the pioneer towards the luxury of modern ideas.”293 Ford quickly picked up
on this fact when the Corvette offered many of the things American enthusiasts said they wanted
in a European sports car, but was not reflected in actual sales of the Corvette, which were quite
low. Furthermore, as will be discussed in greater detail in the final section of this chapter,
enthusiast reaction to the Corvette was very mixed. What General Motors had failed to realize at
the Motorama of 1953 was that the Corvette display car appealed to the general public, a consumer
base which had different standards and expectations than enthusiasts, and especially the hardcore,
SCCA member enthusiast. The distinction is perhaps best illustrated by an excerpt from an article
on American sports cars in a 1956 issue of Sports Cars Illustrated, “The American sports car buyer
wants to travel with speed and distinction, but he is not interested in freezing to death or struggling
with a clutch and gearshift and will not sacrifice comfort and carrying capacity… the out-and-out
enthusiast market is a very limited yet vocal group, and that a more versatile vehicle will reach
much wider acceptance.”294 Most non-enthusiast Americans wanted a vehicle with decent fit and
finish, no leaks, V8 power, and a touch of European style that hinted at the potential of highperformance. This was what Ford designed the Thunderbird to provide, rather than a machine for
the enthusiast to take to the track.
The Thunderbird was therefore a hybrid of American and European design and styling
elements which Ford anticipated appealing to a wider range of American consumers. However,
this meant that in the eyes of sports car enthusiasts, the Thunderbird was not a sports car. Since
the Thunderbird was a rushed project to compete with the Corvette it borrowed much of its initial
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design cues from the Chevrolet. For instance, the Thunderbird had the same odd 102-inch
wheelbase of the Corvette. Notably, the Corvette borrowed this from the XK-120 Jaguar and it
interesting to note that this design quirk from a British manufacturer managed, for a brief time, to
become an industry standard. However, unlike the Corvette. Ford was not interested in making an
exact copy of either the Corvette or the European sports car. Ford was instead looking towards
trends in the mainstream American automotive market, and therefore borrowed styling elements
from American hot-rod subculture. John Heitmann notes this in The Automobile and American
Life, “As a result, the style of the first Thunderbirds mixed a touch of European influence with
such hot-rod features as a hood scoop, ‘frenched’ headlights, and dummy fender louvers.” 295
Furthermore, the Thunderbird eschewed the inline six-cylinder engine archetype popular in higherend European sports cars, and offered a powerful V8 engine from the beginning. The additional
weight a power of the V8 meant that the Thunderbird could accelerate very quickly, but did not
handle as well as the Corvette or smaller European sports cars.
Because Ford was focusing on a different target market than the European sports car, they
also understood that the vehicle would need to be marketed very intentionally. As early as 1954
Ford had established a clear rational for its marketing and merchandizing of the Thunderbird.
While General Motors had gone directly after the European importers in the sports car market,
Ford repeatedly stated that the Thunderbird was not a sports car. In a presentation to the Society
of Automotive Engineers in 1954, Ford Executive W.E. Burnett, argued that the Thunderbird
represented the, “successor to the American Sports car.”296 Specifically this successor to the sports
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car was developed to alleviate some of the drivability issues that came with the sports car as a class
of vehicles:
Although the Ford Thunderbird has the performance and sleek racy styling of the
sports car class of vehicle, it emphasizes passenger car comfort and conveniences,
and retains the resemblance of the Ford family of automobiles. The Ford
Thunderbird was American conceived and designed specifically and primarily for
the American public. The name itself reflects Americana since the ‘Thunderbird’
in Indian lore was representative of power, swiftness, and prosperity… It was
designed to only to appeal to the sports car enthusiasts, but also to those of the
general public who desire a distinctive type of personal transportation.297
Ford’s presentation of the Thunderbird stresses that it is an American product, designed for an
American consumer used to driving the ‘Detroit Iron’ that sports car enthusiasts constantly
bemoaned. This speech clearly sets the Thunderbird apart from much of its competition, and also
establishes an expectation among consumers. Whereas the Corvette attempted to capture an
element of ‘European-ness’ in the Corvette, the Thunderbird rejected European driving qualities
as a desirable asset.
The Thunderbird was a poseur, a car for an American consumer who wanted the
conveniences of a typical American car with the co-opted image of European sport. Along these
lines Ford began locking down terminology and design rationale, making sure to remind
employees at all levels to not call the Thunderbird a sports car. Indeed, even Executive
communiques stress that, “The Thunderbird is not a sports car – it is more truly a personal or
boulevard car for the customer who insists upon comfort and yet would like to own a prestige
vehicle that incorporates the flair of performance characteristics of a sports car.”298. Executives
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also pointed out the all-weather durability of the Thunderbird – since a hardtop convertible was
technically the base model – which they determined, “differentiate[d] the Ford Thunderbird from
the Chevrolet Corvette which appears to have been directed toward the sport car market, is ‘foreign’
in appearance, is not an all-weather car, and is relatively high priced.” 299 These ideas at the
executive level were eventually carried out in marketing campaigns like a full color spread on the
back page of Sports Car which read, “A distinguished kind of personal car that combines sport car
styling and performance with passenger car convenience.”300 In the marketing material comfort,
utility, and image were emphasized over performance. Merchandized and marketed this way, the
Thunderbird represented an appropriation of the European sports car by an American manufacturer,
where the style and imagery of sport was claimed without those features being a part of the actual
product.
Despite Ford’s clear intentions the reality of the American automotive market was more
complex and the Thunderbird would compete with imported European sports cars as well, not just
the Corvette. While in its first conceptual phase the Thunderbird had originally been intended to
outperform the Corvette and XK-120 Jaguar, when the objective was later shifted to style and
comfort Ford executives also shifted the price lower to make the car more attractive to consumers.
Ford executive Walker Williams noted in an inter-company memo to colleagues on the Executive
Committee that, “At $2,965 suggested list, the Thunderbird would sell for less than either the
Corvette or the Jaguar.”301 In fact, when Ford was developing the base price for the Thunderbird
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they were paying close attention to trends among the import brands. The following excerpt from a
corporate document establishing the rationale for the Thunderbird’s suggested price in 1954 shows
just how closely Ford was watching the import sports car market: “While consumers prefer the
Jaguar 10 to 1 over MG, MG, through its lower price has consistently outsold the Jaguar until this
year. However, late in 1953, Jaguar reduced its prices approximately $600, and its penetration has
risen 43% in 1954. To date in 1954 is has actually outsold the MG.” 302 Taking note of these
developments, Ford again de-emphasized performance and decided to compete on a price-point
basis, and as noted earlier price the Thunderbird under its main competitors, Chevrolet and Jaguar.
This is also illustrative of the dominance of British automakers in the sports car market, as these
documents illustrate that outside of Chevrolet they are the only manufacturers Ford deemed worth
studying.
The initial marketing of the Thunderbird demonstrated again that American manufacturers
were treating the sports car market like an export market; a market that needed to be broken into,
rather than a part of their own domestic market. Taking inspiration from Chevrolet’s – and MG
and Jaguar before – initial marketing campaign, Ford chose to release the first 450 Thunderbirds
to Hollywood celebrities and other VIP customers. However, learning from Chevrolet’s mistake
releasing the initial batch of Corvettes with severe quality defects, Ford screened those 450 cars
tightly through its Factory Delivery Department. The cars were first inspected at the factory, and
a circular sent to Ford dealerships encouraged further screening:
Dealers should be encouraged to make a very thorough pre-delivery examination
of all Thunderbirds… The vehicle should also be checked against the customer’s
order to be sure that all special equipment is installed and in proper condition.
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Furthermore, the pre-delivery operation should include a thorough road test and
cleanup of interior and exterior surfaces.303
The VIP treatment did not end when the customer finally received the keys during a short ‘delivery
ceremony,’ as dealers were strongly encouraged to reach out after a few days, and again after a
few weeks, to ensure that the customer was fully satisfied with their new car. After all, this was a
marketing exercise, and Ford realized that, “Only in this way, can we insure[sic] that our new line
of vehicles gains immediate and complete customer acceptance and enjoys an outstanding
reputation.”304 Ford was rewarded for this tight quality control when early customers like John
Wayne and Marilyn Monroe were frequently seen driving their 1955 Thunderbirds around
Hollywood. 305 While Ford was more closely copying Chevrolet’s marketing efforts, this is
illustrative of Ford’s co-opting a marketing philosophy originally displayed by British
manufacturers in their attempt to break into the American market.
Following the successful public display of the Thunderbird at the 1954 Detroit auto show,
and the subsequent soft-release of the car to preselected customers in late 1954 as 1955 model year
cars, Ford appeared to have more adequately gauged the desires of American consumers. Whereas
only 700 Corvettes were sold in 1955, Ford sold over 14,000 Thunderbirds, a remarkable
achievement in a market niche which had previously seen that total number of sales per-annum.306
Looking forward to 1956 Ford decided that, “due to the specialized nature of its market,
Thunderbird model changes from year to year should not follow the regular passenger car pattern,”
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but rather should feature engineering updates rather than yearly stylistic updates.307 Therefore, it
was planned that the style and design of the Thunderbird would remain relatively unchanged until
a major body shell update in 1958, but that in the interim the car would get performance and
drivability upgrades like fuel-injection, improved ventilation, and improved ride and handling.
However, noting that Ford’s pursuit of comfort and utility had paid off in a sales boon, it was also
recommended that Ford move the Thunderbird even further away from the sports-car inspired
design. In fact, “Consideration should be given to development of a new body shell including…
4-passenger model… station wagon model.” 308 While there never was a station wagon bodied
Thunderbird, it did gain an extra set of passenger seats in 1958, again demonstrating Ford’s focus
on the American themes of comfort and utility over performance. While the Thunderbird would
continue to be a sales success well into the 1960s, it was not as a Corvette or Jaguar competitor
and thus moved the Thunderbird firmly out of the realm of European performance and beyond the
interest of most American enthusiasts.

4.3

Opel: If You Can’t Beat them, Import Them

By the mid-1960s the performance car market in the United States had changed
dramatically. The influence and prestige of British manufacturers was waning as American
automakers churned out ‘pony cars,’ and ‘muscle cars,’ like the Mustang, Camaro, Firebird, and
GTO which appealed to much broader consumer sectors. These cars defined performance in
American terms, they were large, powerful, and could be tremendously fast in a straight line. They
were designed for drag racing, an American motorsport in which the only qualities of a car that

“Forward Car Product Planning: Forward Car Plans” Confidential Report, 1955, 1. Folder 92.99 Forward Car Plans
for Tbird Model Year 1956, Box 1, Acc. 1767 Thomas B. Case Collection, The Benson Ford Research Center,
Dearborn.
308
Ibid, 4.
307

171

mattered were massive horsepower and the ability to transfer that power into forward motion. At
the same time, the import scene had changed as well; German imports were no longer solely
represented by the thrifty yet sluggish Volkswagen Beetle or the awkwardly shaped early Porsches.
In fact, German manufacturer Porsche had captured a significant segment of the enthusiast market
by the 1960s, and early Porsches helped establish the legend of German engineering superiority
among American sports car enthusiasts. Bayerische Motoren Werke (BMW) was also beginning
to enter the American automotive market, importing its unique sports-sedans that were garnering
high praise in the enthusiast press. It was clear that the majority of the competitive effort of
American manufacturers would be spent satisfying consumer demand for the muscle cars and pony
cars which symbolized the decade, however, this left unsatisfied the enthusiast contingent who
still wanted a ‘European’ style sports car. It also seemed to be clear that American manufacturers
couldn’t compete with the European sports car directly, a lesson illustrated for General Motors by
the Corvette, which had to become more ‘American’ to survive. Therefore, in a second attempt to
engage the enthusiast market, General Motors would import its own captive European brand, Opel.
This was not a first for General Motors or Opel. Adam Opel AG, GM’s wholly owned
German subsidiary first imported cars to the United States in 1958 to counter the Volkswagen
Beetle. However, by 1968 it had also sprouted two sports models, the Kadett Rallye and the GT.
Both were attempts to lure in the more tradition enthusiast, a customer who desired a car with
European driving dynamics, European style, and European economy of operation – increasingly a
factor as insurance and gasoline prices began to rise. Importantly, these two cars were designed in
Germany for the German market, and therefore contributed to the transfer of culture from Europe
to the United States through their marketing and consumption by Americans in the same manner
as other German imports like Porsche and BMW. Both cars represented the polar-opposite of
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American ideas of performance which were prevalent in the late 1960s, and their European origin,
marketing, and consumption worked as conduits through which a European idea of performance
would be disseminated to American consumers.
The Opel GT was intended to appeal to a different subset of enthusiast consumers, and the
identity crisis the car suffered was symbolic of the complexities inherent in the adaptation,
appropriation, and reflection of European sports cars by American manufacturers. Unlike the
Kadett Rallye, the Opel GT had been designed for the 1968 model year as a sports car rather than
a premium package on an existing economy car. While the car had been designed and built in
Germany, and primarily intended for a European audience, it clearly called on the styling cues of
the American C-3 Corvette. However, the marketing material for the Opel in the U.S. emphasized
its European heritage, “As you point casually to the Kamm-type rear deck, mention that it’s part
of the GT styling that was conceived at places like Sebring, LeMans and Monte Carlo.”309 This
was intended to call to mind the great racing tracks of Europe, and European motorsport, clearly
intended to evoke the authenticity of the Opel GT as a true European sports car and separate it
from the brand image many Americans associated with General Motors. Other suggested
advertising copy lines included, “The 1971 Opel GT, European craftsmanship and styling at less
than you think.”310 These marketing lines focus on the GTs ‘European-ness’, that element which
had evaded General Motors attempt to capture or appropriate into the Corvette. Therefore, the GTs
target audience was clearly the enthusiast who uncompromisingly believed that the best
performance machines came from Europe, the kind of American enthusiast who was a member of
the SCCA, and read the enthusiast press regularly. This is reinforced in the spiel on the final page
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of the brochure, “Enthusiast, your sports car is ready… Get the message? The genuine sports car
you’ve been waiting for it ready and waiting for you.”311 This is also a clear indication that General
Motors finally thought they understood the market which European brands had been exploiting in
the United States for two decades.
Despite the GT’s complicated design and styling heritage it clearly appealed to at least a
subset of the enthusiast market. As Motor Trend reported in the spring of 1972, “Obviously a
shrunken Corvette, it allowed GM to slip a sports car into the $3,500 range to battle with the Volvo
P1800 and Triumph TR6. Initially it won, you couldn’t buy one of the low two-seaters anyplace,
and dealers in some parts of the country were admittedly selling used GTs in new car showrooms
and getting new car prices for them.”312 In many respects this is similar to what General Motors
had done originally with the Chevrolet Corvette, which was to insert it at a mid-tier price point in
the sports car market. While the Opel GT was apparently popular, it was not consumed by the
enthusiast crowd that the marketing material had so carefully targeted. This is indicated by the
same review, which went on to note that while GTs were hard to come by due to high demand,
“You never saw them at the track…”313 This was not entirely true, as the GT was relatively popular
in the ‘Showroom Stock’ class of SCCA amateur road racing in the early 1970s.314 However, the
gist of the review was correct, unlike contemporary MGs, Triumphs, Corvettes, and Porsches, the
Opel GT found itself on regular streets far more often than on the track. Therefore, while
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Americans who consumed the Opel GT were still exposed to elements of a European enthusiast
culture, it was a far less powerful platform for cultural transfer than its cousin, the Kadett.
Of the two Opel cars, the Kadett Rallye and the GT, the Kadett Rallye was far more
important in terms of cultural transfer. Kadett Rallye advertising made sure to point to the car’s,
“radial tires… front power disc brakes and stiffer suspension,” along with a modified “Super
Kadett engine with twin intake manifolds, carbs and exhausts” 315 Radial belted tires were
relatively new and expensive in 1968 and represented a significant step forward in terms of driving
dynamics, especially grip. Power front disc brakes also represented the leading edge of automotive
technology, offered as optional equipment on American cars like the Mustang, Firebird and
Camaro. However, these items reinforce the fact that this was performance in European terms, the
Opel’s factory modified engine put out a measly 67 horsepower – albeit out of only 91 cubic inches
of displacement – in an era where even the cheapest Camaro or Firebird with the base 230 cubic
inch inline-six was rated at 140 horsepower. Furthermore, almost all of the performance equipment
highlighted by the first Kadett Rallye advertisements made the car handle and corner better, not
necessarily faster when compared to GM’s domestic pony-cars with massive horsepower and
straight-line performance. The clash between the two conceptions of sport is illustrated in Popular
Imported Cars, an enthusiast’s magazine, the Opel Rallye was briefly compared to the “familiar
VW [Beetle] sedan,” and acknowledged as a fairly sporty car, yet the last line of the review, “We
can almost guarantee that it [Kadett Rallye] would take the boredom out of your daily ‘commute’,”
draws to attention the economy of operation that came with some European sports cars and was
missing in all of their American counterparts.
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The name of the model itself, Kadett Rallye is significant, and is itself an embodiment of
the transfer of enthusiast culture that had begun with the first British imports, and would continue
with the Opel. Rallye is a deliberate misspelling of the word Rally, a popular type of motorsports
event among European enthusiasts. This form of motorsport was almost entirely new to the United
States when it was first introduced through the British sports cars and car culture of the late 1940s
and early 1950s. Prior to its postwar introduction to Americans, rally was a European motorsport
practiced on the much narrower, winding roads that crisscrossed western and central Europe which
emphasized control and handling over outright power. The “tracks” on which these races took
place were usually a mix of paved and unpaved roads, with numerous variations of rules and
regulations to ensure a level playing field. However, the popularity of rally was mostly limited to
sports car enthusiasts in the United States. This is demonstrated by the fact that all Buick-Opel
dealers received a packet with the following cover letter from the General Manager of the BuickOpel Advertising division, “This is a concise and comprehensive study of Rallying, covering most
all the questions that will come up about Rallying and some suggestions on how you can use them
in increasing your sales and traffic for Opel.”316 The “concise and comprehensive” study is over
fourteen pages long and goes over basic questions like, “What is a Rally?” and, “What Kinds of
Rallies are There?” According to Buick-Opel there are two main types of rallies, “gimmick” and
“time-and-distance.” The latter is a race, “in which scoring is based upon the ability of contestants
to maintain certain predetermined average speeds over a measured course. Time is the essential
ingredient in determining the winners of such an event although distance may be used occasionally
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as a tie-breaker or as an additional factor in establishing final place standings.”317 It is important
to note that Buick-Opel are not referring to the time-trial or “rally-cross” rallies that were popular
in Europe. In these events it was not only about average time, but fastest average time.
The Rallyist packet also informed dealers what enthusiast consumers would be looking for
in a rally-ready vehicle. This information was primarily intended to help Buick dealers make sales
to enthusiasts, a market which they had little experience with. In this case the packet contained an
equipment list tailored towards increasing sales of dealer-installed options, “important to the
Rallyist in sequence of greater importance.”318 The first three items on the list, “1. Tires, 2. Heavy
duty suspension, 3. Counters (driven mechanically from a front wheel and adjustable for error,”
were key aspects of the car that point to the attempt to appropriate European standards of
performance.319 However, the rest of the items were specifically intended for competitive rallying
and included, “4. A 24-hour clock, 5. WWV Frequency incorporated into the standard broadcast
radio for Arlington time signal, 6. A map light mounted on the passenger side of the dashboard in
such a manner as to illuminate a clip-board without blinding the driver.320 The Rallye Kadett was
therefore clearly aimed at American enthusiasts who intended to compete seriously in rallying, a
European motorsport, and was also a consumer group who would have a depth of experience in
European cars and European driving dynamics.
However, not all reviewers were impressed with the equipment and suspension that came
on the Rallye. The American enthusiast press pointed out that, “It comes back to nomenclature –
it is perhaps too much like a rally car set up for gravel stages. Those beasts sit so high and display
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so much, that mere mortals would think they have a broken spring. Fine! Rally drivers expect this,
but it still doesn’t make the Rallye Kadett a rally car for pros. Nor is it a winding road car for
amateur. It is a long-range high-speed touring vehicle – or would be with more than 200 miles
worth of gas tank.”321 Their complaint that the suspension is not set for the normal driving that
most Kadett’s would see over their service life seems at first to be rather logical. However, this is
illustrative of the attempt to reconcile two different ideas of what a sports car is, one along
American lines, tuned for paved surfaces and high-speed cruising, and the other along European
lines, tuning for a varied driving environment. Nevertheless, the Opel Kadett Rallye represented a
car that came from the factory specialized and modified for a European motorsport, engaging
American drivers in a more visceral way with a type of European automotive culture.
Buick-Opel actively endorsed the “rally” as a legitimate motorsport in a marketing ploy to
sell a greater volume of Kadett Rallyes to Americans, yet by promoting rallying it encouraged a
European motorsport and enthusiast culture to spread in America. A concise history of Opel’s
success in European rallies occupies the entirety of the twelfth page of the packet noting
participation in such prominent events as the Monte-Carlo Rally, the Rally of the Flowers, and the
Tour De Europe, and illustrates Opel’s deep engagement with the motorsport. It should be
emphasized that this was not a stagnant history of past success: Opel was a strong competitor in
the European professional Rally scene. As one American enthusiast periodical reported, “Another
big surprise in the first two championship qualifying rallies of 1968 have been the performance of
the new 1.9 liter Opel Rallye Kadetts, although perhaps it is still a little too early to prove whether
their unquestioned speeds are matched by similar qualities of road-holding and reliability.”322 It
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was therefore suggested that in order to promote the car in the United States, dealerships could use,
“factory support… [to] form local Opel Rallye Clubs – stage competitive events etc.” As a sign of
seriousness on behalf of Buick-Opel the packet also notes that, “The Opel might be entered in the
major rallies across the U.S. with an assigned driver. Top performances could be merchandised
and possibly advertised in to the motor enthusiasts.”323 At least one dealer responded to this callto-action; Reynolds Buick-Opel of California sponsored a team in the 1967 Road Rally USA and
ended up winning the under-1,100cc class.324 Therefore, and perhaps somewhat ironically, General
Motors, the largest American automaker, popularized a European motorsport and enthusiast
culture among American consumers through its dealer network and marketing initiatives for the
Opel Kadett Rallye. While the Kadett Rallye may not have sold more than a few thousand units in
the United States over its production run, the cars effectively transported a portion of European
enthusiast culture to Americans.

4.4

The Enthusiast Reaction to the Corvette

American automotive enthusiasts reacted to Detroit’s attempt to break into the sports car
market with a varied mixture of hope, resentment, praise, and derision. The enthusiast press had
been exhorting American manufacturers to build sporty cars since the first British sports car had
introduced American consumers to European performance. Articles like “J’accuse” which
appeared in the SCCA’s periodical Sports Car, or the entire opening chapter of Ken Purdy’s The
Kings of the Road, encouraged American automakers to call on American ingenuity and reproduce
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the sports car, or at least capture its performance in an American-made vehicle.325 However, this
proved a difficult request to satisfy and the only American manufacturer to really attempt this was
Chevrolet with its Corvette. Enthusiasts expressed wildly differing opinions on the Corvette as
they grappled with what it meant to consume an American product in a field traditionally
dominated by European manufacturers.
General Motors’ best efforts in this regard, the Chevrolet Corvette, which resulted in the
production of as near a copy as possible of the Jaguar XK-120, left many enthusiasts unimpressed.
This is even more perplexing given the knowledge that European enthusiasts generally responded
positively to the Corvette, as indicated by this excerpt from the Porsche-produced, Germanlanguage magazine Christophorus, “As far as the sports cars are concerned, there is one that is
really already in production: the 'Corvette' from Chevrolet ... something Italian looking and
undoubtedly very pretty.”326 Even after the vehicle had been ‘Americanized’ in the 1963 redesign
Bernard Cahier, at the time a well-known European correspondent for the enthusiast periodical
Sports Car Graphic, was quite impressed by the Corvette, going as far to say, “I am very
enthusiastic about it [the 1963 Corvette Sting Ray] and, in fact, I would not mind at all driving one
in Europe. My sincere admiration goes to both the stylists and the engineers who have created the
Sting Ray and to GM for offering it at which I consider to be a very fair price.”327 The praise
coming from Europeans, the people who were arguably the most qualified to judge the Chevrolet
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attempt at producing a sports car, was not universally shared by the American consumers at which
the car was targeted.
While some Europeans demonstrably regarded the Corvette as a genuine sports car, many
American enthusiasts discounted the Corvette entirely. This letter to the editor from Peter Burger,
a sports car enthusiast in New York, ignores the Corvette completely when he states that if the
production of the Scarab – a small, two-seat, limited production car really intended mostly for the
track – ended, “we won’t have another American car as a possible match for the European [sports]
cars…” 328 Burger was writing in 1963, and this is after the Corvette had a nearly ten year
production history and had begun to adopt increasingly American design features and performance.
Perhaps he felt these aspects removed the car from the sports car field, one which was under
increasing criticism from enthusiasts and manufacturers as amateur racing became less and less
amateur. This sentiment is mirrored in a nearly identical comment by another enthusiast, Doug
Mayo, when he commented regarding performance and the supposed unfairness of international
racing rules: “Although I myself highly favor British cars… there is no comparison between a
Ferrari GT and any of the English or American equipment that he mentioned (Healey, Jaguar,
Corvette).”329 While the Ferrari GT was not a sports car, and really had more in common with
racing vehicles of the period, the implication that the Corvette is not a truly competitive sports car
is clear.
Other American enthusiasts targeted the Corvette for its use of fiberglass for the body
panels rather than the traditional steel. Fiberglass had been used because at the time of the Corvette
concept car’s construction General Motors predicted a steel shortage due to the onset of the Korean
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War. However, the material also had some promising qualities for a performance car: it could be
lighter than all but the thinnest steel, could be more flexible, and could be replaced easily and
cheaply in the case of panel damage. This should have been seen as a particularly desirable quality
for a sports car used on the track as eventual body damage was inevitable in a car used for any
kind of racing. Yet fiberglass in 1953 was an exotic material, and different, and therefore drew the
negative attention of snobbish enthusiasts who were unwilling to accept innovation coming from
anywhere but Europe. In a particularly scathing opinion piece, one enthusiast pointed out another
use for the material: “If your biggest fear in life is the thought of departing from this world and
having to leave your big fiberglass jewel behind – relax! A fiberglass products manufacturing
company has just announced a new fiberglass casket. Yes! Now you can be buried in your beloved
fiberglass. I would even hazard a guess that if all of you Corvette owners united and demanded it,
this company might style their caskets to look like a Corvette. After all, is there much
difference?” 330 The implication here is clear: the Corvette is a death-trap, and a commonly
understood contextual undertone of the piece, given that it was published in Porsche Panorama,
would have been that European sports cars were far superior in driving and especially handling
dynamics. A far less incendiary riff on the same theme, also coming from a European singlemarque enthusiast club publication, was this excerpt which appeared in the Triumph Sport Owners
Association’s newsletter, “A Corvette by any other name would still be a great big plastic butter
dish.”331
However, there were enthusiasts who did like the Corvette, and felt that the car represented
a truly viable articulation of the sports car archetype. Dr. Richard Thompson, who had started his
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amateur carrier racing Porsches before moving to production Jaguars at SCCA events was given a
1955 model Corvette, complete with the 235-cubic inch six and the two-speed Powerglide, the
version of the car which was most likely to draw the ire of enthusiasts. Expecting lackluster
performance and a disappointing lap time, Thompson later reflected, “Surprisingly, when I drove
it in practice the times were comparable to our Jaguar… Regardless of the damage I had inflicted
on the car, I was impressed. The potential was there.”332 While Dr. Richard seemed to imply that
the Corvette offered performance in the true European sense, other enthusiasts argued that the
Corvette was a sports car even if it didn’t offer European-style performance. Enthusiast Irwin
Victor argued that while the performance of the Corvette was different than a European sports car,
it was no less of a sports car, “The cornering ability of a Porsche is indeed a thrilling experience,
equaled by few things in this world; however, the brute performance of a Corvette is a like thrilling
sensation… I am now on my second Porsche and my third Corvette. After trying a mixture of Alfa,
TR and MG, I am thoroughly convinced that the Porsche and the Corvette cannot be equaled…”333
Both enthusiasts were grappling with what European performance meant when it came in an
indisputably American package, and what form the sports car could take. While Richards held the
European model as one to be emulated, and a goal which he felt the Corvette could achieve, others
found an Americanized version of European performance to be just as compelling. This is
illustrative of the complexities engendered in the transfer of culture through consumption. There
was no single perspective that encapsulated the views of all American enthusiasts, and while some
would continue to look towards Europe for motoring performance, others were content with the
American vision of the sports car articulated in the Corvette.
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The debate over whether the Corvette’s performance was more American or European
extended beyond the realm of enthusiasts and into popular culture. Popular songs like, “Dead
Man’s Curve” is illustrative of the struggle many enthusiasts had classifying the Corvette’s
performance as either American or European. William Jan Berry, half of the pop duo Jan and Dean
was a Corvette enthusiast and expressed it in the 1964 hit, “Dead Man’s Curve.” It was a song
about the Corvette and street racing, a thriving subculture of the southern California sports car
scene:
I was crusin’ in my Stingray late one night,
When an XKE pulled up on my right,
He rolled down the window of his shiny new Jag,
And challenged me then and there to a drag...
I flew past La Brea, Schab’s and Crescent Heights,
All the Jag could see were my six taillights,
He passed me at Doheny then I started to swerve,
But I pulled her out and there we were – at Dead Man’s Curve…334
In the song, the protagonist – presumably William – is challenged to a drag race, an American
motorsport which the more powerful Corvette should have won handily. However, the race extends
through Los Angeles, and the Jaguar outhandles the Corvette, passing the protagonist before
crashing on the titular Dead Man’s Curve. While the protagonist, and the Corvette are clearly the
victors, it calls into questions aspects of the vehicles performance. Is the Corvette a drag racer? Is
it a balanced-handling European sports car like the Jaguar XKE? In the end, the song provides no
definitive answers other than the implicit argument that the Corvette is better simply by virtue of
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it surviving the race. The debate over the Corvette would be left to rage on in letters to the editor
and opinion columns in all manner of enthusiast publications and continues to this day.
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‘GOES LIKE SCHNELL’: REGULATIONS, NIXON
SHOCK, AND BMW

“In the suburbs, Biff Everykid and Kevin Acne and Marvin Sweatsock will press
their fathers to buy HO Firebirds with tachometers mounted out near the horizon
somewhere and enough power to light the city of Seattle, totally indifferent to the
fact that they could fit more friends into a BMW in greater comfort and stop better
and go around corners better and get about 29 times better gas mileage… not to
mention a lot of other good stuff they didn’t even know they could get on an
automobile, like doors that fit and seats that don’t make you tired when you sit in
them.” – David E. Davis, Car and Driver April 1968

By the mid-1960s it was clear that major realignments were coming to the
American automotive market. The ‘horsepower wars’ between the American Big Three,
and the sports car craze of the 1950s-1960s were being reigned-in by increasingly severe
federal safety and emissions regulations. American manufacturers, especially General
Motors, were facing a severe decline in consumer confidence, a result of a series of
debacles beginning in the early 1960s with the Chevrolet Corvair and its blundered defense.
This led to a series of increasingly restrictive federal safety regulations at the same time as
environmental groups were pressuring automakers and federal regulators to reduce the
toxic emissions pouring from automobile exhaust. These factors were further complicated
by the Nixon shock of 1971, when President Richard Nixon announced the formal end of
the Bretton Woods monetary agreements as a part of the “New Economic Policy,” which
suspended the convertibility of the dollar to gold.335 Overnight the United States dollar
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became a floating currency and its value in relation to European currencies plummeted.
This hit foreign automakers hard, especially British manufacturers like MG, Austin-Healey,
and Triumph, who had established their market position in North America based on their
ability to produce low cost sports cars, a competitive angle made possible by the
comparatively low value of the pound sterling in relation to the dollar.336
This market upset provided a perfect opportunity for the German brand Bayerische
Motoren Werke (BMW) to enter the American automotive market with a new product that
combined the driving dynamics of the European sports car with the utility of a family car:
the sports-sedan. BMW had been unable to penetrate the American automobile market in
the 1950s since they were not able to produce a modern and innovative automobile,
although the company did import small quantities of motorcycles and even a microcar, the
Isetta, beginning in 1956. However, in 1961 BMW launched a major redesign of all its
vehicles, called the “Neue Klasse,” leading with the 1500 model. The 1500 was a
stylistically modern sedan, with sporty performance from an economical four-cylinder
engine, and was quite small and light by American standards. The 1500, and its later sister
models, the 1600, and 2002, caught the eye of veteran automotive importer and distributor
Max Hoffman, who became the sole distributor for BMW cars in the United States from
1960-1975.While going through Hoffman was a questionable choice for BMW because he
was ultimately more inclined to focus on easy sales rather than building a foreign brand’s
image, it got BMW cars in American showrooms at the key moment when American
consumer preferences were beginning to change as the traditional ‘Big Three’ American
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manufacturers were facing a negative publicity crisis. As more and more Americans bought
BMW sports-sedans, it began to alter the American perception of what a sports car could
be; sports cars no longer needed to be British (or German) two-seat convertibles, nor did
they need to be 2-ton American muscle cars with V8 engines of ever increasing
displacement and correspondingly astronomical fuel consumption. As BMW proved, a
sports car could be a sedan, with room for four adult passengers, with an engine that
provided sporty performance while at the same time meeting emissions requirements and
simultaneously providing reasonable fuel economy.
This chapter traces the formation of the disillusionment many American consumers
felt towards domestic automakers, a process which began in the late 1960s and only grew
more pronounced in the 1970s. Consumer attitudes and choices changed markedly as
American manufacturers placed increasing public scrutiny on vehicle safety and emissions
through repeated efforts to dodge liability, leading to increasingly strict federal and state
regulations. This provided an opening that BMW could exploit with its “Neue Klasse”
sports sedans and in so doing BMW redefined what a sports car could be to American
consumers and created a new market niche, the sports-sedan. When emissions regulations
prevented the importation of BMW’s high-performance cars, they turned to American
motorsports in order to keep their performance-oriented brand image. Thus, it illustrates
how one European brand navigated the treacherous years increasing federal automotive
legislation, the Oil Shocks, and rode the economic waves generated by the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system. BMW also marks another significant turning-point in the American
automotive market; it was the last major volume-production European brand to enter the
American market. Thus, BMW serves as an excellent bookend case study for this project
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which has illustrated the influence of European sports cars on American consumers
following the end of the Second World War.
This chapter is split into three sections; in the first section I use the Corvair crisis
as a case study to examine how American manufacturers laid the groundwork for
increasing safety and emissions legislation through inaction, poor engineering decisions,
and incredibly poor public relations. The Corvair, Ralph Nader’s infamous Unsafe at Any
Speed, and General Motor’s poor choice of response led to American manufacturers
alienating large segments of their consumer base, leaving the door open for import brands
in the sedan segment, a market traditionally dominated by American manufacturers. The
second section examines BMW’s approach to the US market from the company’s
perspective, illustrating how they sought to use Max Hoffman as a distributor to build their
brand in the United States from 1960-1975, and despite success, BMW’s ultimate decision
to end their relationship with Hoffman. Notably, this came at the same period as the
American vision of performance, the muscle car, was falling precipitously to the nadir of
its popularity among American consumers. The Nixon shock and the Oil Crisis of 1973
seemed to herald the end of the American ideal of automobile design at the same time as
American manufacturers abdicated their social responsibility, leaving the American market
open to foreign competition. The final section examines BMW’s decision to go racing in
1975 as a tool through which to build a brand image around performance in the American
market. Critically, the decision was driven by emissions regulations in the United States
which created difficult conditions for bringing BMW’s high-performance cars to the
American market. However, entering racing side-stepped this issue and established the
sporting pedigree of BMW for many American consumers.
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5.1

‘Burdensome’ Safety and Emissions Regulations

In a somewhat ironic twist, the success of the American automotive industry from
the 1940s through the 1960s laid the groundwork for future suffering and increasing federal
regulation. As John Heitmann argues, “The hubris of executives related to consumer needs,
an obsession with big cars, garish designs coming from the studios, the neglect of safety
and air pollution matters, and rising prices all played into the hands of critics…”337 Of
those critics, none was more vocal than Ralph Nader, a young lawyer who pillorized the
Chevrolet Corvair, among other vehicles, in his book Unsafe at Any Speed. Nader used the
Corvair to illustrate a stark point about how American manufacturers viewed their
responsibility for consumer safety; or rather, how corporate profit was prized above all else.
Nader’s point was reinforced by the actions of American automakers in another key area
relating to consumer safety, emissions regulations. Since the late 1940s Americans living
in large, dense, urban areas were aware of the dangers of industrial emissions, yet
automotive exhaust remained largely unregulated. However, in the face of unmistakable
ties between the automobile and the smog that was in some cases literally choking large
urban areas, American automotive manufacturers responded with claims that they were
researching the issue. However, they never offered a solution. When the first statewide
automotive emission regulations were established in California, American automakers
claimed they would be unable to meet the new requirements, and sought ways to subvert
the laws rather than ways to comply with them. Both of these actions indicated to American
consumers that their health and safety was ultimately immaterial to the ‘Big Three.’
Ultimately, it did not matter to General Motors whether their cars belched noxious
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emissions before flipping on their roofs going around a corner: as long as Americans
continued to buy their cars and there was no legislation, American manufacturers would
do very little to innovate in these areas. This was especially distressing given that at the
same time General Motors was pouring resources into increasing engine power and size,
even though these were already at astronomical levels and further contributed to the loss
of consumer confidence they suffered in the late 1960s and only grew worse in the 1970s.
A further irony was that the Corvair-which opened the regulatory floodgate and therefore
the door to the American market for BMW—was actually an attempt to compete with other
German imports. The Corvair was a small – by American standards – economy car, however, it
featured an air-cooled, horizontally-opposed six-cylinder engine mounted in the rear of the car,
with an independent rear suspension. Despite being larger and more powerful, the Corvair was
clearly inspired by German imports, primarily aimed at capturing the market for economy cars
which the Volkswagen Beetle satisfied since the early 1950s. However, the Monza sport model
also attempted to take aim at the Porsche sports cars, and garnered such praise as, “If Porsche built
a six-cylinder sports coupe, it would have to resemble this airy and bright modified Monza,” from
the highly regarded Sports Cars Illustrated.338 Furthermore, advertisements for the ‘Fitch Sprint’,
a dealer or owner installed set of modifications to a standard Corvair, were featured in the Porsche
Panorama, the only time advertising for an American vehicle was allowed in the Porsche Club of
America’s magazine.339 The European design influence was also highlighted in the Corvair’s sales
brochures. In the 1961 Corvair brochure a full page is devoted to a color painting of a young
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woman in a short white dress who is in the process of exiting a bright red Corvair Monza parked
on what appears to be a narrow European street.340 The setting is intentionally vague, yet evocative
of a more European than American environment. Images like these, as well as selective advertising
placement in enthusiast magazines that largely catered to a consumer more interested in European
automobiles worked to associate the Corvair with Europe and European driving dynamics.
The Corvair’s launch into the American market initially went very well. It earned Edward
Cole his picture on the cover of time magazine and a large article which praised the Corvair
excessively stating, “Not since Henry Ford put the nation on wheels with his model T has such a
great and sweeping change hit the auto industry. Out from Detroit and into 7,200 Chevrolet
showrooms this week rolled the radically designed Corvair, first of the Big Three's new generation
of compact cars. Smaller and simpler than Detroit's chromespun standards, the Corvair is like no
other model ever mass-produced in the U.S.”341 Time was not the only periodical to lay such lavish
praise upon the Corvair, it also won Motor Trend’s Car of the Year award in 1960, the model-year
of its launch. Furthermore, General Motors executives were, “particularly impressed by the
strength of Corvair sales in the West Coast market, where the foreign cars first made their invasion
of the U.S. market felt beginning about 1956 and then spread across the country.”342 Indeed, while
base models of the Corvair sold well to Americans looking for basic transportation, the sporty
Monza models appealed to enthusiasts, being constantly compared to the Porsche sports cars in
enthusiast periodicals, “Both vehicles (decambered[sic] Monza and early Porsche) are both
driver’s cars in the sense that to get what they have to offer in the way of performance requires a
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deft, knowledgeable touch. This can be, and is, fun.”343 General Motors had explicitly targeted
German imports, and appeared to have finally gotten the right formula for competing with them.
However, there was a flaw in the design of the Corvair’s Beetle-influenced independent
rear suspension which went largely unnoticed until 1965 when the book Unsafe at Any Speed was
published. The book, written by young attorney and political hopeful Ralph Nader hoping for a
break into national politics, examined the American automotive industry through an extremely
critical lens. It argued that American manufacturers were making cars which were styled to be
visually appealing to consumers, yet purposefully designed and engineered to be tremendously
unsafe and short lived. Although the Corvair was only featured in the first chapter, this work cast
a dark shadow over the vehicle from which it was never able to escape. Nader’s primary attack on
the Corvair was aimed at its swing-axle suspension. He claimed that, “What most sets the 19601963 Corvairs apart from light foreign vehicles with comparable percentages of weight distribution
and swing axles is the sudden onset of the critical point at which the vehicle goes out of control
and frequently flips over.”344 The damning assertion was that General Motors engineers knew this
fact, but did not install the parts, rumored to cost fifteen dollars, which would have fixed it in
production.
While Nader’s claim was sensationalist in tone and only supported by largely
circumstantial evidence garnered from ongoing lawsuits, it did reveal that American automotive
manufacturers were mainly engineering to meet price-points. In other words, to save a few dollars
Chevrolet directed engineers to solve the handling issues of the car through methods that would
not cost the factory money; in this case specifying differing inflation pressures for the front and
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rear tires of the Corvair, which initially appeared effective. Furthermore, the transition from understeer to over-steer only occurred at the limits of the Corvair’s handling envelope, therefore usually
only found by drivers who were perhaps pushing their cars too hard. Also, Nader’s argument
against the Corvair was out of date by 1964 when Chevrolet had added a torsion bar to help
stabilize the rear suspension as standard equipment. Despite these points, the book stirred a large
response among the American public, a majority of whom immediately began to agitate for
regulations to protect consumer safety.
While the design of the Corvair may have had some issues with handling stability, General
Motors sealed its fate in the court of public opinion by bungling their defense. Rather than fight
Nader with engineering reports or any other form of objective evidence, General Motors instead
attempted to discredit Nader personally. The corporation hired private detectives to follow and
harass him; their goal was to catch him in compromising situations, even going so far as to hire
prostitutes to proposition him. Nader claimed, “he was being followed, harassed by midnight calls,
his friends sought out and grilled by mysterious operatives…”345 General Motors was eventually
called to testify in a Senate sub-committee hearing on March 22nd 1966, and under oath, James
Roche, President of General Motors, apologized for the investigation into Nader’s personal life,
formally substantiating Nader’s claims of harassment.346 In the eyes of many Americans General
Motors’ admission to bullying seemed to indicate that Nader must have been right in his criticisms
of the Corvair, and as perhaps most succinctly stated by historian Ed Cray, that, “Social
responsibility simply did not figure high on the list of priorities in Detroit’s concept of a freely
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enterprising economy.” 347 Corvair sales dropped precipitously again and the shadow over the
Corvair nameplate was dark indeed. In 1969 General Motors executives quietly discontinued the
Corvair due to lackluster sales post-1965, in large part due to the extraordinarily bad press brought
on by Nader’s book and their subsequent childish defensive strategy. The scandal cut General
Motors deeply, and it was, “sufficiently embarrassed,” that the Corvair remained absent from
official corporate histories for years after.348
The Corvair episode had a broad impact beyond the Chevrolet division, and indeed, beyond
General Motors. As historian Ed Cray argues in Chrome Colossus, “The damage was done. Despite
Roche’s apology, General Motors had been marked as arrogant and mendacious… The result,
ultimately, was the passage of the National Motor Vehicle Safety Act [of 1966]”349 The new law
granted the federal government broad authority to regulate all aspects of the automobile, and
granted regulators until January 1967 to establish new standards. These new regulations ranged
from mandated head-rests, to shatter-resistant glass windshields and manufacturer installed
seatbelts. Furthermore, these safety standards were universal, and therefore also impacted
automotive imports; imported cars would not be granted legal entry unless they could meet the
new safety regulations.350
Even in the face of clearly shifting consumer perceptions the American automotive
industry kept lagging behind. Only legislation eventually forced the implementation of safety
devices. The Highway Safety Act of 1970 created a new agency, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, to administer these new regulations. Over the course of 1970s, federal

347

Ed Cray, Chrome Colossus, 439.
Aaron Severson, “Rebel Yell: The Life and Death of the Chevrolet Corvair,” Ate Up With Motor: Portraits of
Automotive History, July 23rd 2010. Accessed 2/5/2018 from http://ateupwithmotor.com/compact-and-economycars/65-chevrolet-corvair-history.html., 33
349
Ed Cray, Chrome Colossus: General Motors and Its Times (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980), 427.
350
Public Law 89-563, 9th September 1966. Accessed 2/4/2018 from http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/89/563.pdf.
348

195

safety regulations continued to grow, forcing new automotive standards, such as the standard
height of headlights from the road surface, and bumpers that were supposed to prevent any damage
in collisions up to ten miles per hour. In response American automakers complained. Henry Ford
II reportedly said that the new regulations were “unreasonable and arbitrary,” despite the fact that
in all cases the technology required to meet the new regulations had existed since the 1950s and
American automakers had consciously chosen to omit from their designs.351
However, these regulations were far harsher on European brands, who were in some cases
forced to make drastic changes to the design or styling of a car just so it could be sold in the United
States. The regulations established in 1966 took the American regulatory environment in a
different direction than Europe and also marked a major shift in how American politicians,
consumers, and manufacturers viewed automobile safety. As automotive journalist Brock Yates
noted in his monograph, The Decline and Fall of the American Automobile Industry, “The
automobile, not the driver, was to be the target [of new safety regulations].”352 This did two things,
the first of which was to accept collisions as inevitable and focus all the regulatory effort on safety
features which would protect occupants during or after a collision, rather than features which
would help to avoid a collision. This set the regulatory attitude in the American market apart from
its European counterpart. As noted by Yates:
Europeans generally believed... the creation of automobiles engineered with what
they called ‘evasive capability,’ were the key to accident prevention. But the chief
priority of the American safety lobby was now quite different. They wanted Detroit
to build automobiles that were invulnerable: four-wheel padded cells in which
witless drivers could bash into each other without fear of injury.353
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Secondly, this new attitude towards safety shifted the blame onto the manufacturers for damage or
injury resulting from an accident. By making large, generally faceless corporations the target of
public scorn, politicians established themselves as heroes, defending the consumer against
corporate greed, which made legislating new regulations easy. At the same time, American
automakers made themselves look increasingly worse by fighting back against new safety
regulations rather than accepting them. The negative publicity and public opinion of many
Americans towards their own manufacturers opened the door just a little bit wider for foreign
manufacturers to exploit.
While automakers found increasing safety regulations onerous, they were even more
adamantly opposed to state and federal emissions regulations. Just as in the case of safety
regulations, American automakers made a bad situation worse by ignoring calls for improvement
or self-policing. Perhaps most significantly, American automakers had ignored, “the importance
of air pollution as a political issue in the Los Angeles basin, and from there to other parts of the
state of California.”354 As early as 1950 a thick yellowish-brown cloud regularly settled over the
city of Los Angeles, obscuring vision and irritating eyes and lungs. The American automotive
industry responded in 1955 with mediocre budgets for air pollution ‘research,’ taking until 1959
to find that, “a fifty-cent part used even before World War II on military vehicles was effective in
reducing automobile pollution by about 25 percent.”355 However, even when research exposed a
cheap and easy option to reduce pollution General Motors and other American manufacturers
resisted. In fact, they had no intention of ever fitting the device, a Positive Crankcase Ventilation
(PCV) valve to their vehicles, calling them impractical. After nearly a decade of dallying, the
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devices were first mandated in 1963 by California legislators; the resulting law required that the
positive crankcase ventilation system be installed on all domestic passenger vehicles sold in the
state.356 However, as it was a state law and therefore only applied to California, General Motors
and other American manufacturers did not install the devices on all cars, only the ones destined
for California dealerships. In fact, it would take the federal Clean Air Act of 1965 to get American
automakers to install the devices on all passenger automobiles. Even then, American automakers
were able to delay – the model-year by which the devices had to be installed on all new cars was
1968 – and it was later extended again to 1970. In the meantime, General Motors expended
significant effort lobbying Congress to repeal the Clean Air Act, claiming that it could not meet
the more stringent requirements which were scheduled to go into effect in 1975.357 These actions
reinforced the negative swing of public opinion against American manufacturers moving into the
1970s, and especially General Motors.
In the case of emissions legislation, American manufacturers followed an established
pattern of fighting new regulations, thereby inadvertently ensuring there would be more, stricter
ones to follow. The PCV valve was just the tip of the emissions iceberg; increasingly stringent
regulations were set to go into effect in the early 1970s to control nitrates of oxygen (NOx), a key
chemical component in the creation of visible smog. These new requirements mandated stricter
controls on engines, carburetor type and tuning, and forced manufacturers to include new devices,
like ‘smog pumps,’ which injected fresh air into the exhaust stream to promote more complete
combustion. These devices added cost, complexity, and had detrimental effects on engine
performance resulting in lower engine power and higher fuel consumption. Disastrously for the
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American automotive industry and American consumers, these changes came at the same time as
the first OPEC Oil embargo in 1973-74, and while American consumers were watching fuel
consumption more closely than ever, the American fleet average fuel economy fell by 15%.
Simultaneously, small imports seemed not to suffer as much from the new emissions
regulations, “Washington and Detroit were battling each other which the Japanese and Europeans
quietly moved ahead toward compliance.” 358 European manufacturers’ moves toward compliance
were also widely reported in enthusiast magazines, evidenced by this article from 1962 which
noted that Volkswagen had already had their system emissions control system approved by the
Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board (a precursor to the California Air Resources Board), and
“Although the smallest engine-sized vehicles have not yet been included in the compulsory aspect
of California law, many [European] manufacturers are considering installation of proper crankcase
devices on small cars after April, 1963.”359 While Detroit fought emissions and safety regulation,
European manufacturers plunged ahead, unwilling to risk being closed out of the lucrative
American market.
Praise from American journalists and enthusiasts obscures the fact that not all European
brands were as effective at meeting the new regulations, and British manufacturers suffered from
American regulations disproportionately. While British sports cars had introduced Americans to
the pleasures of European performance, they were increasingly hard-pressed to meet new
American safety and emissions legislation. In 1967 British technical representatives were,
“seeking clarification of some details of the code and point that certain dimensional requirements,
such as headlamp heights, are a departure from the European standard, and if enforced rigidly
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would mean major restyling and retooling of 1968 models…”360 British manufacturers, already
declining in their American market-share, simply did not have the resources necessary to create
substantially different cars for the American market. Most of the independent British marques of
the 1950s had, by the late 1960s, been consolidated into the British Motor Corporation, however
no effort had been made to also consolidate products. The result was that:
For years there has been far too much duplication of models under different marque
names. You have been able to buy an Austin, a Morris, a Wolseley, a Riley, or an
MG, all at different prices, and often from different dealerships, and give or take
minor styling changes, interior décor, and few horsepower up or down, you’ve
ended up with the same car. What’s more, some models of one make have been
cutting across other BMC products from another range, and consequently the two
have had to share a market which one model could have served far more
efficiently.361
Therefore, efforts to comply with the new American safety and emissions regulations would have
to be spread over a wide model range, a range which was also in competition with itself. This made
the costs of compliance astronomical, and ultimately unbearable. So, while British manufacturers
managed to meet safety benchmarks, they did so at the expense of new research and design,
essentially just prolonging their eventual demise. American automotive journalist Brock Yates was
even harsher in his critique, written in the early 1980s after British manufacturers had abandoned
the American market, “Sadly the once proud British automotive industry collapsed after its archaic
industrial system could do no better than produce obsolete, badly fabricated, ambulatory jokes.”362
It should also be noted that not all Americans were supportive of the new safety and
emissions legislation, and sports car enthusiasts in particular were targeted with anti-regulatory
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propaganda through the popular periodicals consumed by enthusiasts. Sports Car Graphic, at the
time a widely circulated monthly enthusiast magazine, began running a new section in 1967 called
the “Washington Report,” written by political correspondent Robert Herzberg. The report, which
appeared in multiple automotive-focused periodicals, was exactly what the unimaginative name
implied, a report on the ongoing debates over increasing federal automobile regulation, produced
by Herzberg, the first Washington D.C. based correspondent for Hot Rod Industry News. 363
However, it was strongly critical of all efforts to federally regulate safety, regularly going on antigovernment tirades.
In one early edition which dealt with federal regulations concerning driving under the
influence of alcohol, Herzberg ranted that, “This method [of Federal regulation]… is more
reminiscent of the fascist method of dealing with a problem… Drivers will lose rights guaranteed
by the Constitution.”364 The continual outrage presented here impacted consumers, as a letter to
the editor in September of 1967 indicates, “My congratulations to you and to Robert Herzberg for
the excellent and objective report on page 10 of the May issue. If this doesn’t hit ‘galloping
socialism” right square in the nose, then nothing will… I’ve told at least ten people, ‘Don’t argue
with me, friend, until you buy the May issue of SCGH and read the ‘Washington Report’…” 365
While efforts to combat driving under the influence targeted drivers, the anti-regulatory sentiment
overflowed onto regulatory actions targeting automobiles. This is indicated here in a letter to the
editor, also published in Sports Car Graphic, “In a seemingly necessary attempt to make cars safer,
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our Federal Government has shown its bureaucratic stupidity once again. With practically no
emphasis placed on brakes… Washington obviously doesn’t know where to start (or in this case,
stop). Fortunately, I still have the choice to buy cars with good brakes, but how well is that huge
iron hulk behind me going to stop?”366 The author of this letter seemingly implies that the purchase
of a European car, with its better brakes, can be interpreted as an act of defiance, both of federal
regulations, but also of American automakers. This letter illuminates the influence of federal
regulations in turning consumer perceptions against domestic automotive manufacturers, and also
making the act of consuming a foreign automobile one of protest.
Popular resistance to regulation also extended to emissions regulations, however the
language here was far less passionate as smog was visible and had a noticeably detrimental effect
on public health. In an opinion article published in April of 1968, journalist and automotive
enthusiast Bob Kovacik admitted that something must be done about the pollution problem, but
lamented that emissions regulation was hampering automotive performance. Kovacik argues, “if
you don’t think smog pumps hamper performance, just listen to one of these new small-engined
sports cars or sedans at idle. The engines starve for fuel on acceleration, it balks and can be a
hazard…” 367 Kovacik then ranted about the supposedly inept anti-smog laws emerging from
California, which were under consideration for application at the Federal level, however he failed
to offer any potential solutions. Yet despite his negative opinion regarding the cost and
performance detriment of existing pollution control tools he also paradoxically argued, “to hell
with the $50 smog pump or retarded spark device. To hell with the crankcase-ventilation unit.
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Let’s get something that works right, even if it costs $100 or $150!”368 Unlike the safety legislation
which some viewed as the encroachment of Federal regulation into the private sector, it was hard
to openly oppose emissions legislation in the name of sports car performance, which just looked
like selfishness on the part of enthusiasts. Even naysayers like Kovacik understood that emissions
regulations were here to stay and manufacturers would just have to find an effective way to meet
them.

5.2

‘Neue Klasse’: The BMW Sports Sedan

The failure of American manufacturers to respond appropriately to the dual challenge of
safety and emissions legislation contributed to a tangible shift in public opinion; many American
consumers now viewed their domestic automakers as bumbling and lazy at best and greedy, evil
corporations at worst. This provided the opening for one German manufacturer, Bayerische
Motoren Werke (BMW) to gain entry into the American market in a segment traditionally
dominated by American manufactures, the sedan. However, BMW combined the performance of
the European sports car into their sedans, giving them a unique product and introducing American
consumers to the idea that sports cars didn’t have to be small, uncomfortable, or of limited daily
utility to have real performance potential. Furthermore, BMW was able to provide all these features
while meeting American safety and emissions legislation, a feat that most American manufacturers
claimed was not possible. The introduction of the sports sedan in the American market began a
paradigm shift in American attitudes towards what a sports car could be, and established a niche
BMW would successfully fill well into the 1990s.
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BMW emerged from the Second World War a broken shell of its former self. Perhaps more
than any other western Automaker, BMW was crippled by the devastation of its factories and the
imposition of strict Allied controls because it had been a major producer of military aircraft engines.
BMW also suffered the total loss of its manufacturing plant at Eisenach, which was on the Soviet
side of a divided Germany. These factors meant that while other German manufacturers and
industries were starting to enjoy the Wirtschaftswunder, the “economic miracle” of the 1950s and
1960s, BMW was left lagging behind. In the immediate postwar years BMW factories produced
pots, pans, and baking utensils from its stocks of old engine cylinders, and then simple
motorcycles.369 In fact, the first postwar BMW automobile, the conservative 501 sedan, would not
be delivered to European customers until December 1952.370 After struggling through the 1950s
mainly on the profits from its motorcycles and barely surviving a few proposed buyouts, BMW
finally turned itself around in the 1960s with its ‘Neue Klasse,’ first displayed at the Frankfurt
Motor Show in 1961.
The ‘Neue Klasse’ BMWs began a revolution in the American automotive market,
although it would take nearly a decade to build momentum. The ‘new class’ BMWs – for the
American market the most significant of which was the 2002 model – were typified by their sportsluxury features which included, “small but smooth, high-revving engines, exceptionally precise
steering, and road hugging suspension that provided a hands-on albeit butt-bouncing, driving
experience. BMWs were the opposite of Detroit’s gaudy Buicks, Cadillacs, and Lincolns, which
wallowed through turns like a walrus on a skateboard.”371 The BMW cars were not sold on fancy
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or eye-catching styling, but rather on their actual performance and in this regard, they provided a
truly unique take on European sports-performance. British designs, which were universally twodoor, two-seat convertibles with under square four-cylinder engines, had established the paradigm
for ‘European’ sports cars, at least from the perspective of most Americans. The BMW on the
other hand was a boxy, utilitarian four-seat sedan body powered by an over-square four-cylinder
engine of low displacement. This meant that to extract power from the engine the driver had to
keep engine revolutions high, and when combined with the cars’ exceptional handling due to a
well-engineered independent rear suspension, provided an exhilarating driving experience. BMW
had injected sports car performance into the much more practical sedan body style creating a new
niche in the sedan market. This new niche was a part of a broader market segment traditionally
dominated by domestic manufacturers and therefore represented a much more significant market
penetration that then European sports car of the 1950s, a vehicle which had no direct American
analogue. Furthermore, BMW used increasing American safety and emissions regulations to its
advantage, creating a truly sporting car at the same time as American domestic manufacturers
struggled to meet regulatory goals, losing power and fuel economy in the process.
BMW’s success helped establish and substantiate the image of superior German
engineering, which was enough to justify the vehicle’s increasing cost during and after the ‘Nixon
Shock’ of 1971. When the dollar became a freely floating currency and plummeted in value,
effectively raising the price of imported goods, BMW importation steadily increased. In fact,
BMW’s exports to America, a mere trickle in the low double-digits per year at the beginning of
the decade, expanded dramatically in 1968 with the release of the 2002 for the American market,
and continued to grow, “between 1970 and 1986, BMW’s U.S. sales jumped tenfold, to nearly
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97,000 cars from just 9,800. Sales kept growing after that.”372 The 2002 opened the door to the
American market for BMW, a feat which had proved impossible for the earlier BMW 507 sports
car of the mid-1950s, and in so doing paved the way for the sports sedan as a specific sub-category
of vehicle. that European manufacturers could exploit.
BMW’s interest in the American market began long before 1961. As early as 1952 BMW
looked longingly across the Atlantic, wanting to cash in on the potential the American market
appeared to offer for volume automobile sales. The company sent four of its executives to the
United States in October 1952 to ascertain the possibilities for importing their motorcycles,
microcars, and new sedans. In their report, the executives noted the inadequacies of public transit
outside large cities, how far apart major cities were, the infrequency of trains compared to
Germany, how roads were cleared of snow yet sidewalks were not, how mailboxes were placed so
as to be accessible from a car, and, “all this makes the car indispensable and explains the many
cars. One car for every two or three people.” 373 Alfred Böning, the engineer responsible for
designing BMW motorcycles, called attention to how the automobile had become an indispensable
tool for modern American living, and sought to increase the impact of his report by closing with,
“to really understand it, you have to have experienced it.”374 Böning’s report revealed the potential
of the American market for BMW if only they could produce an appropriate car. However, what
an appropriate car for the American market would be was up for debate.
BMW learned early that their ticket into the American market would not be a traditional
sports car, as it had been for many other European brands. The sports car had appeared to be a safe
bet in the mid-1950s, Porsche and Mercedes-Benz were both importing larger numbers of their
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sports cars to the United States every year. The pressure of performance was even felt in the
European market. In 1954, BMW received a letter from one of its German dealers in Stuttgart
urging the company to produce cars which were “lighter and faster, rather than luxurious and slow,”
and, interestingly, suggested the use of a plastic body to meet this goal, citing the Chevrolet
Corvette as a potential model to follow.375 This was combined with pressure from their American
importer and distributor, Max Hoffman, to produce a small, two-seat convertible sports car,
indicated by his later claim that the BMW 507 was ‘his’ car.376 The product of this pressure was
the BMW 507, a small, two-door, two-seat convertible sports car powered by BMW’s new V8
engine. By all available metrics the 507 should have been an incredible success. Like the Corvette,
the 507 seemed to combine everything American enthusiasts were asking for in a European sports
car: handling, style, and power. Indeed, BMW appeared to be counting on a significant number of
507 sales to Americans, noting that, “It will be important that we prepare as soon and as well as
possible for the [507] demonstration car, spare parts in sufficient quantities, operating instructions
and catalogs in English, and spare parts lists in dollars.”377 However, the sales failed to materialize
when the final price of the car rose to around $9000 due to BMW’s failure to control production
costs and that resulted in Hoffman abruptly cancelling his initial order for two-thousand 507s,
which he had advertised to Americans as costing only $5000. Over the vehicle’s production run,
which lasted until March 1959, only 252 units were completed, and even at its exorbitant pricepoint BMW lost money on each 507 sold.
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The reasons for the failure of the 507 are contested and point to deeper changes in the
American automotive market. David Kiley hypothesizes that the failure of the 507 was due to the
release of the Corvette and the Thunderbird in 1953 and 1954 respectively, which were similar
and offered at a significantly lower price.378 While plausible, it was more complex than the price
being too high, and competition from Corvette and Thunderbird, both of which struggled in their
first years to gain wider acceptance among American consumers. Unfortunately for BMW, the 507
launched in 1956, a year in which American consumers had unprecedented choice in the sports car
segment, from the traditional MG, Jaguar, Porsche, etc. to the new American sports cars, the
Corvette and Thunderbird. Nor did the BMW offer anything unique to the marque, while a segment
of the enthusiast population derided the Corvette for being a poor copy of a European ideal, others
praised its innovation, especially in Chevrolet’s use of fiberglass body panels which saved weight
and thereby increased performance. Furthermore, the introduction of the 507 in 1956 came just
two years before the short, albeit sharp, recession of 1958 which temporarily resulted in lower
demand in the American automotive market. 379 Ultimately, the 507 was a sales flop, and its
lingering lesson for BMW appeared to be that in order to successfully enter the American market
it had to have a unique product, to differentiate its brand from the competition, offered at a
reasonable price.
In 1958, BMW revisited its prospects for the American market, and compiled a marketresearch report on the United States. The report is exclusively focused on the “small car,” which
showed significant promise given the Volkswagen Beetle as well as the recession of 1958, which
caused more US consumers to pay more attention to fuel economy and overall utility. However,
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BMW research showed that despite, “foreign small cars are gaining in popularity… [while] the
American automotive industry has stuck to its policy of offering U.S. consumers large, heavy and
expensive cars with lots of accessories. However, the fact that Detroit does not offer its customers
what they want is not shown by the growing sales success of European small and mid-size
cars…”380 While BMW wanted the lucrative sales volume that a successful small car seemed to
promise, they also noted the failure of other European brands that tried a similar approach.
Therefore, as David Kiley argues, “BMW’s future formula was clear: four doors, room for five
adults, a sporty engine, fine handling, neat styling, and high-speed autobahn capability.” 381
Through their marketing report it is clear BMW understood that successfully entering the
American market would take more than just a good small car, it had to find a niche, in this case by
combining sporty performance with the small to medium sized sedan. It is also important to note
that these early market reports are derived entirely from sales-volume statistics, which as economic
historian Timothy Whisler astutely points out in At the End of the Road, only present a part of the
story.382 From the statistics it would seem clear that American consumers only wanted large four
door cars. However, these statistics were largely influenced by the fact that these are the types of
vehicles that were mass produced domestically. While the report indicates that import sports cars
represented only 0.2% of the US new car market in 1958, it ignored the fact that they were sold to
an enthusiastic community of consumers who were committed to their vehicles and very vocal in
their promotion. This is evident in club magazines, like the SCCA’s Sports Car, which reached a
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much broader readership than just sports car owners. These qualities helped build brand awareness
and loyalty, which was critical for a manufacturer attempting to break into a new market, and one
of the lessons of the failed 507.
Another indication of BMW’s desperation to enter the American market was their decision
to award the rights of sole distributorship of BMW cars in the United States to Max Hoffman in in
the mid-1960s. Max Hoffman was, as early as the late 1950s, well known as a major distributor
for European automotive brands in the United States and therefore a seemingly logical choice; he
had helped establish Jaguar, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche, and even Volkswagen in the late 1940s and
1950s. However, his distributorships always ended in a United States courtroom with the
manufacturer settling by buying Hoffman out of his distributor contract, often at great and
continuing cost. Invariably this was due to clashes with Hoffman who often demanded last minute
changes to import orders, refused to accept any real inventory overhead, and often sought to control
consumer contact with the manufacturer, forcing buyers to go through him for parts, warranty
repairs, etc. Not only that, but BMW had experienced these qualities firsthand when Hoffman
pushed for the 507, ordered two thousand units, then when sales failed to materialize, quickly
cancelled all the orders and refused to accept the cars. Therefore, as early as 1957 BMW, was
looking for any possible alternative, as indicated in a terse letter between Ernst Hof, the Director
of Technical Sales Planning, and the Vorstand (Board of Directors), “Previous attempts to find an
import company that would equate to Hoffman automobiles in terms of organization, experience,
and capital, were without success.”383 Therefore, BMW tentatively sought out Hoffman’s input
regarding their proposed new line of vehicles, “He already recommended to develop and provide
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a two-seater sports body for this [new vehicle], as there would be a great demand for it in Europe
and the U.S.”384 In this regard Hoffman was simply repeating the same advice he had given all
European manufacturers, however, with their market research BMW knew that a sporty four-seat
car had greater potential.
The doubt regarding Hoffman persisted into the early 1960s, when BMW went so far as to
hire a private firm to research him and his reputation in the United States. The firm, Bishops Inc.,
through interviews with representatives of foreign automobile companies that had worked with
him and other confidential sources, produced a twelve-page character analysis that vilified
Hoffman. Section after section all contained reports in a similar vein:
Now, throughout this investigation, various phrases were used readily and quite
voluntarily by informants to describe the subject of this inquiry. Many cannot be
quoted verbatim in this report, due to the fact that these gentlemen expressed
themselves concerning Hoffman in language so vehement and forthright that – in
the interests of good taste – the aforementioned language cannot be quoted herein.
Then there were the informants – and many of these were in widely separated
sections of the automobile industry – whose wordage seemed to be a veritable echo:
“he’s (Hoffman) a hard guy to get along with”; “too difficult for anybody to get
along with”; “Hoffman’s got the worst reputation for service”. Mostly informants
used the word “arrogant”.385
The report clearly indicated that Hoffman was not a wise choice for a fledgling brand to partner
with in the long-term, however Hoffman’s record of successfully introducing foreign brands,
especially upper-tier brands like Porsche and Jaguar, into the United States could also not be
ignored. Therefore, even though, “Hoffman was described by one informant as being the ‘Adolf
Hitler of the automobile industry’,” he was still used as BMW’s vector into the American
384
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market.386 This indicates that while BMW was not as susceptible to Hoffman’s influence in the
design of the ‘Neue Klasse’, evidenced by the fact that they never offered a two-seat variant of the
2002 model, they were quite desperate to get the new cars in front of American consumers.
Americans first heard about the new BMW sports sedan in reports from the international
automotive shows which appeared annually in enthusiast periodicals. Bernard Cahier, writing for
Sports Car Graphic in January of 1962, noted that the first of the Neue Klasse line, the BMW 1500
was, “a very attractive, well balanced sedan with a tremendous amount of room inside. The trunk
is huge, the seats wide and comfortable and there is more leg, elbow, and head room than in any
other car of that class that I have ever tried.”387 Cahier also noted that the new BMW would be
offered for more sport-minded consumers with a larger and more powerful engine. In fact, the
larger engine was the only variant that made it across the Atlantic in any quantity, with 4,530 of
the 1600 models imported in 1967.388
The BMW 1600 was well received by the enthusiast press when it finally began to arrive
in quantity in 1967. Journalist Jean Calvin wrote in his driver’s report that the BMW was “a
definitive answer to: What IS a ‘sports sedan’, pointing out that, “On some of our favorite mountain
roads, the BMW took the tight turns and less-than-ideal surface with all the aplomb of a genuine
sports car.” 389 BMW succeeded in making their small sedan unique among its competition,
injecting the element of sports-performance which had captivated American consumers and driven
sales of other European brands. Prophetically, Calvin predicted that, “With this model, BMW
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should certainly increase its market penetration in this country... [the BMW 1600 is] a well-built
and nicely equipped ‘sports sedan’ at a very popular price.”390 As Tony Lewin argues in The BMW
Century, “Americans took to the baby BMW with particular relish. In an era when Detroit’s
products were still overweight, oversize, and dull to drive,” the tiny BMW offered a new vision of
sports performance with the utility required to be a family’s only car. 391 Despite the accolades,
there was continual pressure from Hoffman to provide the same sedan, but with more power to
further enhance its performance image.
The new model that BMW would create to satisfy the demand for more performance, the
BMW 2000 and 2002, offered proof that increasing regulations did not have to mean the death of
performance. This directly opposed the argument American manufacturers were using in their
increasingly despondent pleas for less severe regulation. In fact, BMW produced a variant of the
1600 which had more power and was already available in Europe, the 1600-TI. However,
American emissions regulations prevented the car from being legally imported, “The 1600-TI,
with its extra power achieved by traditional European means of higher compression and more
carburetors, would have been a nice addition to the American market… but it was a relatively
tough assignment to make the twin-carburetor engine conform to the American rules.”392 Rather
than invest the engineering time required to make the 1600-TI meet emissions standards, BMW
instead chose to use a 2-liter design based on the same engine block that could more easily meet
American regulatory requirements. Therefore, due to Hoffman’s pressure for more performance
and American emissions standards, the 2000 and the 2002 models were created by putting the
larger 2-liter engine in the same sedan body. Furthermore, by using larger displacement rather than
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increased compression or adding more complicated carburetion, BMW was following a wellestablished American pattern, which increased performance while also keeping the car
mechanically simple. Putting a larger engine in a ‘small’ car was combination that Americans
intrinsically understood, after all it was the basic design principle behind the muscle car, a symbol
of 1960s Americana.
The 2002 was a significant development for BMW and cemented not only BMWs place in
the American automotive market, but also that of the European sports sedan. In a widely read
review, an excerpt of which appears as the opening quote of this chapter, originally published in
Car and Driver, reviewer David E. Davis Jr. lavished exceptional praise on the 2002 noting the
performance and utility of BMW’s sedan in comparison to the faux performance image sold by
American manufacturers. In fact, Davis went so far as to call out American manufacturers by
noting how BMW’s product was almost ‘American’:
If it wasn’t already German, I’d be tempted to say it could be as American as Mom’s
apple pie or Rapp Brown’s carbine. Not American in the same sense as the
contemporary domestic car, with all its vast complexity and nouveau riche selfconsciousness, but American in the sense of Thomas Edison and a-penny-saved-isa-penny-earned and Henry Ford I (before his ego overloaded all the fuses and shortcircuited his mind and conscience)… It does everything it is supposed to do, and it
does it with ingenuity, style and verve.393
The 2002 reminded American consumers that domestic manufacturers were letting them down,
there were ways to make a performance car in an era of increasing safety and emissions regulation,
“Nobody believes it, until I suck their headlights out. But nobody doubts it, once that nearly-silent,
unobtrusive little car has disappeared down the road and around the next bend, still accelerating
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without a sign of the brake lights...”394 Indeed, Davis endlessly harped on the performance of the
BMW, even compared to the ‘true’ sports cars, the MGs, and Porsches, calling to attention the
BMW’s superiority. In a paragraph dripping with derision and sarcasm Davis states, “What you
like to look for are Triumphs and Porsches and such. Them you can slaughter, no matter how hard
they try. And they always try… the first couple of drubbings at the hands of the 2002 make them
think they're off on a bad trip… Ha! Grovel, Morgan. Slink home with your tail between your legs,
MG-B. Hide in the garage when you see a BMW coming.”395 The power of Davis’s article in
bolstering BMW’s brand image among American enthusiasts cannot be overstated. Not only was
Davis a highly regarded automotive reviewer and critic, but his article appeared in one of the two
most widely circulated enthusiast periodicals, Car and Driver, whose audience included
enthusiasts, hot-rodders, and casual readers, perhaps researching their next purchase. Furthermore,
the sports-performance image of the 2002 distinguished it from other foreign competitors in the
American market, like Mercedes-Benz, which produced touring cars in which performance was
displaced in favor of luxuriousness. All of this added to the creation of a new and exploitable
market niche.
While 2002 sales were strong, the first major test of BMW’s market penetration was the
Nixon shock of 1971. From 1968-1970, BMW had experienced consistently expanding sales of its
2002 model in America, the car provided a unique combination of performance and utility which
was appealing to American enthusiasts. However, those critical years were also supported by an
overvalued dollar, which kept the prices of BMWs in America relatively low; David E. Davis Jr.
called the 2002 “the best $2850 sedan in the whole… world.”396 However, after the convertibility
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of the dollar ended in August 1971 and its value settled BMWs were no longer so cheap. In fact,
the price of the 2002 was increased multiple times in an effort to keep the price reflective of the
value of the vehicle. BMW raised the price on September 1st, 1971, then only one month later
another increase of DM 200 was recommended.397 By late 1972-1973 the cost of a BMW 2002 in
the United States was between $5000 to $5800, a significant increase which moved the small
BMW out of the low-cost bracket and solidly into the upper tiers of the American automotive
market. Yet sales continued to increase, from 8045 units in 1970 to 9364 in 1972. There was a
slight dip in 1973 to 8962 units, likely due to the turmoil that came with the dying gasps of the
Bretton Woods agreements, however the following year 2002 sales reached a new benchmark,
13,961 units.398 In fact, BMW prospered through the Nixon Shock in America, having earned
enough brand cachet in the previous three years to support it as economic factors beyond BMW’s
control moved the brand into the upper tiers of the American market.
The devaluation of the dollar was quickly followed by another crisis, the 1973 Oil Embargo,
which exposed a serious weakness in BMW’s American strategy: Max Hoffman. Based on the
successes of the 2002 in 1968, Hoffman had sought a renegotiation of his distributorship contract,
namely an extension of his relationship as the sole importer for BMW cars in the United States
until 1985, by far the longest such distribution-rights extension in the automobile industry. This
concession was awarded on the basis that Hoffman built an “import center” in New York, which
would serve as a warehouse for spares, a place for new BMW cars to wait en-route to American
retailers, and locked BMW into a long-term business relationship with Hoffman which gave him
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little incentive to improve BMW’s market share in the U.S.399 The oil crisis meant that the fuelmiserly 2002 was in high demand, however BMW also marketed larger six-cylinder luxury cars,
and as he was the sole distributor of BMW cars, Hoffman’s contract required him to distribute and
help sell these vehicles as well. However, Hoffman was not interested in expending his own
resources – despite contractual obligations to so – aggressively marketing the unpopular sixcylinder cars in an environment temporarily hostile to a full-size luxury vehicle. Therefore, he
consistently sought to renege on his sales commitments.
Letters between J.C. Rakes, the Vice-President of Hoffman Motors Corporation (HMC),
reference the difficulty of selling the larger, less fuel-efficient six-cylinder cars, “we are in a very
precarious position as a result of our catastrophic 6-cylinder inventory, and we are hopeful that
you will assist us by cancelling our 6-cylinder October productions as previously indicated.”400
Yet Hoffman knew quite well that BMW could not simply cancel production, not without dire
consequences for its German labor force. The issue was further compounded by the fact that in its
production-quota negotiations HMC had agreed to take a ratio of six-cylinder cars to four-cylinder
2002s, an agreement which it later fought, arguing that, “the ratio of 6-cylinder to 4-cylinder
automobiles, as determined by you [BMW], is unreasonable, repressive, and inconsistent with
United States marketing trends as they are today.”401 This conflict quickly escalated and HMC
threatened legal action under American Anti-Trust legislation for the first time in October of 1973,
creating a serious problem for BMW in terms of getting their cars marketed to American
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consumers at a time when the entire automotive industry was facing a downturn due to the Oil
Crisis.
The legal standing for HMC’s claim was the establishment of BMW North America (BMW
NA) in 1971 as a wholly owned American subsidiary of BMW AG in Germany. The company had
reportedly established a direct American subsidiary to provide better service to American
customers and to work more closely with representatives of the U.S. government in order to remain
abreast of the rapidly changing American regulatory environment. However, Hoffman responded
exactly as the investigative report conducted in 1961 suggested he would, by becoming combative
and requiring that all BMW contact with the United States flow through HMC. Even BMW dealers
in America were not allowed to contact BMW or BMW NA with warranty, parts, club, or any
other questions, for any reason, without incurring a heavy monetary fine.402 As a sign of both his
increasing displeasure and pettiness Hoffman, who immigrated from Austria prior to the Second
World War and was therefore fluent in German, even begin writing all business correspondence
to BMW AG in English. Over the course of 1972-1973 relations between HMC and BMW
worsened to the point that by the summer of 1974 BMW revoked Hoffman’s distributorship,
causing HMC to sue under Anti-Trust legislation. Hoffman’s arguments, expressed in the District
Court case documents, claimed that the establishment of BMW NA was done, “to harass HMC, to
force HMC to surrender its distribution rights, and to take over from HMC the BMW distribution
in the United States,” and therefore the subsequent cancelling of the distributorship was an attempt
by BMW to monopolize the distribution of BMW cars in America.403 The two sides eventually
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settled their differences out of court, but despite onerous payments to Hoffman, he was removed
as a distributor and BMW NA took on the tasks of marketing and distributing BMW cars in
America.
The removal of Hoffman in 1975 marked a turning point, not just for BMW, but also for
the American automotive market; BMW was the last major volume-production European
automaker who would enter the American market on the back of an individual, third-party
distributor. From 1975 forward, all major European brands would import their vehicles and do
business in the United States through wholly-owned subsidiary companies. This promoted a deeper
engagement between European automakers and the American market, and was a step towards the
eventual establishment of manufacturing facilities in the United States like the Volkswagen Plant
in Pennsylvania in 1978, the first foreign automotive manufacturing plant in the United States. By
removing middlemen distributors, European automakers like BMW were able to more clearly
understand American market trends as well as more effectively market their products and establish
a cohesive brand image. Furthermore, this was the last time that Hoffman would play a role in the
establishment of a European automotive brand in America, while he remained a member of
BMW’s executive board Hoffman exercised no real control, and was otherwise out of the
automotive business. This is significant given the fact that Hoffman had been involved in the
establishment of nearly every European automotive brand in the United States; with very few
exceptions the first sports cars from MG, Austin-Healey, Jaguar, Porsche, among others, came to
American consumers through Hoffman’s New York distributorship. Lastly, the mid-seventies
marked the highpoint for European automakers in the American market, increasing competition
from Japan, a free-floating dollar, as well as stricter regulation made the American market
incredibly competitive at the same time as the cost of doing business in America was also rising.
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5.3

Time to Go Racing: BMW’s Brand Image

While the legal drama between HMC and BMW unfolded over the course of 1974, the
work of designing and selling BMW cars to American consumers passed to BMW’s wholly-owned
American subsidiary, BMW of North America (BMW NA). As the 1973 oil crisis abated, the focus
of BMW returned to performance, a critical aspect of the brand’s success. The Vice-President of
Marketing at BMW NA, John Plant, wrote in early 1974, “I feel it imperative that our four-cylinder
product maintain its “spitze” image for performance among small, sport sedans… GM has
developed some turbo-charged hardware which they are looking at from a performance/emissions
standpoint; perhaps with some modifications we can unleash our turbo here…”404 In this he is
referencing the BMW 2002 Turbo, a variant of the 2002 with considerably more power due to its
turbo-charged engine and new five-speed manual transmission which debuted at the Frankfurt
Auto Show in 1973. However, the 2002 Turbo never made it to American consumers, having been
withdrawn from production in response to the fuel crisis, and as a result the performance image of
BMW was beginning to falter. After all, by 1973 the 2002 model had been in production for six
years with no significant changes. Rather than reintroduce the Turbo, which would have had
difficulty in complying with emissions regulations set to go into effect in 1975, BMW decided to
directly engage in motorsports to promote is performance image, and drive the further
development of the market niche for the sports sedan. However, this also came at a time when
most major American automakers had formally disavowed themselves from direct involvement in
motorsport, citing safety, cost, and other concerns. Therefore, direct racing activities made BMW
look confident in its products and energetic at the corporate level, while ‘malaise’ was becoming
a common adjective in reference to the American automotive industry.
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Motorsport had played a significant role in the marketing of nearly all European sports cars
to American consumers. Although BMW had established a motorsport division, BMW Motorsport
GmbH, in 1972, its first serious project would be providing a competitive entry for American GT
racing in 1975. BMW, fully understood the importance of a performance image in order to
differentiate their products from the competition, as illustrated in an internal report, “In the USA,
where automotive racing has a significantly higher relevance than our [country], the sport, with its
image-building function, is ideally suited to quickly increase awareness of BMW.”405 It should be
noted that even though BMWs had been sold to Americans since the early 1950s – if one counted
the Isetta microcar, the 507, and motorcycles – in 1974 Americans were more likely to think that
BMW stood for “British Motor Works,” rather than the company’s actual name. 406 Therefore,
BMW targeted the International Motor Sports Association (IMSA), the governing body for
American Grand Touring race series, with its larger, six-cylinder cars to put the company, and its
sports-sedan, in front of more potential American consumers.
Going racing in the IMSA series was a carefully calculated move made at a time when
BMW had plenty of options in terms of which racing series to invest in. For instance, BMW could
have entered one of the several production classes organized under the auspices of the Sports Car
Club of America (SCCA). However, “advertising… under Hoffman had concentrated almost
exclusively on the enthusiast magazines,” and therefore the enthusiast market was not the audience
which BMW needed to reach.407 The Camel GT IMSA series would allow BMW to reach a broader
audience, the race series included some of the most famous American tracks, such as Sebring,
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Daytona, and Talladega, which were also in other popular American racing series like NASCAR.
Playing up this ‘American’ aspect of the GT Championship series, BMW also attempted to reach
out through their tire sponsor, Goodyear, in an attempt to sign Richard Petty, a famous NASCAR
driver, on the BMW team.408 Furthermore, the rules allowed for a relatively broad field of entries,
so the BMW CSL racing car’s, “Major competitors will be Porsches, Camaros, Corvettes and the
new Chevrolet Monza.”409 Lastly, BMW was the only manufacturer to enter the series as a factory
team. While other race teams certainly had factory support from the relevant manufacturer, none
of them were as directly involved as BMW. This demonstrated BMW’s confidence in their product,
at least to American consumers, and it came at a time when most major American automakers
were abandoning racing, at least publicly.
The logic that drove BMW’s foray into GT racing was that it would function as a brandenhancing exercise for the American market, a fact which was widely disseminated within the
organization. In a report on the concept behind the entry into motorsport the press department of
BMW noted the myriad of ways in which racing and product information could be disseminated
to American consumers, both through the dealers as well as the press, and specifically requested,
“a regular mailing of press clippings about all BMW, BMW NA, and [BMW] Motorsport related
publications.”410 This is indicative of how closely BMW was monitoring the outcome of their
racing venture in order to gauge its public relations and marketing value, particularly for an
American audience. After their victory in the second race of the series John Plant, the VicePresident of Marketing for BMW NA, sent a letter to all American BMW dealerships announcing
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the victory, and calling to attention the fact that, “This victory for BMW in the Sebring event is
part of a serious BMW Motorsport sponsored racing program for the 1975 Camel GT IMSA series.
This first win has demonstrated our product’s superiority in terms of performance and endurance
over competitive makes. So that you and your customers can be a part of the future successes of
BMW products in similar races, we plan to notify you in advance of the races in which BMW will
participate.”411 For BMW, racing was all about driving increased association of the brand with
motorsport, and linking this image of performance with the cars themselves.
While enthusiasts who already knew about BMW were not the primary market that the
company was attempting to reach with its racing program, it also did not ignore this important
group. BMW was in contact with American enthusiasts through an independent owners’ club, the
BMW Automobile Club of America, and used that as another avenue to exploit its racing
achievements. Club officials maintained close contact with BMW, and BMW provided press-kits,
which outlined racing activities and particularly noted successes, as well as racing technology that
influenced production models. A letter from the editor of the BMW Automobile Club of America
periodical to BMW’s motorsport divisions perfectly illustrates these activities:
We received the Motorsport 1975 Press Kit for which we are extremely grateful.
This kind of information enables me to provide our enthusiastic membership with
the ‘correct’ information. Our February newsletter had already gone to press but
you can see from the enclosed copy that we do give the Motorsport activities a full
play using whatever resources are at our disposal. Some of my article was gathered
through a conversation with Martin Braungart…412
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BMW owners did not need to be sold on the car that they had already purchased, however, BMWs
involvement in racing kept interest high, even among those already ‘bought-in.’ Furthermore,
Whitworth’s letter illustrates the sense of connection and excitement that racing activities fostered
among American BMW owners, noting that, “Your race (or races if the Riverside event comes off)
in California will be greeted with nothing less than wild enthusiasm.”413 From this it can be seen
that BMW’s racing activities worked to create a sense of community and brand loyalty, especially
among enthusiasts.
This newfound attention to racing in the American market was not lost on BMW’s fellow
European competitors. Indeed, Porsche enthusiasts as well were watching the action, noting in
Panorama, the monthly magazine published by the Porsche Club of America, “The BMW factory
has made an assault on the Camel GT series, the likes of which have never been seen in the short
history of the series.”414 While BMW would go on to win a few events in the IMSA GT series,
hardly upsetting the dominant Porsche cars, it motivated enthusiasts of both brands to watch the
series and support their marque. In a clearer targeting of American enthusiasts BMW expanded
their racing efforts, entering the Watkins Glen Grand Prix with two of the race-prepared CSLs.
Porsche responded by organizing and sending the top five Porsche Carreras and the ten best drivers
in the SCCA Grand Prix series to race at Watkins Glen. The competition being about more than
racing was not lost on Americans, even among non-enthusiasts, as demonstrated by an article in a
small-town New York newspaper, “Why all the attention on The Glen? Kelly theorizes that
Porsche doesn’t want to be beat by the BMWs in one of their prime market areas. BMW must have
the same thought, with an increasing share of the Munich carmaker’s products being exported to
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the U.S.”415 Clearly, the BMW strategy was working, the brand name was even getting in local
papers, and making BMW synonymous with motorsport among Americans who were not
automotive or motorsports enthusiasts.
When looking forward towards 1976, which would bring with it the discontinuation of the
2002 and the introduction of the new 3-series, BMW evaluated its motorsport program and found
it to be a great success. The enterprise had begun due to the need for BMW to establish a brand
image on the basis of performance, a task made more critical due to, “the situation resulting from
the takeover of sales in the USA [which] demanded increased support from BMW AG in the areas
of marketing, PR and press.” 416 This increased support, which came in the form of factory
supported IMSA GT Championship racing was well received by American audiences. In fact,
BMW noted, “the response to the BMW involvement in American motorsport is unexpectedly
diverse and positive,” especially the radio and TV exposure that came with it.417 To be sure, it
wasn’t free publicity, the motorsport program was quite expensive. However, the publicity gained
was far more than the cost of such had it just been bought through an advertising agency, and
certainly much more enthusiastic. It also stood in stark contrast to American manufacturers, who
abstained from racing as their cars lost more and more power to poorly implemented emissions
controls and left them looking enfeebled.
By the end of 1975 BMW had shown that performance could come with a responsible
environmental impact, that regulations did not mean the death of sporty cars. This then justified
the higher price of BMW cars as the Nixon shock caused the American dollar to plummet in value,
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thus raising the cost of an already expensive import. When emissions regulations made importing
a high-performance sports sedan too difficult, BMW turned to racing to create a brand image based
on motorsports performance, even if the cars that raced could not be legally driven on American
streets. This image supported the introduction of the 3-series in 1976, which as Paul Ingrassia
argues came at an opportune time, “The first baby-boomers were hitting thirty, and had money to
spend.”418 And spend it they did, the 3-series kept BMW sales numbers growing well into the
1980s, and demonstrated the stability of the sports sedan segment that BMW had created with the
2002 in 1968.
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EPILOGUE

In 1978, Volkswagen purchased a partly constructed automobile factory abandoned by
Chrysler due to financial problems in New Stanton, Pennsylvania, becoming the first foreign
automotive manufacturer to establish a production facility in the United States. The neat
association between products and national identity—between imports and domestically produced
automobiles—that had characterized the American car industry for almost a century was now
challenged by a foreign manufacturer operating an assembly facility in the United States. Were the
Volkswagen Rabbits produced there an American product? What defined the nationality of a
product? Was it where the majority of the components were manufactured, where it was assembled,
or where the brand was headquartered? As automotive journalist Brock Yates noted in 1983, “the
growing internationalization of the business… blurs the distinction between a ‘domestic’ and
‘imported’ automobile.”419 American consumers were forced to grapple with these questions at the
same time as a rising tide of automotive imports from Japan threatened to swamp domestic
automakers, which added a layer of nationalistic rhetoric about the ‘survival’ of American industry.
The visible erosion of American automakers, a symbol of postwar American industrial and
economic power, within their own market was a shocking indicator of American industrial malaise
and decline. In response to foreign pressure, American industries and politicians resorted to ‘Buy
American’ campaigns in an effort to stem the tide, however this only further demonstrated the
weakness of American automobiles compared to their foreign competition. The campaign also
highlighted the problems of determining the national origin of products and forced many
Americans to reckon with the realities of a global economy in which American industries were not
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dominant. This has led to a debate which continues to this day, illustrated by the conversations and
forum posts of contemporary American enthusiasts who spend countless hours arguing about the
national traits of manufacturers and consumers.
This epilogue provides a brief overview of the establishment and failure of the first foreign
automotive manufacturing plant in America. It illustrates why this project ended in the 1970s, as
the clean lines that traditionally delineated product nationality – which allowed American
enthusiasts to see their European sports cars as a product with national and regional traits based on
its place of design and manufacture – began to dissolve moving into the 1980s. The success of
Japanese automakers in this period is then briefly examined as it has come to dominate historical
narratives and generally obfuscates the earlier successes and influence of European manufacturers.
Japanese success, and their capture of a significant market-share in America, led to a ‘Buy
American’ pushback, which resulted in harsh anti-Japanese sentiment. It concludes with an
examination of how these debates have informed current perspectives on foreign influence in the
American automotive market. The global economy and supply chain is no longer shocking, yet
that does not mean it is universally accepted: just as historians have demonstrated that
‘Americanization’ within Europe was complicated by adaption, appropriation, and outright
resistance, so too is the contemporary global economy resisted and co-opted by individual
Americans.
The Volkswagen plant in New Stanton, Pennsylvania was only responsible for producing
one model, the Rabbit, which replaced the Beetle as Volkswagen’s entry-level economy car. Far
more important than high American demand, which was straining capacity of Volkswagen’s
Wolfsburg factory, was that after the collapse of Bretton Woods Volkswagen sought to be, “less
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susceptible to gyrations in the value of the [Deutsch]mark.”420 The ripples of the Nixon shock did
not end in 1973, but continued well into the 1980s as the now unconvertible dollar’s value was
equalized. As the dollar fell, and European currencies like the Deutschmark rose, Volkswagen was
forced to keep increasing the prices of their products in America. The increases were usually small,
but had begun to add up; in over the course of a year-long span in 1977-1978 Volkswagen had
been forced to increase prices across their product range by three percent five separate times.421
Karl-Otto Pöhl, a German Staatssekretär and Volkswagen Aufsichtsrat member pointed out that,
“We realize that Volkswagens made in Germany are just too expensive, after repeated dollar
devaluations, to meet the American and foreign competition in the United States.” 422 Therefore,
moving production to America was undertaken as a strategic move to keep the costs of production
aligned with the value of the dollar and hopefully stabilize prices in the American market.
Just as in the majority of cases of American companies establishing subsidiaries in Europe,
locals welcomed the venture with open arms. Rural Pennsylvanians hoped the factory would bring
an economic boom that would revitalize a region increasingly abandoned by the steel mills and
coal mines which had driven settlement and small-town economies. However, there were problems.
The site of Volkswagen’s plant in rural Pennsylvania meant that none of the nearly 5700 workers
hired locally had any experience in manufacturing, let alone high-tech automotive manufacturing.
Therefore, the state of Pennsylvania stepped in and lent the services of local community college
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faculty to help train new workers as well as a six-million-dollar investment from the Pennsylvania
State Employee’s Pension fund; this was all in addition to the other economic and infrastructure
‘sweeteners’ the state had offered, such as a low interest loan of forty-million dollars.423 While this
helped shore up the need for workers, investments from the state government could not, however,
compel Americans to buy Volkswagen products over the Japanese competition.
This new era of globalization heralded by the surprising tide of incredibly successful
Japanese automotive imports flowing into America not only hurt American manufacturers, but
European automakers as well. Far from regaining their former title of number-one import brand in
the American market, Volkswagen continued to slip downwards as Japanese automotive brands
continued to dominate the American market moving into the 1980s. The reasons for this are
multifaceted, but many blamed Volkswagen’s refusal to innovate to counter increasing Japanese
competition in the economy segment. The president of an automotive research and consulting
company, Thomas O’Grady, argued in an interview that Volkswagen had, “designed cars for
Germany and then tried to sell them here. Meanwhile the Japanese grabbed their market away from
them.”424 Others, like Steve Smith, an automotive columnist, claimed that by assembling their
vehicle in America, Volkswagen had lost “The old German image… Since they’ve touted
themselves as being built here, you’ve got to wonder if people think they have the same shabby
craftsmanship they associate with Detroit.”425 This is illustrative of the complex global issues that
an increasing number of American consumers were puzzling through when they considered
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purchasing a new vehicle; where was it made and how will that effect the attributes of the final
product? As journalist Brock Yates argues, “image remains a critical factor in the car selling
business,” and the nature of that image for a foreign brand manufacturing in America was difficult
to coherently articulate.426 On one hand, Volkswagen wanted to tell consumers that the Americanproduced Rabbit was just as German as the one that rolled off the line in Wolfsburg. However, as
increasing anti-import sentiment brewed due to the competition from Japanese brands,
Volkswagen also wanted to emphasize that the Rabbit was really an American car, produced by
American workers and thus just as vital to the national economy as General Motors, Ford, or
Chrysler. Decreasing American sales meant a correspondingly decreasing need for production and
the factory went from working two full shifts to just one. In 1987 Volkswagen announced that the
plant would be closing in 1989 just after its ten-year anniversary, an ignominious end for the first
foreign manufacturing plant in the United States.427
While the Volkswagen experiment in American production ended in 1989, it did not signal
the end of foreign automobile production in the United States; in fact, it was a harbinger of things
to come. Although the trend was started by a European brand, it would be Japanese automakers,
driven by their capture of core segments of the American automotive market, which would
establish a lasting manufacturing presence in America. The herald of serious Japanese competition
arrived in 1973, just in time for the Oil Crisis, in the form of the 1973 Honda Civic. The Civic was
a small vehicle strictly focused on fuel economy and utility in the vein of the original Beetle, one
of the few European automobiles to enjoy volume-sales in America. The economical Civic was
the perfect automotive product for the time in which many Americans faced fuel shortages and

426

Ibid.
"VW Closing Hits Struggling Town Hard Though Many had seen Signs Coming, Bad News Came as Shock." Los
Angeles
Times,
21st
November
1987.
Accessed
3/4/2018
from
https://search-proquestcom.ezproxy.lib.purdue.edu/docview/292686626?accountid=13360.
427

231

gasoline rationing, but more importantly the Civic was tangible proof of the maturation of the
Japanese automotive industry. This is indicated by the accolades it won in several American
periodicals, including Car and Driver’s Best Economy Sedan for 1974, an incredible achievement
for a manufacturer that had only managed to produce extremely small and cheap-feeling cars and
motorcycles in years prior.428 Their image was further bolstered when, in response to the tightening
of U.S. emissions regulations in 1975, Honda responded that its products would have no trouble
achieving the new targets without the need for an expensive catalytic converter which was driving
up the cost of comparable domestic and European vehicles. For the first time since their
introduction in the American market Japanese cars were associated with technical and material
quality, not just their cheap price. However, Honda was not alone, Toyota was another Japanese
automaker gaining significant market share in America with their economy vehicle range. In 1975
there was another shock; Japanese carmaker Toyota replaced Volkswagen as the leading foreign
automotive import to the United States, with sales of over 300,000 units.429 Thus, by the end of
the 1970s the majority of American attention was focused on the dominance of Japanese
automakers rather than the fact that the initial inroads to foreign manufacturing in America was
made by a European brand.
It was therefore unsurprising when Honda began automobile production in Marysville,
Ohio in 1982. The manufacturing of a Japanese car in America raised the same questions of
product nationality that played at least a partial role in the decline of Volkswagen. Andrew
McKevitt illustrates the complex relationship of American consumers with Honda cars in the
1980s, noting that ‘Made in America’ stickers on the bumpers of Honda cars indicated, “the

428

Wanda James, Driving from Japan: Japanese Cars in America (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2005),
114.
429
Ibid, 61.

232
American hands assembling the cars defined the products’ national identity more than the Japanese
name on the rear end.”430 Indeed, even automotive journalist Brock Yates pointed out in his 1983
book, The Decline and Fall of the American Automotive Industry, “American loyalists can buy the
four-door [Honda Accord] in good conscience because it is being manufactured – with the same
exceptional standards of quality – in Honda’s new Marysville, Ohio plant.”431 Their dominance in
the economy car and sedan sectors, bolstered by the fact that their vehicles didn’t face as much of
the nationalistic vitriol endured by other imports, meant that their facility was consistently
expanding over the course of the 1980s and production continues to this day.
In response to Japanese dominance in the automotive market, American manufacturers
responded with marketing that pressured consumers to ‘Buy American.’ This is perhaps best
illustrated by television advertisements for Chrysler cars featuring Lee Iacocca, the man who had
been installed as CEO in a last-ditch attempt to keep the company from going out of business,
walking through an automotive factory touting the benefits of American cars. In a one minute and
thirty second video segment which opens with Iacocca saying, “A lot of people think that America
can’t cut the mustard anymore… when you’ve been kicked in the head like we have, you learn to
put product first,” he argues that American industries are capable of producing quality
automobiles.432 However, these advertisements obfuscated the fact that most American cars were
no longer entirely American, as Yates argues, “Perhaps the ultimate absurdity is a ‘Buy American’
sticker on a Plymouth Horizon or Dodge Omni, cars which are powered by German-made engines
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and French-designed transmissions.”433 Yet despite the fact that many so-called ‘American’ cars
were perhaps not as domestic as they first appeared, the message was internalized by uncritical
American consumers and equated with patriotism.
While marketing campaigns could only exhort American consumers to purchase
domestically manufactured vehicles to display patriotism, in the public-sector legislation could
force the issue. In 1984 Pennsylvania state law required that, “cars purchased by public agencies
must be assembled in the United States. Three-fourths of the parts must be manufactured
domestically.”434 However, while seeming in support of the traditional domestic manufacturers,
this law was more than likely intended to help Volkswagen, which was still manufacturing cars at
their Pennsylvania plant. The law was further complicated by the fact that many American firms
were increasingly turning to imported sub-assemblies or major components for their cars, and had
been for decades. Even if imported only from Canadian facilities, many General Motors, Ford and
Chrysler products weren’t considered ‘American made’ by the state law. ‘Buy American’
campaigns extended into the private sector as the cause was taken up by well-meaning American
business leaders. In 1983 Curtis Rodgers, the president of an eyeglass manufacturing firm, offered
his employees $300 if they would buy an American-built car within six months.435 In the end,
however, these campaigns did little to stem the tide of Japanese automotive imports as increasing
numbers of American consumers chose to buy imported cars over their domestic competition.
While the clean lines that had separated domestic and import categories had faded, the
reality that by 1980 Japanese manufacturers had captured just over 30% of the American market
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ignited fears of American decline. Those fears, whipped up by ‘Buy American’ campaigns, were
especially prevalent among automotive workers, and resulted in anti-Japanese sentiment and
nationalistic rhetoric. This had a tragic result when on June 19th, 1982, Vincent Chen, a ChineseAmerican, was murdered by a recently laid-off Chrysler foreman and his step-son who had
mistaken him for a Japanese person.436 This deadly incident was an outlier, although anti-Asian
sentiment continued to percolate. On the West Coast, far from the industrial centers of the Midwest,
frustrated Americans targeted Asian immigrants for their role in ending the dominance of
American automotive manufacturers. In this case however, they were targeted as consumers:
It is essential for all new neighbors to demonstrate patriotism and love for America.
And one sure way is investing their earnings into U.S. made products. But many
Asians & others have been accustomed to purchasing an assortment of trendy
Japanese cars. And so obvious are those who show off their arrogant economic &
social status with expensive, prestigious European[sic] type foreign vehicles… The
current massive foreign car-buying behavior of new immigrants not only insults the
American workers, it also increases U.S.-foreign trade deficit. However, the free
choice of buying fine American produces[sic] would clearly demonstrate how a
new neighbor could show their grateful appreciation to the American workers and
for being here in the U.S.A.437
The anger, frustration, and resentment of whoever wrote this flier, which was delivered to the
offices of Asian Week, a San Francisco based newspaper with an obviously targeted demographic,
drips through the poorly constructed text. Despite the fact that no vehicle in the 1980s was really
the product of a single nation, it is clear that within some circles American public opinion still
demanded a quasi-nationalist fealty to the traditionally domestic manufacturers. Anything else
simply wouldn’t be neighborly.
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While some of the vitriol has subsided, in the 2000s, long after the Japanese threat of total
automotive dominance had proved unfounded, American automotive enthusiasts are still grappling
with the questions raised by the globalizing influence of the automotive industry. As fuel economy
standards continue to rise, increasing effort is being made by American manufacturers like Ford
to bring European technology and design to Americans, however the consumer reaction is not
always positive. An example is the direct-injected, 3-cylinder turbo-charged engine, developed by
Ford’s UK subsidiary for the European market.438 The engine is specifically designed to achieve
impressive fuel economy, without the typical resultant loss of power that comes with less
displacement. Given that the engine was announced to Americans as the price of gasoline reached
record highs in 2013, Ford’s timing could not have been better, and this was reflected in positive
press reveals which touted the new engine’s benefits. Yet when one reads the comment sections
of these articles one finds that many consumers reacted negatively, as illustrated by the following
comment posted to one of these press reveals:
I’m really tired of car companies trying to push their “advanced” European junk on
Americans. I don’t care how many awards this mill has won in Madrid, or how
many chain-smoking, hirsute French fashion models wearing bad Betty Page wigs
gush over its innards at some Paris auto show. This engine is a dog. I’m sick of car
companies trying to European-ize[sic] the American driver. This turbo-3 works
well in Europe for one reason: Europeans don’t drive. Gasoline over there is more
expensive than a good wine, so they stay home and drink. Americans love long
trips, they love short trips. We like to gun our engines when cold, we like to idle
them when hot too. We pack our cars with stuff and people and we love our a/c.439
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While the commenter calls the engine a dog, meaning it has lackluster performance, it is clear that
there is more going on here than someone indicating that the new engine is underpowered. While
presented less overtly than the ‘good neighbor’ flier, the same sort of nationalistic resentment is
displayed. In other words, the comment isn’t about engine power, it is about the place of American
industries and American consumer preference within a globalized economy and reflected in that
sentiment is a nostalgic wish to return to a period in which foreign influence could be shut out.
Yet this imagined period never existed; Americans were never immune to influence from
beyond their borders even at the height of its geopolitical power as this dissertation has
demonstrated. From the British sports cars that introduced GI’s to a new type of vehicle and
European enthusiast culture to the BMW Neue Klasse which redefined sports-performance in the
late 1960s, America has never been free of European influence. Indeed, American manufacturers
adapted and appropriated the European sports car resulting in the Chevrolet Corvette, which is
viewed today as a symbol of 1950s Americana. However, the Corvette was not alone, competition
with European manufacturers inspired the Ford Thunderbird as well as the importation of GM’s
captive European brand, Opel, in an attempt to capture the niche market for performance vehicles
which European manufacturers revealed. Furthermore, this project has used the European sports
car as lens to examine the globalization of the American automotive industry and particularly the
enthusiast community, demonstrating that the consumption of a particularly European product
served as a conduit to transmit forms of European culture to American consumers. American
enthusiasts engaged in the adaption of a European automotive culture and forged transnational
connections through their passion for European performance vehicles and motorsport. The love of
American consumers for European sports cars even compelled some to travel through Europe,
experiencing the culture first-hand, and forming transnational connections with European
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enthusiasts. In this way American sports car enthusiasts reflected a microcosm of cultural and
economic globalization occurring within America, not just beyond its borders. Indeed, American
automotive enthusiasts had perhaps the most cosmopolitan outlook on the increasing globalization
of America, a position that is perhaps best articulated by sports car enthusiast Jasbir Singh Dillon
in a 2018 video interview for Petrolicious, “The thing that you always take away is the people that
you meet as a result, and the relationships that you make, really… lifelong friendships. It
transcends all boundaries, races, borders, countries, the passion is truly global.” 440 As my
dissertation has demonstrated, the passion is global and the consumption of European sports cars
by American enthusiasts has significantly contributed to a process of cultural and economic
globalization that begin as Europe recovered from the Second World War.
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